Tuesday, July 20, 2010

How crude is the reality of Kurdistan's oil business?

The recent saga over oil being smuggled out of Iraqi Kurdistan highlights the need for a more systematic and coherent work of the KRG in terms of teamwork, more transparency and a steady flow of information to the public about the government's work.
Since the start of the new Iraq, oil has been a major issue of contention with Baghdad. So far, the Kurds have failed to explain exactly to Baghdad and the world why is it important for the region and Iraq to have an oil industry in Kurdistan and how is that industry developing and the way it is being handled.
This may have been explained in an interview or two by an official or two, but this is clearly not enough. A more structured system is needed whereby information about the oil industry (and other aspects of government work) is provided in the form of a steady stream of information.
The work of the KRG in this regard has very much been a fire-fighting one.
Without having a proper and aggressive channel of communicating its strategy and vision (if there is a united one) to the outside world, the KRG often finds itself fending off allegations and having to react to statements by Baghdad officials or reports by the press.
The issue of oil is new to the region and it seems to be complicated and controversial, responding to a long report of the NY Times with a short statement on the KRG website is not enough.
The more information available the less fire-fighting needs to be done.
The media and the public usually look for facts and figures.
The questions of what is in these tankers? Where is it coming from? Who is getting the money? Who is benefitting? etc… are all question that should have been answered long ago by the KRG if there are no dodgy deals.
But the two ruling parties need to have a common stance over this issue. Although publically the PUK and KDP say that they are united over this issue but in reality they are different. The recent New York Times report was apparently a tip off by one of the leading figures in one of the two ruling parties.
This is not at the external level only. Internally, the perception is that this is a clear case of corruption.
Perception can sometimes be more important than facts. Whether they like it or not the issues of oil, from extraction to production to selling has all been perceived by the public as scams for the benefit of the few in the leadership.
The burden of proving the opposite is on the Kurdistan region's leadership.

Saturday, July 10, 2010

Kurds, Arabs and others!

The recent tour of President Barzani to the arab neighbourhood was a new reminder to the arab world that Iraqi Kurdistan is not against being part of its arab surrounding and that Iraq’s Arab component is the one that has arab phobia not the Kurdish one.
Since the beginning of the new Iraq, ie, 2003 many attempts were made to ostracise the kurds and create the anti-arab beast out of the new Iraq.
The majority of those who were trying to do so were people who were part of the old regime or those who cannot bare the view of a pluralistic Iraq.
But the key issue here is that the Kurds should not display any behaviour that that they are an anti-Arab component of the new Iraq.
One of the key aims of Al-qaida and the enemies of the new Iraq is to drive a strong wedge between the Kurds and Arabs and put all the other ethnic minorities on the Arab side of the divide. The Kurds should be careful not to fall into that trap.
While the Kurds and especially their leadership always emphasises that the new Iraq is one of equality and fraternity, there still are some traces of xenophobic and racist behaviour in certain parts of Kurdistan.
This has to change and especially in certain apects of the public service and its political setup in Iraqi Kurdistan. Already some damage was made on this front. And the sooner the Kurds act the quicker they can restore their status as a key player in the new Iraq. The results of the recent election and the declining number of the Kurdish lists in the Arab areas of Iraq should serve as weak up call.
There are a few measures that can be taken in Kurdistan and a some in Baghdad.
In Kurdistan, although there is words of praise from a lot of the large Arab community in Kurdistan that ran away from the violence in the centre and south and the treatment is largely satisfactory but there still are some pockets of racist and unwelcoming remarks that could create the wrong tension between the people.
This is mostly seen at checkpoints and at some government offices. Interestingly enough the business people seem to have a much better relationship than that of the politicians and the public servants.
The Arab community of Iraq is now going through tough times, sooner or later they would restore their powerful position in the new democratic Iraq. The stories of today are the ones that would make their minds tomorrow.
At the end of the day, the Kurds of Iraq are in more need of the Arabs than the Arabs of the Kurds.
One key element here is also the treatment of the other ethnicities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Again the kurds should not just talk about equality they should also do it. Although religious and ethnic tolerance is at a good stage in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The region should also send the following message to Iraq and the rest of the world: Kurds, Turkomans, Kaldo-assyrians, arabs and others make todays Iraqi Kurdistan. This should also be reflected in their policies and behaviour not only in Kurdistan but also in Baghdad.
Politically speaking, the Kurds should also take a more active role in Baghdad. They should transform their role from being representatives of the Kurdish region in Baghdad to being an active Kurdish partner in running the affairs of the country.
Over the past few years, every Thursday afternoon, Baghdad’s airport is heaving with Kurdish officials; ministers, deputy ministers, mp’s, DG’s you name it. The time that is usually used to socialise and creat a stronger network in Baghdad is usually spent in Arbil or Sulaymaniya.
As a result, relationship with the political establishment in Baghdad remained very official and stayed in meeting rooms.
Now is the time for the Kurds to have a good role in Baghdad. They can move their centre of political gravity to Baghdad and be able to be at the centre of events.
Many anti-Kurds say that Iraq was taken away from its Arab surrounding, now is the chance for the Kurdish leadership to bring Iraq back to its arab surrounding through arbil.

Friday, July 2, 2010

An ambassator to Iraq ... at Iran!

The new US ambassador to Baghdad, James F Jeffery, would have a tough task ahead of him. Not only should he keep focused on Baghdad, he should also look at Tehran too.
While he would have to oversee a new phase of relationship between DC and Baghdad, he would also have to establish a new standing for the USA in Iraq.
The withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq would place Iraq and the US in front of the real challenge of making sure that Iraq would not descend into real chaos and would not slip quietly into Tehran’s hands.
This would be based on two key policies; the first is not interfering in government formation; the second is to interfere in preventing Tehran from doing so.
These two concepts should be translated into two clear messages from day one. First message; “It is not our business who forms the government, just form one”. Second; No dodgy deals with Tehran.
The various political blocs who are vying for government formation are hoping that the new ambassador would tip the balance in favour of one side against the other.
When Ambassador Jeffery starts his job, each group would try to convince him of supporting them to form the next government. But he should stay away from this.
He should only make sure that the process is as Iraqi as possible by communicating clearly that the US would not support the candidate of a regional capital.
The reality is that Iraq’s dysfunctional politics cannot move forward with outside interference. It makes things worse.
Historically, Iraq’s neighbours always preferred to see politics in Iraq as dysfunctional as possible, as this gives them more room for interference.
After about two years of work on Iraq, in 2006, Ambassador Jeffrey became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
He led the Bureau's Iran Policy Team and coordinated the Bureau public diplomacy at a time when Iran’s interference in Iraq was at its peak.
The key question here is how to stop Iraq from being another battleground between Iran and the US.
When Ambassador Jeffery submits his credentials to President Talabani, he should ask him this question. As he is known to be almost the only man in Baghdad who stands at an equal distance from Iran and the USA. Describing the earlier as brothers and the later as friends.
Iranians always posed privately and sometimes publically by saying: in Iraq, the US provides security and we provide politics and we are always a step ahead.
It is ambassador Jeffery’s chance to turn this around.