As fallout of America’s withdrawal from Iraq begins to take shape, it looks as if it will be some time before the "new Iraq" can truly stand on its own.
One scathing example of Iraq's political immaturity was brought to light last week by an Amnesty International report on the state of the country's prison system.
The disappointing and confusing reactions to the report from Iraq's government, security apparatus and civil society have made it clear that human rights in Iraq is still an abstract concept. This needs to change.
The Amnesty report "New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq" claimed that an estimated 30,000 detainees are being held without trial in Iraqi prisons. It also found that "Some detainees have been held in secret detention facilities and tortured."
Many prisoners face violence, psychological abuse as well as other forms of gross mistreatment, according to the study which was compiled from interviews with detainees, prison directors, refugees and activists.
The scope of prisoner abuse listed in the report underscores the need for a better understanding of human rights by correctional institutions and personnel, as well Iraqi politicians and the public. But that's not all.
The findings serve as a direct contradiction to the repeated statements of government officials who have stressed a commitment to uphold the human rights of Iraqi citizens. In fact, Iraqi officials were quick to dismiss either the sources or numbers mentioned in the report.
Although the judiciary, ministry of justice, security officials, politicians and rights groups all reacted with different shades of denial, one point became clear: no official mechanism exists in Iraq to monitor and report human rights violations.
As it stands, there is no state-run watchdog that assures the accurate flow of information on rights abuses to the public, the government and international community.
An organization such as this would institutionalise the concept of human rights into the security culture, and could be a move towards adopting international humanitarian standards.
A key issue in the debate over the report was the number of detainees. This should never have happened. The Iraqi government should have a record of everyone in custody and make this list available to the likes of Amnesty and Human Rights Watch. After all, transparency is a key guarantor of good practice, good governance and accountability.
Ambiguity, stark denials and lack of access can have damaging effects, especially with reputable international organizations. Iraqis should not forget that it was these same organisations that helped expose the former regime and his crimes against the people of Iraq.
The United States can play an effective role in preventing Iraq from reverting to its awful past. Although many in Iraq argue that the human rights situation was worse when the US forces were in Iraq, at least they were seen as monitors and enforcers of due process and procedure.
US military spokesman in Baghdad, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Owen, said after the release of the Amnesty report that the Iraqi detention facilities were "inspected frequently and abide by the rule of law and international standards for detainee care and management."
US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley’s remarks on the report were welcomed by many Iraqis who fear that the human rights situation could deteriorate further. Crowley said that respect for human rights is an important issue in relations between Washington and Baghdad. "Human rights are a critical component" of US work "to build up institutions of the Iraqi government," he added.
One of the things that we in the new Iraq take pride in is that we are striving to uphold the values of the free world. America can help us reach this goal. Washington can help the Iraqi government - and at times put pressure on it - to uphold the values that both American and Iraqi blood was shed for.
But this cannot be done by simply dismissing and denying unpleasant reports. This is achieved through engaging seriously with rights organizations, responding positively to their recommendations, and demonstrating solid steps to prevent further abuse.
The US should encourage the Iraqi government to study the Amnesty prison report carefully. The allegations of this study, and previous reports, must to be taken very seriously to make sure that the next report is not as damning as this one.
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
US-Kurdish relations, short term venture or a long term partnership
The visit of US vice-president Joe Biden to Arbil was an important recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan and president Barzani and the role the region plays in Iraq’s political process.
It was also seen as a reassurance that US relations with Kurdistan region are intact. But what type of relations exist today?
Depending on the size and gravity of the problem, the level of contact between the two have ranged between the Americans inviting Kurdish leaders to the White House to a phone call or meeting in Baghdad when the American president is in town.
Other means of contact are usually left up to the vice-president or the secretaries of state or defense, who call Kurdish leaders and occasionally visit Kurdistan.
Thus far, Kurdish-US relations have fluctuated based on the issue at hand – with the problem usually involving Baghdad, Kirkuk or Turkey.
The typical scenario is that the Kurds are adamant about a certain issue, and the US steps in with either a visit, invitation or a phone call. The Kurdish stance softens soon afterwards.
A key issue that the Kurds are debating now is whether they are getting their money’s worth out of this relationship.
Some Kurds say that the US needs Iraqi Kurdistan more than Iraqi Kurdistan needs the US today, as Iraqi Kurdistan is the only success story of the US liberation of Iraq.
This may not be a very popular statement amongst the Kurds in general. Many still want to believe that the US is Iraqi Kurdistan’s key partner and ally.
But this could change. Relations are usually based on give and take. The Kurds maintain that despite positively responding to all of America’s requests, the US is not as responsive when the Kurds ask for help on any their issues.
The issues of article 140, revenue-sharing, relations with Turkey and the constant shelling of borders are all issues that the Kurds believe that the US could play a more effective role in solving.
Thus far, on the surface at least, America’s high-profile political engagement with Kurdistan came during crises, when they wanted the Kurds to soften their position.
While it is clear that the Kurdish relationship with the US is a valuable, strategic option that the Kurds cannot abandon, they can certainly manage it better. Relations with the United States are deeply rooted and long-term – they are not just with the administration that happens to be in power.
America’s pride in Iraqi Kurdistan’s achievements is mostly limited to security and stability. They are still hesitant to speak out when it comes to democracy, good governance, transparency, anti corruption, freedom of speech and human rights.
While steps have been taken on a democratic path, Iraqi Kurdistan still has some way to go.
It is not difficult to become an ally of the United States, but it may be more of a challenge to become a true ally and partner.
Measures to combat corruption, promote transparency and good governance, and uphold human rights and freedom of speech are all steps that Iraqi Kurdistan’s leadership can take.
This would create a much more solid foundation for Kurdish-US relations. It would also open the scope for more partners. Let’s not forget that some Kurds argue that compared to its neighbors, Iraqi Kurdistan is much better off in terms of democratic progress.
But this comparison doesn’t stand because no country in the region constitutes a good example of democracy, human rights and good governance. The Kurdistan region should look at the European democracies as a model.
Kurdish-US relations are at a crossroads. They can either resemble US relations with its pseudo allies in the region like Egypt or Saudi Arabia, or they can be modeled after America’s relations with democracies in Europe.
It is now up to the Kurds and the US to decide which way it will go.
It was also seen as a reassurance that US relations with Kurdistan region are intact. But what type of relations exist today?
Depending on the size and gravity of the problem, the level of contact between the two have ranged between the Americans inviting Kurdish leaders to the White House to a phone call or meeting in Baghdad when the American president is in town.
Other means of contact are usually left up to the vice-president or the secretaries of state or defense, who call Kurdish leaders and occasionally visit Kurdistan.
Thus far, Kurdish-US relations have fluctuated based on the issue at hand – with the problem usually involving Baghdad, Kirkuk or Turkey.
The typical scenario is that the Kurds are adamant about a certain issue, and the US steps in with either a visit, invitation or a phone call. The Kurdish stance softens soon afterwards.
A key issue that the Kurds are debating now is whether they are getting their money’s worth out of this relationship.
Some Kurds say that the US needs Iraqi Kurdistan more than Iraqi Kurdistan needs the US today, as Iraqi Kurdistan is the only success story of the US liberation of Iraq.
This may not be a very popular statement amongst the Kurds in general. Many still want to believe that the US is Iraqi Kurdistan’s key partner and ally.
But this could change. Relations are usually based on give and take. The Kurds maintain that despite positively responding to all of America’s requests, the US is not as responsive when the Kurds ask for help on any their issues.
The issues of article 140, revenue-sharing, relations with Turkey and the constant shelling of borders are all issues that the Kurds believe that the US could play a more effective role in solving.
Thus far, on the surface at least, America’s high-profile political engagement with Kurdistan came during crises, when they wanted the Kurds to soften their position.
While it is clear that the Kurdish relationship with the US is a valuable, strategic option that the Kurds cannot abandon, they can certainly manage it better. Relations with the United States are deeply rooted and long-term – they are not just with the administration that happens to be in power.
America’s pride in Iraqi Kurdistan’s achievements is mostly limited to security and stability. They are still hesitant to speak out when it comes to democracy, good governance, transparency, anti corruption, freedom of speech and human rights.
While steps have been taken on a democratic path, Iraqi Kurdistan still has some way to go.
It is not difficult to become an ally of the United States, but it may be more of a challenge to become a true ally and partner.
Measures to combat corruption, promote transparency and good governance, and uphold human rights and freedom of speech are all steps that Iraqi Kurdistan’s leadership can take.
This would create a much more solid foundation for Kurdish-US relations. It would also open the scope for more partners. Let’s not forget that some Kurds argue that compared to its neighbors, Iraqi Kurdistan is much better off in terms of democratic progress.
But this comparison doesn’t stand because no country in the region constitutes a good example of democracy, human rights and good governance. The Kurdistan region should look at the European democracies as a model.
Kurdish-US relations are at a crossroads. They can either resemble US relations with its pseudo allies in the region like Egypt or Saudi Arabia, or they can be modeled after America’s relations with democracies in Europe.
It is now up to the Kurds and the US to decide which way it will go.
Thursday, September 2, 2010
Which one comes first, democracy or federalism?
As things stand today, all indications suggest that the revived Iraqi National Alliance, INA, will form the government under the leadership of current prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and will be joined by the Kurds.
Iraqiya has declared that if this scenario occurs, they will denounce the process as illegal. Some Iraqiya leaders even suggested that they would boycott the political process.
A boycott would send the political process in Baghdad back to square one, throwing Iraq back into the political turmoil it faced 2005.
At that time, the Shias and Kurds were leading Iraq while the Sunnis remained on the sidelines. This led to a three-year-long wave of violence, terrorism and extremism that swept Baghdad and stretched into other provinces. It was a truly sectarian civil war, the traces of which continue to haunt and threaten us today.
To be sure, the same turmoil would emerge if Iraqiya formed the government on its own with Ayad Allawi as the prime minister, alienating the Shia-dominated lists. And let’s not forget the Kurds -- they would join his government as well.
A closer look at the two options makes it clear that there is a serious mistrust not between Allawi and Maliki -- or even between the Iraqiya and the INA ¬– but rather between the Shia and Sunni Arabs of Iraq.
In addition to the discrimination, injustice and atrocities committed against Iraq’s Shia before the fall of Saddam, the lack of clarity and progress in national reconciliation by today’s rulers have also contributed to deepening the mistrust between the two communities.
No concrete steps have been taken to achieve a true national reconciliation. On the contrary, in the weeks before the last election, the de-Ba’thification committee headed by a leading Iraqi National Congress member, Ali Allami – who is accused of strong ties with Iran -- disqualified a number of candidates for their past involvement with the Ba’th Party. Most were from Iraqiya.
If there was a true will to move forward and a confidence in a democratic system based on equality, these candidates – who after all were entering the democratic process through elections -- should have been commended and brought into the fold of the new Iraq rather than being driven back to the Baath Party.
Although the Shia and Sunni communities lived peacefully as neighbours in many regions of Iraq, each appears to mistrust the political leadership and military force of the other. Hence, both sides fear or reject being ruled by the other.
But the dilemma for today’s Iraq is that a government based in Baghdad would have to rule the entire country -- and it will need to be either INA or Iraqiya.
In any mature democracy, it is usually the case that one bloc is in the government and the other is in the opposition. Iraq’s democracy does not seem to be ready for such a setup yet.
Each bloc fears being in the opposition, as being in power seems to be the only guarantor for protection.
One interesting point to note here is that the Kurds are not afraid of either bloc being in power. The reason is that they rule their region alone and are trying to work out a federal relationship with Baghdad.
If the Sunnis and the Shia of Iraq had their own federal regions, our democracy would have been solid and the bickering over forming the government would not have lasted this long.
The last six months demonstrated that for democracy to be entrenched in Iraq it needs to have a truly federal structure whereby each of Iraq’s communities live in a region or regions that enjoy a federal relationship with Baghdad.
Once this is in place, policies and issues would replace personalities. Each community would worry more about their federal status in Iraq as opposed to who is ruling in Baghdad.
The leadership in Baghdad would worry more about regulating the relationship with (and between) the regions, including managing the delegation of power regionally, as opposed to focusing on consolidating all of the power in one city, in one office and with one man.
The days of one man holding all of the power have long gone. This is confirmed by the constitution, and is something the politicians must come to realize. The irony here is that the same people who are calling for a strong, centralised state are going to be harmed most by this centralisation.
Iraqiya has declared that if this scenario occurs, they will denounce the process as illegal. Some Iraqiya leaders even suggested that they would boycott the political process.
A boycott would send the political process in Baghdad back to square one, throwing Iraq back into the political turmoil it faced 2005.
At that time, the Shias and Kurds were leading Iraq while the Sunnis remained on the sidelines. This led to a three-year-long wave of violence, terrorism and extremism that swept Baghdad and stretched into other provinces. It was a truly sectarian civil war, the traces of which continue to haunt and threaten us today.
To be sure, the same turmoil would emerge if Iraqiya formed the government on its own with Ayad Allawi as the prime minister, alienating the Shia-dominated lists. And let’s not forget the Kurds -- they would join his government as well.
A closer look at the two options makes it clear that there is a serious mistrust not between Allawi and Maliki -- or even between the Iraqiya and the INA ¬– but rather between the Shia and Sunni Arabs of Iraq.
In addition to the discrimination, injustice and atrocities committed against Iraq’s Shia before the fall of Saddam, the lack of clarity and progress in national reconciliation by today’s rulers have also contributed to deepening the mistrust between the two communities.
No concrete steps have been taken to achieve a true national reconciliation. On the contrary, in the weeks before the last election, the de-Ba’thification committee headed by a leading Iraqi National Congress member, Ali Allami – who is accused of strong ties with Iran -- disqualified a number of candidates for their past involvement with the Ba’th Party. Most were from Iraqiya.
If there was a true will to move forward and a confidence in a democratic system based on equality, these candidates – who after all were entering the democratic process through elections -- should have been commended and brought into the fold of the new Iraq rather than being driven back to the Baath Party.
Although the Shia and Sunni communities lived peacefully as neighbours in many regions of Iraq, each appears to mistrust the political leadership and military force of the other. Hence, both sides fear or reject being ruled by the other.
But the dilemma for today’s Iraq is that a government based in Baghdad would have to rule the entire country -- and it will need to be either INA or Iraqiya.
In any mature democracy, it is usually the case that one bloc is in the government and the other is in the opposition. Iraq’s democracy does not seem to be ready for such a setup yet.
Each bloc fears being in the opposition, as being in power seems to be the only guarantor for protection.
One interesting point to note here is that the Kurds are not afraid of either bloc being in power. The reason is that they rule their region alone and are trying to work out a federal relationship with Baghdad.
If the Sunnis and the Shia of Iraq had their own federal regions, our democracy would have been solid and the bickering over forming the government would not have lasted this long.
The last six months demonstrated that for democracy to be entrenched in Iraq it needs to have a truly federal structure whereby each of Iraq’s communities live in a region or regions that enjoy a federal relationship with Baghdad.
Once this is in place, policies and issues would replace personalities. Each community would worry more about their federal status in Iraq as opposed to who is ruling in Baghdad.
The leadership in Baghdad would worry more about regulating the relationship with (and between) the regions, including managing the delegation of power regionally, as opposed to focusing on consolidating all of the power in one city, in one office and with one man.
The days of one man holding all of the power have long gone. This is confirmed by the constitution, and is something the politicians must come to realize. The irony here is that the same people who are calling for a strong, centralised state are going to be harmed most by this centralisation.
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