Iraq’s volatile politics, punctuated by a hard-fought national election and protracted negotiations over a new government, dominated the headlines in 2010.

IWPR Iraq senior media adviser Hiwa Osman analyses the performance of Iraq’s party-driven media over the last 12 months.

How would you assess the Iraqi news media’s coverage of politics this year, and how would you compare it with coverage of the parliamentary election in January 2005?

I would say that the coverage was a reflection of politics itself. The media is split along the same political lines that exist in today’s Iraq: sectarian, ethnic, pro- and anti-government. Most media outlets are backed by political parties, and covered events from their own perspective.

This hurt Iraqi citizens, because in order to get a complete picture, you need to rely on more than one news outlet. The media in Iraq still has not made the transition to become a service provider rather than a mouthpiece and a propaganda tool.

That said, there has been some improvement - the coverage was slightly more mature than in 2005. In 2005, the outlets were not as diverse and there were fewer of them, especially television stations. The bias back in 2005 was much clearer and more blatant.

The Iraqi media covers politics almost exclusively, ignoring most other news besides sports. Why do you think this is?

Most media is funded by political parties, not the private sector, and our most powerful political parties still carry their legacy from the past. They were born as opposition or revolutionary groups and used their media outlets as propaganda tools against the regime. While the regime is long gone, their philosophy – that the media should serve party rather than public interests - remains unchanged.

For them, media is a tool in their political campaigns, agendas and aspirations. As a result, the media only concentrates on politics, and the parties think they’re getting their money’s worth by funding coverage of their news. Of course, promoting a party’s agenda provokes a reaction from rival party media, so we end up with non-stop political coverage.

As a result, we end up with uninformed citizens. For example, several months ago a toddler died while in a day-care centre in Erbil. A child’s death in a day-care during office hours raises 100 questions that only the media can raise,www.ekurd.netand they need to provide answers for the public. The media didn’t cover the case at all. I only found out through a friend who lived close to the school. The media should have investigated the case and interviewed the education and health authorities.

This aspect of non-political reporting is being touched on slightly by the online community and social networking. Just the other day, an IWPR journalist posted a picture online of an electricity pole that was placed right in the middle of the street.

But news organisations barely use social media. Why?

Internet penetration in Iraq is very low - although even with this very low internet penetration, something like 90 per cent of internet users in Iraq access social media.
But social media hasn’t found an identity in Iraq yet. In some countries, it’s used to report; in others it’s used to organise, mobilise; in other places it’s just for networking and entertainment. Iraqis simply haven’t figured out how social media can be used here.
However, quite a lot of parliamentary candidates did try to use social media this year, especially in Kurdistan where the penetration is higher.

Polls indicate that Iraqis do not trust the media. What can Iraqi news organisations do to build their credibility with the public?

First of all, they should separate news from opinion. This is a symptom of a partisan media because political parties believe the media’s role is to air their views.
Editors also need to apply professional news judgement by choosing stories that impact on the public, rather than just running stories about leaders’ meetings and press conferences where nothing substantial is said. This would be a step towards having a media that functions as a service provider as opposed to a propaganda tool.
The other thing that can be done is to encourage the private sector to invest in media. If it is an honest investment, and isn’t just a business front for a political party, the media will be in a better position to serve the public.

Iraq’s next election is slated for the spring of 2011, when citizens in Iraqi Kurdistan will vote for local representatives. What lessons can the Kurdish media learn from the coverage of the 2010 parliamentary elections, and how can they better serve the public?

It is unlikely that the media in Iraqi Kurdistan changed anyone’s mind about who they wanted to vote for in the last election. The challenge for them this time is to influence voters by better informing them.
The only way they can do this is if they act as good information service providers. They can still have their opinion section, but they should separate this from the news. The biggest lesson that they can learn is that they should strive to provide quality information, as opposed to being a propaganda tool.
Having said all this, it’s unfair to place the blame entirely on the media. A country’s media is a reflection of its politics, and Iraqi politics are currently divisive and brutal. And in order to create an environment conducive to professional, free and responsible media, legislation is required guaranteeing both the right of information to the public and guaranteeing freedom of expression.
The right to freedom of expression and the press is enshrined in the Iraqi constitution, with the caveat that it “does not violate public order and morality”. In order to create an environment conducive to professional, free and responsible media, we need legislation.

Federalists, Separatists & Unionists

Once again, the people of Kurdistan have realized that neither the media nor those who raised a brouhaha over President Barzani’s statement about self-determination seem to have understood or want to understand what the new Iraq is about.

Barzani has been under fire for publicly stating that Kurds have a right to self-determination, an argument that is not new. He was simply repeating a long-held Kurdish position on self-determination.

This should not have shocked anyone — but the exaggerated, critical response to Barzani’s statement shows that the new reality of Iraq is not accepted by everyone.

Rights are inherent in the Iraqi constitution, and the country is clearly a voluntary union of its people.

The preamble of the constitution states: “We the people of Iraq of all components and shades have taken upon ourselves to decide freely and with our choice to unite our future and to take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, to draft … this lasting constitution.”

Unless this fundamental principle is understood and appreciated by anyone involved in Iraq, proper decisions can never be made about the future of this country.

The irony here is that critics of Barzani’s statement have fiercely opposed suppressing other rights and liberties in other parts of Iraq, including banning alcohol from the capital, out of their “conviction” for human rights.

Instead of worrying about the future of the country, the guardians of Iraq’s unity should focus on the theocracy that is emerging. They, along with their neighbors and allies,www.ekurd.netshould concentrate more on the real dangers: the acts of religious extremists and fascists who are moving Iraq toward tyranny and extremism. Signs of religious bigotry are rising and attempts to drive Iraq back into the dark ages are underway.

The new Iraq is being partitioned and the Kurds are not the ones responsible. Islamic radicals are dividing society along religious and sectarian lines.

Barzani’s leadership in brokering a deal between the various parties to form a national government needs to be recognized. In any other country, a man who played a strategic role in bringing together Iraq’s notoriously fractured parties and leaders would not be considered a threat.

In fact, stating that his region has the right to self-determination should be encouraging and positive, given that the Kurds are exercising their right through remaining within Iraq. They are choosing to be a part of this country.

Still, the Kurds should ask themselves why this statement created such a storm. Was it badly timed, even though it came shortly after Barzani’s national initiative?

Or are the Kurds unable to make their case to Baghdad and the outside world? Do they need a more aggressive campaign to explain who the Kurds are? Or do they need to review their relations with their allies?

Regardless of the answers to these questions, the reality is that once again, the Kurds are being accused of wanting to partition Iraq.

The Kurds should seize this opportunity to clearly state that as Iraqis, they want to be part of the free and modern world – and so should the rest of Iraq.

The values of equality, human rights and freedoms are what keep Iraq together, and they are all enshrined in the constitution.

The last sentence of the constitution’s preamble states: “The adherence to this constitution preserves for Iraq its free union, its people, its land and its sovereignty.”

Detracting from these values would split Iraq, not the Kurds.

A zero-sum game for America

The role of the US in Iraq is becoming less and less relevant, and this is not because of the onslaught of Wikileaks.
Washington’s recent failed attempts to form Iraq’s next government show less interest in the details of Baghdad politics and more concern with finishing what they have at hand.
The eye of the US is mostly on their withdrawal as opposed to the future of the region. Given the fact that this is President Barack Obama’s first term, it is understandable that he is already planning his election campaign and working on gathering numbers and achievement for his re-election bid.
A colleague of mine who is an expert of US policy in the Middle East said that over the next two years, it is best to expect nothing from Obama.
The White House will have a quiet year ahead and will only focus on achievements to boost the campaign in the year that follows.
If this happens, the US will be less and less relevant in Iraq and the region. Other players like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey will take over. The continued disengagement of the US in Iraq would certainly be at the expense of the US’s status and prestige in the region.
As things stand, the US does not scare anyone anymore. In fact, it is much easier to attack the US than most of our neighbors. If you attack the US, they come after you to see what you want. If you attack the others,www.ekurd.netthey come after you and make sure you don’t do it again.
If you are friend of America, they ask you to make concessions. If you are a foe, you are rewarded.
In this respect, some in the US think that if they pull out of Iraq they will have more influence. They are wrong.
The gap the US leaves behind would have to be filled with a functioning state able to respond to various threats and challenges, as well as being strong enough to stand on its own.
Looking at the events of the past year and the challenges that lay ahead, Iraq certainly does not fit this definition of a functioning state.
By all measures, Iraq will not be ready by the time the US forces withdraw in 2011 to withstand external challenges and regional actors will increasingly interfere.
The US disengagement would be the start of real failure and Iraq would slip into the hands of America’s enemies and pseudo allies – both of which are making sure that the US image in their media remains abominable. This factor is contributing to the rise of Islamic extremism in the Middle East.
For the US to withdraw, they need to leave behind a functioning state and a political process that is able to defend itself and stand alone.
What we see on the streets of Baghdad and TV screens does not suggest at all that Iraq is capable of doing so.
The way the Iraqi government is configured is a recipe for dysfunction. Bringing together opposing parties in the same room is a good start for reconciliation, but not for rebuilding a country.
The new Council for Strategic Policies, for example, will only add another bureaucratic layer to the already byzantine political and governmental processes.
The key challenge for all of us is to separate divisive politics from the management of affairs of state.
This is done by strengthening Iraq’s public service sector and working strongly to promote good governance, transparency, anti-corruption, strong media and national reconciliation.
To be blunt, most Iraqis still need of America’s help. We still badly need Washington to help separate politics from governance.
The less politicized our public service and other state institutions become, the more ready they will be take over when the US pulls out.

On Our Media

Last weekend, I conducted a training course for the staff of an emerging Kurdish TV station that says it wants to uphold the values of strong, professional journalism.
News judgment was heavily emphasized in the course. This skill is fundamental for professional journalists and builds a news outlet’s credibility as well as its audience. For those not familiar with the concept, news judgment involves prioritizing the most important news by placing it at the top of a story and running the most important news items in a publication or newscast first.
After a number of discussions, we studied several TV news bulletins on the same day. All of the stations are owned by political parties. The bulletins highlighted the key defect and crippled nature of political party media.
In one of the exercises, I asked the journalists to reorder news items based on the impact it had on the public, and to estimate the number of people affected by the story.
The result was that we turned the original bulletin upside down! Instead of running a story about a leader’s (rather dull and non-newsworthy) official meetings first, as the party media had done, we prioritized stories about mobile petrol stations closing and explosions in Talafar and Jalawla.
For another exercise, we watched bulletins from two party-run TV stations and were able to predict exactly what a third party-affiliated station would run. The stations’ news line-ups were entirely based on the political stance of the parties that own them.
A quick analysis of the stories and issues that news outlets choose to report shows that the coverage is reflective of Iraqi’s divisive politics: pro-government media praises official initiatives while anti-government media is critical. At the end of the day, our media tailgates our politics.
But in every society, the number of people who are interested in politics is much smaller than those who are not. Our media unfortunately caters to politicians and political junkies, and fails to give the public information they need for their daily lives.
Many of my western journalist colleagues have observed that our media has not yet transitioned from acting as a political party’s revolutionary mouthpiece to serving as a mirror of a society that is working to rebuild itself.
Particularly in this delicate phase, the news media should reflect our society and should gauge our progress. So far, this has not occurred. We need to follow stories from multiple news organizations to get a complete picture of what is happening in our country, because most have their own agenda that does not reflect the entire truth.
We still don’t have a single trustworthy news source. This is mainly because our media is either owned by wealthy political parties that are focused on broadcasting their views to the public (as well as the daily schedule of its leaders); or by not-so-wealthy media owners whose outlets primarily criticize the political parties and publish items that the parties won’t.
The result is that neither of the two provides the full picture. In many ways, both operate in the same way but with different content.
This deadlock will not break until one decides to fundamentally shift toward independence. This requires a wealthy investor who wants to change the landscape of media and to serve as the leading news source for the public. Such an investment would be profitable,www.ekurd.netgiven that there is a huge untapped market for credible information. Advertising dollars would follow. If this model were applied, the party media would be left behind as it would be too late for them to catch up.
The other avenue is for the political parties to overhaul their current media policies. This can be done by prioritizing the public’s need for information above the party’s desire to inform the public of its leaders’ meetings.
This is done by separating news from propaganda, i.e. the news division of any media outlet should be completely independent from other departments. It should be managed by professional journalists who are not even members of the party, who prioritize public’s right to know.
It is clear that there is a huge news and information gap in our society. Whoever fills this gap by creating a trustworthy news outlet will reap the benefits –the investors will profit and the political parties will win votes.

An ethno-sectarian democracy!

Even as Iraq’s leaders congratulate each other on resolving bitter disputes over the country’s top executive positions, another battle has emerged for the coveted ministerial posts.
This new round of political jockeying has raised the most pressing question facing the new Iraq: is Iraq a true democracy or an ethno-sectarian system? Is it ruled by elections and votes or is it shackled to the dysfunctional quota system?
Terms, like “power-sharing” and “unity government,” are making headlines, but the reality is much different. Over the next month, the political blocs will try to answer the questions posed above, and, so far, it seems that the ethno-sectarian quota are beating out votes.
One of the key issues around the head of Iraqiya, Ayad Allawi, receiving one of the other two top posts, president or speaker of parliament, was that he was a Shia, even though he headed a mostly Sunni coalition.
The “logic” of Iraqi politics today dictates that the top three slots – prime minister, speaker of parliament and president – are distributed between Shia, Sunni and Kurds. Even so, the divvying up of top slots was still a major hurdle over the past eight months of wrangling.
With that, however, the simple math is over. Observers wishing to decipher the next round of government formation had better use a calculator.
As in the last government formation, a complex system gives points for each senior position. A rough breakdown of this allotment, pending a final agreement of the blocs, is as follows; prime minister (15),www.ekurd.netspeaker (12), president (10), deputy prime minister or speaker (8), vice-president (8), sovereign minister (8), production minister (6), service minister (5), minister of state (3).
This system also gives each bloc participating in government a number of points based on the number of seats they have in parliament. The seats-to-points ratio is decided by the negotiating teams of the blocs. In the last election, it was one point for every two seats. This time, some negotiators are talking about 2.6 seats for each point.
For each post taken, the allocated points are then deducted from the relevant bloc’s total. Given that all the players are participating in government this time, the demand for ministerial posts is at an all-time high. As usual, each bloc is counting on a lot more than they deserve in accordance with this system. Most of them would be thinking in quota terms and not in points. The question her is which system would prevail, points or quota.
The Kurds, for example, would have used most of their electoral points by the time a deputy prime minister is appointed. If the points system is applied, the government would have no Kurdish ministers!
In another scenario, if Allawi or another leading Shia member of the Iraqiya bloc receives a high-profile post that gobbles up a big share of points, Sunnis who still see Allawi as a Shia and not member of Iraqiya, would regard this as disturbing the “national balance” as there would be more Shia than Sunnis in the new cabinet.
In the end, such dilemmas prove that Iraq’s political math still has its own rules. The sad truth is that Iraq remains an ethno-sectarian state, one which acts and governs accordingly. There is clearly still more importance given to representation quotas than the election results. The results in governance speak for themselves. This must change.
All Iraqis have all seen how the ethno-sectarian quota system has contributed to the increase of corruption and decrease of security. For this to be redressed, two key measures need to be taken by the next government. First, true national reconciliation. Second, all outstanding issues between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government must be worked out.
These two important initiatives would be a step towards ending quota and affording democratic rights and equal opportunities for all Iraqis, regardless of ethnicity or sect.
Although these principles are carefully enshrined in the constitution and repeated almost daily by Iraqi leaders, they are hard to come by in the streets.
Until this happens, Iraq will remain an ethno-sectarian state in which no one truly trusts each other and all the groups looking for protection, compensation or the upper hand.
In such a divided system, designed in theory as an equalizer, big groups get less than they deserve and small groups get more than they deserve.

End of power-sharing or end of Iraqiya

Since the very beginning of the 2010 political process, the Iraqiya bloc has fed its supports a steady diet of disappointments. From day one, the mostly Sunni and secular coalition has lost credibility with its allies, foes, analysts and the regional and international players who once saw the grouping as a game-changer in the new Iraq.
The decision to walkout on the November 12 meeting of parliament has only underscored a deepening dysfunction, leaving many in Iraq’s political arena to question Iraqiya’s viability as a political partner. To be blunt, Iraqiya has gradually gained the reputation as a moody and unpredictable group that no one can do business with.
The excuses that they came up with in the second meeting of parliament showed cracks in the coalition and revealed a disorganised and fractured list. One leader, Dr Rafi’ Al-Issawi, dismissed the walkout as a misunderstanding, while another, the head of the list Dr Ayad Allawi, declared the power-sharing deal that broke eight months of political gridlock dead in the water.
Perhaps more importantly, and not without some irony, Iraqiya proved its own ineffectiveness. They were unable to block the process as they claimed, and it’s now clear that a government can move forward with or without them.
After securing the speakership, and using the excuse of parliament ratifying the political agreement and removing de-Baathification on some of their figures, Iraqiya tried to stop the process of electing the president and naming the Prime Minister. This was seen by many as a clear manoeuvre to get more than what they had originally agreed to.
Not only did they fail to stop the process and break the quorum, they became irrelevant to the election of the president. Therefore, when the first problem faces them,www.ekurd.netand there will be many, they would have to tell the president that “Although we did not vote for you, we want you to help us solve a problem.” In such a scenario, President-elect Jalal Talabani’s support would come out of graciousness, not duty. After all, they did not vote for him.
Even more important, Iraqiya lost the trust of a key ally in Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani. It was Barzani’s initiative, some observers believe, to specifically include Iraqiya in the political process and provide them with guarantees.
But their behaviour has made many people, including those who honestly wanted to support them, think twice. Iraqiya has proved that as a bloc they are not very united and clearly lack strong leadership.
From the start of their declaration of victory minutes after close of polls on election day, Iraqiya has demonstrated that it would be quite difficult to rely on them as a united bloc and as a bloc that can institute real change to Iraq.
Every few weeks, a new speaker for the list emerges and says something different from the one before. Each leader of the bloc says something different from the other. They have not articulated a united argument about their demands or vision for the future. It is common for divergent members to contradict one another. One says they are in, another says they are out; so it goes in Iraqiya.
They have many so-called leaders, and each leader seems to want something different. When a new development takes place, Iraqiya moves in a thousand different directions. This lack of cohesion has cost them many different opportunities to get a better deal than the one they have today.
It’s been a catalogue of missed opportunities: from refusing a power-sharing deal with Maliki early on to refusing to support Adel Abdulmahdi’s candidacy for PM and, lately, losing Barzanis trust, when he tailored his initiative purely to bring them on board.
While some Iraqiya members said they supported Barzani’s initiative to bring an Iraqi solution to the issue, others got extremely excited about the Saudi initiative that was designed to bring an outside settlement to the government formation.
Such indecision still plagues Iraqiya: at a time when some attended the second session of parliament, the head of the list was heading out of Iraq to London and declaring the power-sharing deal dead while predicting a deterioration of the security situation.
Iraqiya’s cracks are showing and their political future is unclear. Given their all-or-none approach; their division and lack of leadership raise serious questions about their viability to continue as a bloc despite the large number of seats they have.

A Stillborn Initiative

The Saudi king’s invitation to the Iraqi parties to hold talks in Riyadh after Hajj raises numerous questions and alarm bells for the Iraqi people about their future. It also serves as a reminder of the dangers and challenges that lie ahead for the new Iraq.
On Saturday, 30 October 2010, as the various Iraqi parties were preparing to meet in Arbil and Baghdad to settle the political crisis and form a government, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia invited President Jalal Talabani and other Iraqi leaders for talks in Riyadh after Eid Al-Adha.
The irony here is that a country which has never seen an election, does not allow for a Shia presence, and does not have, or recognize, any ethnic minorities is trying to fix the problems of a new democracy with a Shia majority and a sizeable Kurdish, Turkoman and Chaldo-Assyrian population.
The manner in which the invitation was drafted was a clear indication that the Saudis do not have a clue about the new Iraq, nor do they intend to solve the country’s problems.
The invitation mentions President Jalal Talabani by name and “the rest of the parties that took part in the election” -- as if the problem here is President Talabani and the other parties, or is over the presidential post, or is between Kurds and Arabs.
The reality is that the dispute is between the Arabs. One day it is an internal conflict between the Shia; another day it is between the Sunnis; and at other times, it is between Shia and Sunnis.
Given their impartial position, the Kurds were paving the way for a settlement of the dispute.
Many here in Iraq recognize that the Saudi invitation was timed to spoil these attempts by driving a deeper wedge between the Arabs and the Kurds of Iraq while at the same time prolonging and deepening the Sunni-Shia conflict.
By its very nature, Saudi Arabia is not fit to either mediate in Iraq or even understand the nuances of this complex and diverse country.
Their predominant position is an anti-Shia one. During his entire time as prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, who is Shia, did not receive a single invitation to visit Saudi Arabia. Given examples such as this, how can Saudi Arabia overnight become a mediator or an arbitrator between the Shia and the Sunnis?
The Iraqi reactions to the initiative were a clear demonstration of the limited credibility Saudi enjoys. The Shia and the Kurds refused the mediation, while the Sunnis welcomed it.
Every now and then, the people of Iraq hear of Saudi preachers insulting Shia symbols, including the revered Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, as well as disparaging comments toward the Shia faith in Saudi Arabia’s mosques and satellite TV channels. Most Iraqis believe that ending these practices would be a goodwill gesture before helping to form the government.
As opposed to dressing their initiatives with an all-Iraqi solution to form the government, the Saudis would have been much better off if they were more open and truthful by solely expressing concerns about the status of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. They could have also been more open in expressing their concerns about the extent of Iran’s influence or interference in Iraq.
The initiative also could have been better prepared. As things stand, it seems that Saudi minimized Iraqiya’s chances of positioning themselves well in the next government. They instead managed to draw the Kurds and the Shia closer to each other, while further enhancing Iran’s role in Iraq.
If tomorrow Mahmoud Ahmadinajad makes a similar invitation as the one extended by King Abullah (who, it should be noted, has not even appointed an ambassador to Iraq) surely many more people -- including Sunnis -- would attend the Tehran meeting rather than one in Riyadh.
But Ahmadinajad would not interfere so blatantly, because he seems to understand the new Iraq better than the Saudis. The past seven months have proven that any interference in negotiations over the government formation will only further complicate Iraq’s deeply polarized political environment.
When the people of Iraq went to the polls to vote for their MPs, they did so with the understanding that the Iraqis are the only ones who should form the government, and that the only place where it can be formed is Iraq. If Iraq veers from this principle, the political blocs will be responsible – and the citizens will be the ones to pay the price.

Kingmakers again!

The Kurds have once again found themselves the kingmakers of Iraq, but this time, the stakes are much higher. Iraq’s political paralysis has earned it the world record for the longest period of time in which a country has gone without forming a government after holding an election. Given that all of the other parties have taken sides, it is clear that it is up to the Kurds to decide who will lead the country.
The good news is that this time, the political picture and the leadership options are clearer. After months of indecision, incumbent Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki finally won his battle to secure the National Alliance’s nomination for the premiership. Two months ago, I wrote about players and spectators and encouraged the Kurds and other smaller blocs to make up their mind about the next prime minister. The Sadrists and the others seem to have made their decision by nominating Maliki; luckily for the Kurds, it did not change the equation much.
To be sure, Iraqi politics remains dysfunctional and paralyzed. The country is unable to move in any definitive direction because of its politics. The Kurds should not be influenced by the political quagmire, however. Their choices are simple today: Allawi or Maliki.
The ongoing conflict over the prime minister’s post was a clear symptom of the paralyzed politics of Baghdad. It became clear that the conflict is one between lists, and not about policies. Sadly, the conflict is centered on the interests of the blocs rather than to the public interest.
Breaking the world record and not feeling the sense of urgency to form the government or make concessions is a clear example.
The Kurds are different from other blocs because they are not embroiled in Baghdad’s difficult and divisive politics.
External pressures could be placed on the Kurds to not support a seemingly sectarian government led by powerful Shia parties. But the reality is the other options are not much better.
In the early stages of negotiations, a national unity government could have been an answer. But today it is not. The bad relationship created over the past six months has in my opinion destroyed any potential for trust between the two main lists to create a national unity government. Maliki remained a strong candidate so did Allawi.
As one of the more neutral groups in Baghdad’s vicious political fight, the Kurds have an opportunity today to make a real difference in the political process and for themselves.
Although they are a list and an alliance, their politics are more mature and clearer in terms of hierarchy, goals, interests and objectives. The main reason for this is that they are from one region. Their aims and demands were not created yesterday; they were developed after decades of struggle.
Many observers believe that the ball is in the Kurds’ court, but this should not be seen as a burden. In fact, it could be an opportunity.
The Kurds cannot afford to play the political game without having a clear idea as to their demands. The 19-point list should be the basis for the Kurds to negotiate a deal with either Allawi or Maliki.
Other characteristics, like the leadership, vision, strength of the candidates, should also be considered.
In dealing with the blocs, the Kurds should consider the composition, unity and sustainability of each bloc and their historic relationship with -- or animosity toward -- the Kurds and their demands.
During the months-long political game, the Kurds have thus far been spectators. As we approach the final stretch, it is now their time to play, and to score the winning goal.

A digital democracy is emerging

A pioneering conference in Erbil last week provided a much-needed look at Iraq’s technological future.
It offered unprecedented discussion of how Iraq can use technology, information and e-governance to re-establish its strong economic, intellectual and political standing in the region.
The two-day conference, organized by international media development agencies the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) and IREX, explored the innumerable ways Iraq can develop its emerging democracy by utilizing technology to harness the information revolution.
Information and communication are keys to creating a healthy society; one in which the public is engaged, informed and empowered, while the government is responsive, transparent and accountable.
At the heart of this “revolution” is a free and unfettered flow of information to the public. This info-stream cannot happen by leaving technological advancement to take its own course; the process must be managed.
The use of communication technologies is increasing by the second. Iraq is well placed to benefit from this accelerated pace. By handling this transition wisely, chaos and confusion can be avoided.
It is the duty of the government, the media and the public to see this transition through and develop Iraq’s “digital democracy.”
This new technological landscape is changing old ways of receiving and transmitting information. We, too, should change. The public, the media and government can all play important roles in shaping the future.
Information empowers the public and enables individuals to learn their rights as well as how exercise and protect them. Information is always a key tool in combating corruption.
With today’s technologies, individuals have increasingly become information providers. Any citizen can take a picture, record a video or write something, and then post it immediately on the Internet for the entire world to see.
The media in Iraq can promote public awareness about the need for information and its benefits. It can also disseminate information on public services and rights awareness.
Public media provide a forum to voice dissatisfaction, as well as demand accountability and action. It is, after all, a forum for public debate. The most important role of media, however, is to create a public that is informed enough to be critical and analytical of any information received.
Our media market is saturated with low quality, and often downright bad, products. Even so, no authority can or should close them down.
The only party that can do this is the public. If credible and professional media creates a media-literate public that can interpret, analyze and use the information, there would be no market for bad media in Iraq.
The best avenue for the government to take is to lift all obstacles on communication and access to information. For example, develop legislation for the people’s right to information, strengthen the mechanisms for access to information through e-governance, and work on increasing Internet access by allowing the private sector to enter the service provision market.
In the new technological landscape, fair play is the only way to win in the long run.

Human Rights - Iraq's first post withdrawal test

As fallout of America’s withdrawal from Iraq begins to take shape, it looks as if it will be some time before the "new Iraq" can truly stand on its own.
One scathing example of Iraq's political immaturity was brought to light last week by an Amnesty International report on the state of the country's prison system.
The disappointing and confusing reactions to the report from Iraq's government, security apparatus and civil society have made it clear that human rights in Iraq is still an abstract concept. This needs to change.
The Amnesty report "New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq" claimed that an estimated 30,000 detainees are being held without trial in Iraqi prisons. It also found that "Some detainees have been held in secret detention facilities and tortured."
Many prisoners face violence, psychological abuse as well as other forms of gross mistreatment, according to the study which was compiled from interviews with detainees, prison directors, refugees and activists.
The scope of prisoner abuse listed in the report underscores the need for a better understanding of human rights by correctional institutions and personnel, as well Iraqi politicians and the public. But that's not all.
The findings serve as a direct contradiction to the repeated statements of government officials who have stressed a commitment to uphold the human rights of Iraqi citizens. In fact, Iraqi officials were quick to dismiss either the sources or numbers mentioned in the report.
Although the judiciary, ministry of justice, security officials, politicians and rights groups all reacted with different shades of denial, one point became clear: no official mechanism exists in Iraq to monitor and report human rights violations.
As it stands, there is no state-run watchdog that assures the accurate flow of information on rights abuses to the public, the government and international community.
An organization such as this would institutionalise the concept of human rights into the security culture, and could be a move towards adopting international humanitarian standards.
A key issue in the debate over the report was the number of detainees. This should never have happened. The Iraqi government should have a record of everyone in custody and make this list available to the likes of Amnesty and Human Rights Watch. After all, transparency is a key guarantor of good practice, good governance and accountability.
Ambiguity, stark denials and lack of access can have damaging effects, especially with reputable international organizations. Iraqis should not forget that it was these same organisations that helped expose the former regime and his crimes against the people of Iraq.
The United States can play an effective role in preventing Iraq from reverting to its awful past. Although many in Iraq argue that the human rights situation was worse when the US forces were in Iraq, at least they were seen as monitors and enforcers of due process and procedure.
US military spokesman in Baghdad, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Owen, said after the release of the Amnesty report that the Iraqi detention facilities were "inspected frequently and abide by the rule of law and international standards for detainee care and management."
US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley’s remarks on the report were welcomed by many Iraqis who fear that the human rights situation could deteriorate further. Crowley said that respect for human rights is an important issue in relations between Washington and Baghdad. "Human rights are a critical component" of US work "to build up institutions of the Iraqi government," he added.
One of the things that we in the new Iraq take pride in is that we are striving to uphold the values of the free world. America can help us reach this goal. Washington can help the Iraqi government - and at times put pressure on it - to uphold the values that both American and Iraqi blood was shed for.
But this cannot be done by simply dismissing and denying unpleasant reports. This is achieved through engaging seriously with rights organizations, responding positively to their recommendations, and demonstrating solid steps to prevent further abuse.
The US should encourage the Iraqi government to study the Amnesty prison report carefully. The allegations of this study, and previous reports, must to be taken very seriously to make sure that the next report is not as damning as this one.

US-Kurdish relations, short term venture or a long term partnership

The visit of US vice-president Joe Biden to Arbil was an important recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan and president Barzani and the role the region plays in Iraq’s political process.
It was also seen as a reassurance that US relations with Kurdistan region are intact. But what type of relations exist today?
Depending on the size and gravity of the problem, the level of contact between the two have ranged between the Americans inviting Kurdish leaders to the White House to a phone call or meeting in Baghdad when the American president is in town.
Other means of contact are usually left up to the vice-president or the secretaries of state or defense, who call Kurdish leaders and occasionally visit Kurdistan.
Thus far, Kurdish-US relations have fluctuated based on the issue at hand – with the problem usually involving Baghdad, Kirkuk or Turkey.
The typical scenario is that the Kurds are adamant about a certain issue, and the US steps in with either a visit, invitation or a phone call. The Kurdish stance softens soon afterwards.
A key issue that the Kurds are debating now is whether they are getting their money’s worth out of this relationship.
Some Kurds say that the US needs Iraqi Kurdistan more than Iraqi Kurdistan needs the US today, as Iraqi Kurdistan is the only success story of the US liberation of Iraq.
This may not be a very popular statement amongst the Kurds in general. Many still want to believe that the US is Iraqi Kurdistan’s key partner and ally.
But this could change. Relations are usually based on give and take. The Kurds maintain that despite positively responding to all of America’s requests, the US is not as responsive when the Kurds ask for help on any their issues.
The issues of article 140, revenue-sharing, relations with Turkey and the constant shelling of borders are all issues that the Kurds believe that the US could play a more effective role in solving.
Thus far, on the surface at least, America’s high-profile political engagement with Kurdistan came during crises, when they wanted the Kurds to soften their position.
While it is clear that the Kurdish relationship with the US is a valuable, strategic option that the Kurds cannot abandon, they can certainly manage it better. Relations with the United States are deeply rooted and long-term – they are not just with the administration that happens to be in power.
America’s pride in Iraqi Kurdistan’s achievements is mostly limited to security and stability. They are still hesitant to speak out when it comes to democracy, good governance, transparency, anti corruption, freedom of speech and human rights.
While steps have been taken on a democratic path, Iraqi Kurdistan still has some way to go.
It is not difficult to become an ally of the United States, but it may be more of a challenge to become a true ally and partner.
Measures to combat corruption, promote transparency and good governance, and uphold human rights and freedom of speech are all steps that Iraqi Kurdistan’s leadership can take.
This would create a much more solid foundation for Kurdish-US relations. It would also open the scope for more partners. Let’s not forget that some Kurds argue that compared to its neighbors, Iraqi Kurdistan is much better off in terms of democratic progress.
But this comparison doesn’t stand because no country in the region constitutes a good example of democracy, human rights and good governance. The Kurdistan region should look at the European democracies as a model.
Kurdish-US relations are at a crossroads. They can either resemble US relations with its pseudo allies in the region like Egypt or Saudi Arabia, or they can be modeled after America’s relations with democracies in Europe.
It is now up to the Kurds and the US to decide which way it will go.

Which one comes first, democracy or federalism?

As things stand today, all indications suggest that the revived Iraqi National Alliance, INA, will form the government under the leadership of current prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and will be joined by the Kurds.
Iraqiya has declared that if this scenario occurs, they will denounce the process as illegal. Some Iraqiya leaders even suggested that they would boycott the political process.
A boycott would send the political process in Baghdad back to square one, throwing Iraq back into the political turmoil it faced 2005.
At that time, the Shias and Kurds were leading Iraq while the Sunnis remained on the sidelines. This led to a three-year-long wave of violence, terrorism and extremism that swept Baghdad and stretched into other provinces. It was a truly sectarian civil war, the traces of which continue to haunt and threaten us today.
To be sure, the same turmoil would emerge if Iraqiya formed the government on its own with Ayad Allawi as the prime minister, alienating the Shia-dominated lists. And let’s not forget the Kurds -- they would join his government as well.
A closer look at the two options makes it clear that there is a serious mistrust not between Allawi and Maliki -- or even between the Iraqiya and the INA ¬– but rather between the Shia and Sunni Arabs of Iraq.
In addition to the discrimination, injustice and atrocities committed against Iraq’s Shia before the fall of Saddam, the lack of clarity and progress in national reconciliation by today’s rulers have also contributed to deepening the mistrust between the two communities.
No concrete steps have been taken to achieve a true national reconciliation. On the contrary, in the weeks before the last election, the de-Ba’thification committee headed by a leading Iraqi National Congress member, Ali Allami – who is accused of strong ties with Iran -- disqualified a number of candidates for their past involvement with the Ba’th Party. Most were from Iraqiya.
If there was a true will to move forward and a confidence in a democratic system based on equality, these candidates – who after all were entering the democratic process through elections -- should have been commended and brought into the fold of the new Iraq rather than being driven back to the Baath Party.
Although the Shia and Sunni communities lived peacefully as neighbours in many regions of Iraq, each appears to mistrust the political leadership and military force of the other. Hence, both sides fear or reject being ruled by the other.
But the dilemma for today’s Iraq is that a government based in Baghdad would have to rule the entire country -- and it will need to be either INA or Iraqiya.
In any mature democracy, it is usually the case that one bloc is in the government and the other is in the opposition. Iraq’s democracy does not seem to be ready for such a setup yet.
Each bloc fears being in the opposition, as being in power seems to be the only guarantor for protection.
One interesting point to note here is that the Kurds are not afraid of either bloc being in power. The reason is that they rule their region alone and are trying to work out a federal relationship with Baghdad.
If the Sunnis and the Shia of Iraq had their own federal regions, our democracy would have been solid and the bickering over forming the government would not have lasted this long.
The last six months demonstrated that for democracy to be entrenched in Iraq it needs to have a truly federal structure whereby each of Iraq’s communities live in a region or regions that enjoy a federal relationship with Baghdad.
Once this is in place, policies and issues would replace personalities. Each community would worry more about their federal status in Iraq as opposed to who is ruling in Baghdad.
The leadership in Baghdad would worry more about regulating the relationship with (and between) the regions, including managing the delegation of power regionally, as opposed to focusing on consolidating all of the power in one city, in one office and with one man.
The days of one man holding all of the power have long gone. This is confirmed by the constitution, and is something the politicians must come to realize. The irony here is that the same people who are calling for a strong, centralised state are going to be harmed most by this centralisation.

Iraq After US Withdrawal – End of Era or New Beginning?

As the debate continues over the effects of the United States troop withdrawal from Iraq, there are forces manoeuvring to fill the gap left by the Americans. But they are outsiders, not Iraqis.
The 4th Stryker Brigade made history last week when they withdrew to Kuwait, the last US combat soldiers to leave Iraq.
So what’s next? Iraqis don’t seem to be thinking about the repercussions too much, but regional players are already strategising about how they can gain the upper hand.
Each of Iraq’s neighbours is carefully plotting its own strategy. Every scenario would be detrimental, destabilising and damaging for both Iraq and America.
Iran is trying to frame its relationship with Iraq as one of brotherly concern. As the stalemate in forming a new Iraqi government has continued since the March parliamentary election, Tehran has managed to stall the political process while ensuring that the next government can be only be created with its blessing – and only after the US troop withdrawal.
As Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi’s bid for the premiership gained momentum, Iran quickly forged a new alliance between Iraq’s two main Shia blocs, the Iraqi National Alliance, INA, and State of Law. The goal was to prevent Allawi, who is favoured by Sunnis and enjoys close ties with US and Arab leaders, from become prime minister.
The short-lived alliance between the two rival Shia groups collapsed when Tehran failed to shift INA’s staunch opposition to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s re-election bid. But Iranian influence remains intact, with Tehran reportedly continuing to pressure Shia leaders within INA to accept Maliki, as they hold talks with all the major players.
Iran has made extraordinary efforts to ensure that it has the upper hand in Iraq, and if it brokers the deal that creates the next government, its influence will be assured.
Turkey, meanwhile, has already made it clear that it might intervene to fill the gap created by the departure of the Americans, albeit in an area where the US never had a presence, the Qandil mountains, stronghold of the Kurdish rebel group, the PKK.
The wider Arab world seems to have its own plans for gaining a foothold in Iraq and changing the political landscape. Some Arab states are working quietly, through Turkey, to influence the situation in favour of the Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority.
A recent piece in the London-based, Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, reported that Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries were planning a conference modelled on the 1989 Taef Agreement which ended Lebanon's civil war.
The article said the conference would seek “to resolve issues in Iraq away from Iranian and American influence”, and would take place in Damascus.
The paper quoted Iraqi sources as saying that a government could not be formed without the involvement of Arab states, and set out four different scenarios, all of which excluded Maliki and favoured Allawi to head the government.
Syria seems to be turning a blind eye to al-Qaeda activities, including allowing insurgents to cross into Iraq.
Earlier this year, a joint Iraqi-US special operations team in Mosul killed Abu Khalaf, a top al-Qaeda figure based in Syria who had coordinated suicide bombings in Anbar and Baghdad. In late 2008, a US raid on the Syrian border city of al-Bukamal killed several senior foreign fighters operating against Iraqi targets.
Damascus is also allowing the Baath party to organise and operate freely as it attempts to destabilise Iraq. Fugitive members of the Baath who have been charged with or convicted of various crimes are moving around freely in a number of Arab countries, in some cases with the protection of the host government.
It is clear that al-Qaeda will do whatever it can to capitalise on Iraq’s current vulnerability. The security forces are demoralised, there is no government in place, and the top security officials – the interior and defence ministers – have been undermined by losing their parliamentary bids in the March election.
All the above scenarios are plausible if neither the Iraqis nor the Americans make positive plans for the post-withdrawal phase.
Following the troop withdrawal, the US still needs to ensure that Iraq heads towards becoming a stable, democratic, peaceful and viable partner of the US and the free world. This has not happened yet, and has taken longer than originally anticipated.
For this to happen, the US needs to play an active political role in the country, and to do so in ways that empower the voices of independent Iraqis and groups. The Americans need to promote good governance and support efforts to steer Iraq in the right direction.
Iraqis need to realise that thus far, the doors have been left open to interference by nearly everyone in the region. Now that the American troops have gone, Iraq’s leaders need to understand that the more interference they allow, the less relevant they themselves will become. And in doing so, they will let Iraq become a battleground for regional and international players.

A fraudster and some ignorant and malicious media workers are shaping Kurdistan’s freedom of expression

If doctors, engineers, lawyers or members of other professions make mistakes, they are barred from practicing their occupations and their licenses are revoked.
But luckily enough for our media and government employees, these requirements are not applied to them.
Government and media workers are neither accountable nor sackable. In fact, they may be quite similar in many ways.
I often hear our politicians asking: What makes someone a journalist?
I also hear them answer their own question: Well, anyone can be a journalist if they are prepared to swear at the establishment. The best journalist is one who most eloquently insults high-ranking leaders and officials.
Journalists on the other hand ask: What makes someone a government official?
They answer their own question: Anyone can become a government official if they are loyalists of the right person in the right party.
On the face of it, this relationship seems like a formula that some can live with. But in reality it is harming the public and insulting their intelligence.
The last couple of weeks provided good examples as to how this relationship is failing.
If there was an award for the worst media performance, it would have been given to pro- and anti-government media jointly.
To those who don’t know, here is what happened: A magazine called Lvin published an interview with an individual, Qani Fard, who claims to be a historian earning his PhD at Harvard. He made all kinds of allegations against the Kurdish movement’s history and leadership.
He based these claims on alleged documents from Iranian and other countries’ intelligence services, yet provided no documentation to support the accusations.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party was immediately up in arms about the claims and started a campaign against Lvin, stretching from the pages of its newspapers to the pulpit of mosques. This was exactly what Lvin wanted: The interview was clearly published to trigger this controversy and boost the paper’s sales -- nothing else.
A professional and reputable media outlet that cares about its professional and business reputation would take allegations such as these very seriously. They would conduct an internal investigation first and then determine what went wrong and form a position based on their findings.
A professional outlet would usually issue an apology if what they wrote was incorrect, or would stand by every word they wrote if they discovered that their article held water. Lvin’s immediate reaction was a ready-made email to everyone saying “Our lives are in danger.”
It did not take a colleague of mine 30 minutes to find out that Qani Fard has never attended Harvard. Nor has he earned a PhD at Cambridge, as his Wikipedia page claims. Nor did his name show up in any Australian university.
In the case of Xebat and other pro government outlets, they simply published anti-Lvin statements threatening the magazine without verifying the source or looking into the repercussions of it.
So this is what we’re left with: A fraudster of the present and the past, along with several ignorant and malicious media workers, nearly caused another PR disaster for the Kurdistan region.
Each one’s motives were clear: The fraudster wanted to get as many Google hits as possible, while those in the malicious and ignorant camp wanted to sell as many papers as possible and to please their party bosses.
This is all at the expense of freedom of expression in the region.
Our media is a reflection of our politics. “Our politicians are corrupt”, said one journalist, “and so are we”.
But this need not be the case. While politicians may be forced to reform because of electoral pressure, the media is under more pressure to self-regulate.
The fact of the matter is that neither the politics nor the media in Iraqi Kurdistan are regulated. This leaves both with the difficult task of regulating themselves.
I believe that if there is a strong will to develop a healthy media, each sector of society needs to play a role in implementing reforms.
For the media: If the information a source is giving does not make sense, investigate further. If it still does not make sense, don’t use it.
For the politicians: If a headline does not make sense, ignore it -- they want you to react. If you have to react, react directly by writing to the media outlet. The aim of this is to correct the error and raise journalistic standards. If the media outlet does not respond, then ignore them.
For the public: If a headline does not make sense, pick up the newspaper and read the first line or two of the report. If you still aren’t convinced, put the paper down. Do not buy it; try to make it unsellable. Do not even talk about it to your friends.

The rule of law and the rule of man

One of the most frequently-raised questions about Iraq is why the country is in such a state of chaos and has not made any real progress.
Seven years after the fall of Saddam, basic services required by every citizen are still far from satisfactory. This is especially true in the south and centre of Iraq.
The airport of Baghdad is a prime example of the failure of the new Iraqi public service sector.
In every other field of service, the excuses of terrorism and bad security can be used. But the airport is still in one of the most heavily-protected areas of the country, and works with regional airports that operate on timetables that are accurate down to the minute. Yet taking off from or arriving on time to Baghdad is almost unheard of.
In terms of all other public services, the track record is just as dismal as that of the airport.
Healthcare, drinking water and sewage systems are among the plethora of concerns that consume the average citizen today. But the reality is that no one is being held accountable for or taking responsibility for the shortcomings.
This is not just in the in the centre and south; it also exists in Kurdistan. The situation there is improving in terms of services, but is nowhere near what it should be.
Corruption is still one of the biggest problems eating away at the state, both in Kurdistan and in the rest of the country.
The fact of the matter is that large parts of the Iraqi public service sector are inefficient and corrupt.
And hence the chaos and lack of progress is evident in many aspects of public services.
Public service employees and officials do not seem to be held accountable, as most appointments are political and are based on ethnic, sectarian or partisan affiliations.
Usually, eradicating corruption and providing better public services are carried out by either the rule of law or the rule of man.
Political analysts define these two systems as follows: the rule of man is any system in which a man directs the course of the nation. That man is usually feared and sometimes loved.
A rule of law system is quite the opposite. In this system the nation possesses a set of guidelines, usually in a constitution, which sets the terms of governing.
Although the constitution provides strong guarantees for the rule of law, in reality it is still far from being implemented in most parts of the country.
As for the rule of man, Iraq seems to have moved from the rule of one strong man to the rule of a number of men scattered across the country. None seem especially interested in building solid foundations for the Iraqi state.
To sum up, in Baghdad there does not seem to be either rule of law or rule of man and hence the high corruption and the bad public service.
In Kurdistan, there seems to be a bit of both and hence the better public service but deeper corruption.
Political analysts argue that any rule of man system, whether by mob or the elites, is destined for failure.
Although rule of man may be necessary for the Iraqi or Kurdish context, liberty and property will not be protected under such systems, and the nation will ultimately suffer under tyranny.
Thus if anyone wishes to help the people of Iraq out of their crises and raise living standards, they need to establish the rule of law as a starting point.

Of players and spectators

Allawi, Maliki and the other blocs are in a game. Allawi is making the best decision he can, holding on to what he believes is his right to form the government. Any move he makes must take into account Maliki’s fight to become the new Shia bloc’s candidate for PM; as well as the decision of the other blocs to stay out of this conflict.
On the other hand, Maliki is also making the best decision he can, insisting on leading the formation of the government. His strategy is taking into account Allawi's intention to be the PM and the other blocs’ intention to stay out of this conflict.
The other blocs are making the best decision they can, staying out of the conflict, taking into account the decisions of both Maliki and Allawi. They say one of them would eventually be the PM and we would then support whoever is chosen.
In game theory this stalemate is called the Nash equilibrium. In 1994, John Nash won the Nobel Prize of economics for a theory he derived about peoples’ decisions when interacting with others.
Nash equilibrium is a concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally.
This seems to be the case in Iraq today – but it need not remain this way.
While Allawi and Maliki have no other choice but to stick to their positions and hence keep the equilibrium, the others, including the Kurds may have an interest in breaking it.
While all the attention is on the two big blocs or the two big names, Maliki and Allawi, the other blocs can have a significant role and can truly be the kingmakers.
So far, the smaller groups have decided on being neutral in the conflict and waiting for a winner.
This may be a sound policy if the conflict is short-lived or relatively superficial.
Not so in Iraq. As the conflict between the two blocs intensifies, those who have kept outside it may run the risk of becoming irrelevant to its settlement.
If a given bloc outside the two main conflicting ones decides to break the stalemate by supporting one of the two lists, they could well tip the balance in favour of their preferred choice, get whatever commitments they want from it and be key players in the political scene.
Given the mathematics of the parliament, even if the preferred option of the smaller bloc did not get the premiership, there would be a political price to be extracted for switching alliances and getting whatever they want from the other side.
The Kurds and other blocs have a true opportunity to be the kingmakers again. They should take the lead and break the deadlock by putting their 60 seat weight behind their preferred choice and get the ball rolling
In situations of conflict, those who stay in the middle or outside gradually become spectators.
And usually, spectators in matches do not get anything at the end.

How crude is the reality of Kurdistan's oil business?

The recent saga over oil being smuggled out of Iraqi Kurdistan highlights the need for a more systematic and coherent work of the KRG in terms of teamwork, more transparency and a steady flow of information to the public about the government's work.
Since the start of the new Iraq, oil has been a major issue of contention with Baghdad. So far, the Kurds have failed to explain exactly to Baghdad and the world why is it important for the region and Iraq to have an oil industry in Kurdistan and how is that industry developing and the way it is being handled.
This may have been explained in an interview or two by an official or two, but this is clearly not enough. A more structured system is needed whereby information about the oil industry (and other aspects of government work) is provided in the form of a steady stream of information.
The work of the KRG in this regard has very much been a fire-fighting one.
Without having a proper and aggressive channel of communicating its strategy and vision (if there is a united one) to the outside world, the KRG often finds itself fending off allegations and having to react to statements by Baghdad officials or reports by the press.
The issue of oil is new to the region and it seems to be complicated and controversial, responding to a long report of the NY Times with a short statement on the KRG website is not enough.
The more information available the less fire-fighting needs to be done.
The media and the public usually look for facts and figures.
The questions of what is in these tankers? Where is it coming from? Who is getting the money? Who is benefitting? etc… are all question that should have been answered long ago by the KRG if there are no dodgy deals.
But the two ruling parties need to have a common stance over this issue. Although publically the PUK and KDP say that they are united over this issue but in reality they are different. The recent New York Times report was apparently a tip off by one of the leading figures in one of the two ruling parties.
This is not at the external level only. Internally, the perception is that this is a clear case of corruption.
Perception can sometimes be more important than facts. Whether they like it or not the issues of oil, from extraction to production to selling has all been perceived by the public as scams for the benefit of the few in the leadership.
The burden of proving the opposite is on the Kurdistan region's leadership.

Kurds, Arabs and others!

The recent tour of President Barzani to the arab neighbourhood was a new reminder to the arab world that Iraqi Kurdistan is not against being part of its arab surrounding and that Iraq’s Arab component is the one that has arab phobia not the Kurdish one.
Since the beginning of the new Iraq, ie, 2003 many attempts were made to ostracise the kurds and create the anti-arab beast out of the new Iraq.
The majority of those who were trying to do so were people who were part of the old regime or those who cannot bare the view of a pluralistic Iraq.
But the key issue here is that the Kurds should not display any behaviour that that they are an anti-Arab component of the new Iraq.
One of the key aims of Al-qaida and the enemies of the new Iraq is to drive a strong wedge between the Kurds and Arabs and put all the other ethnic minorities on the Arab side of the divide. The Kurds should be careful not to fall into that trap.
While the Kurds and especially their leadership always emphasises that the new Iraq is one of equality and fraternity, there still are some traces of xenophobic and racist behaviour in certain parts of Kurdistan.
This has to change and especially in certain apects of the public service and its political setup in Iraqi Kurdistan. Already some damage was made on this front. And the sooner the Kurds act the quicker they can restore their status as a key player in the new Iraq. The results of the recent election and the declining number of the Kurdish lists in the Arab areas of Iraq should serve as weak up call.
There are a few measures that can be taken in Kurdistan and a some in Baghdad.
In Kurdistan, although there is words of praise from a lot of the large Arab community in Kurdistan that ran away from the violence in the centre and south and the treatment is largely satisfactory but there still are some pockets of racist and unwelcoming remarks that could create the wrong tension between the people.
This is mostly seen at checkpoints and at some government offices. Interestingly enough the business people seem to have a much better relationship than that of the politicians and the public servants.
The Arab community of Iraq is now going through tough times, sooner or later they would restore their powerful position in the new democratic Iraq. The stories of today are the ones that would make their minds tomorrow.
At the end of the day, the Kurds of Iraq are in more need of the Arabs than the Arabs of the Kurds.
One key element here is also the treatment of the other ethnicities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Again the kurds should not just talk about equality they should also do it. Although religious and ethnic tolerance is at a good stage in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The region should also send the following message to Iraq and the rest of the world: Kurds, Turkomans, Kaldo-assyrians, arabs and others make todays Iraqi Kurdistan. This should also be reflected in their policies and behaviour not only in Kurdistan but also in Baghdad.
Politically speaking, the Kurds should also take a more active role in Baghdad. They should transform their role from being representatives of the Kurdish region in Baghdad to being an active Kurdish partner in running the affairs of the country.
Over the past few years, every Thursday afternoon, Baghdad’s airport is heaving with Kurdish officials; ministers, deputy ministers, mp’s, DG’s you name it. The time that is usually used to socialise and creat a stronger network in Baghdad is usually spent in Arbil or Sulaymaniya.
As a result, relationship with the political establishment in Baghdad remained very official and stayed in meeting rooms.
Now is the time for the Kurds to have a good role in Baghdad. They can move their centre of political gravity to Baghdad and be able to be at the centre of events.
Many anti-Kurds say that Iraq was taken away from its Arab surrounding, now is the chance for the Kurdish leadership to bring Iraq back to its arab surrounding through arbil.

An ambassator to Iraq ... at Iran!

The new US ambassador to Baghdad, James F Jeffery, would have a tough task ahead of him. Not only should he keep focused on Baghdad, he should also look at Tehran too.
While he would have to oversee a new phase of relationship between DC and Baghdad, he would also have to establish a new standing for the USA in Iraq.
The withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq would place Iraq and the US in front of the real challenge of making sure that Iraq would not descend into real chaos and would not slip quietly into Tehran’s hands.
This would be based on two key policies; the first is not interfering in government formation; the second is to interfere in preventing Tehran from doing so.
These two concepts should be translated into two clear messages from day one. First message; “It is not our business who forms the government, just form one”. Second; No dodgy deals with Tehran.
The various political blocs who are vying for government formation are hoping that the new ambassador would tip the balance in favour of one side against the other.
When Ambassador Jeffery starts his job, each group would try to convince him of supporting them to form the next government. But he should stay away from this.
He should only make sure that the process is as Iraqi as possible by communicating clearly that the US would not support the candidate of a regional capital.
The reality is that Iraq’s dysfunctional politics cannot move forward with outside interference. It makes things worse.
Historically, Iraq’s neighbours always preferred to see politics in Iraq as dysfunctional as possible, as this gives them more room for interference.
After about two years of work on Iraq, in 2006, Ambassador Jeffrey became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
He led the Bureau's Iran Policy Team and coordinated the Bureau public diplomacy at a time when Iran’s interference in Iraq was at its peak.
The key question here is how to stop Iraq from being another battleground between Iran and the US.
When Ambassador Jeffery submits his credentials to President Talabani, he should ask him this question. As he is known to be almost the only man in Baghdad who stands at an equal distance from Iran and the USA. Describing the earlier as brothers and the later as friends.
Iranians always posed privately and sometimes publically by saying: in Iraq, the US provides security and we provide politics and we are always a step ahead.
It is ambassador Jeffery’s chance to turn this around.

Kurdish security agencies and the public

Forty days have passed since the murder of zardasht othman. Regardless of the reasons and the circumstances that led to the killing which is open for interpretation. Nobody still knows what has actually happened.
The public is still looking for answers, while the authorities are still trying to fend off the allegations of their involvement in the murder. The decisive factor in this is the work and findings of the committee established to investigate the murder.
The security service in the region has a good track record for its professionalism and efficiency in protecting the region and its inhabitants, especially in recent years.
It has undergone significant transformation from the days of the civil war to the phase of professional security.
In many ways, one of the main things that the Kurdistan region shows for with the rest of the country is its security.
On many occasions it proved capable of hunting down culprits or those who disturbed peace in the region.
A key element in their work is the steady flaw of information to the public about the case in question.
The key factor for this is people’s sense of ownership of the place and as a result their cooperation with the security services.
The killing of Zardasht presented a new challenge for the security service’s professionalism. By modern standards, it has so far failed to be up to the task.
When the murder was discovered, all, including the security services, condemned it.
This is fine but not enough for the public. Instead of just condemning, the public was expecting information about the circumstances of the killing.
Usually, a the security agency provides the public with detailed information available to them up to the time of the announcement and encourages the public to help with the investigation by contacting them if they have any leads on the crime.
Although a committee was set up to investigate the killing but no information was provided to the public yet about its work and findings
The committee so far has not come up with any new evidence that leads to the culprits or to the understanding of why this murder was perpetrated.
Providing the public with regular updates that contain as much information available as possible is the key factor in preventing rumors and innuendos prevailing and the accusations and counteraccusations of the politicians would still continue.
At times of crisis, the security agency is usually the one that rallies public support and confidence in the state institutions it is also the one that creates a sense of ownership of the process.
The committee has the opportunity to depoliticize the case and put the case in the hands of the people of security and law and not people of politics.

New Shia bloc: deadlock or breakthrough

The new shia bloc formed recently brings good news and bad news to other blocs and to the political process.
it further adds a new complication to the ongoing issue of naming the pm.
It brings good news to the kurds because they cease to be the fourth bloc in parliament and they would be dealt with as a component of the Iraqi society.
This will strengthen their standing in parliament because they would not be seen for their seat numbers when it comes to the naming of the PM their consent to the next pm would have to be a condition.
The bad news for them is that they would be stuck between Iran and the Arab world.
One of the key issues on the agenda for the kurds over the next four years is the disputed areas and they are controlled by al-Iraqiya.
They would be stuck between history and geography. Historically and politically, they would have an easier deal with the Shia blocs, or bloc. But their geographic proximity to areas dominated by al-Iraqiya would make it difficult for them to strike a strong deal with the Shia only.
So their choice of naming the PM will strongly be influenced by the relationship between Al-Iraqiya and the shia bloc.
As for the Shia bloc, their unification seems to be a good step in the direction of keeping the premiership with the Shias, but it is strongly undermined by their internal differences and their external pressure mostly from Iran to stay united.
Their differences stem mostly from the fact that they are not united over the name of the next pm and the fact that each group of them has a different option of who from the Sunnis they should ally with outside the bloc.
By unifying they took the first step of undoing what the new election law was about. It was intended to break the sectarian and ethnic nature of voting in Iraq. But putting all the shia in one group proves that the political process of Iraq is still far from being based on real political issues. It is still very much divided along sectarian and ethnic lines.
Although the unification makes them the biggest player, it also makes it more difficult for them to ally themselves with just on of the two other blocs, Al-Iraqiya and the kurds. Since they opted for the shia identity to be in one group , they have to chose both, the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs as partners.
Since national politics in the country is still ethnic and sectarian, all three main components need to be running the affairs of the country.
As for Iraqiya, tacitly they are split. Those who want a position in the next government are not so keen for Allawi to become a PM. Because, if he is appointed as PM, they would lose some strong ministries for that position.
Allawi himself seems to settle for nothing less than the PM post.
The formation of the new Shia bloc provides them with the assurances that they would not be ousted but it also send allawi the bad news of losing his chance to form the next government.
In short, the formation of the new shia group presents every one with two options to ally with. Each one of the choices is not viable on its own. Given all the challenges and the tasks that lie ahead, the only way forward is to form a national unity government.
But the stumbling block still is the name of the pm. It is obvious that it would be a Shia, but the two other lists would be better of with a weak compromise candidate to be appointed. It could even be good for a better federal system of the country.

Put Policy Before Personality

It seems the new Iraqi state still has some way to go before the interests of the public are put above those of its leaders.
There does not seem to be any sense of urgency among the leaders in Baghdad to settle the ongoing saga of who is going to form the next government, despite US Vice President Joseph Biden’s recent statement affirming his country’s determination to withdraw most of its troop after two months.
The March election proved that politics in our society is still very much polarised and personalised. No one managed to get enough seats to form a majority government.
The attempted alliances, the talks over forming new blocs and the dispute over the results are all centered around the issue of who should lead the country.
They do not address the questions the electorate is most interested in – how will the next government work, and what will it do.
The partisan divisions and personality politics that flourish in Iraq have caused the delay in forming the government. Almost three months have elapsed and we still do not seem to be any closer to having a new administration.
With every day that passes, the electorate is losing faith in representatives it recently elected to office.
While these representatives fight over who is to be the next PM, they could also work towards bringing the views of the people to the foreground.
This can be done by seeking to build a national consensus over the issues that are important for the Iraqi voter over the next four years.
A team of elected representatives who are not seeking cabinet posts could get together to produce a national charter that sets the roadmap for the country over the next four years. It can also serve as the political programme for the next government.
This would be a step to assure the public that Iraq’s political process is about policy, not personalities.
The charter can address issues on which there is some consensus, ranging from security and national reconciliation to public services and good governance; from guaranteeing democratic rights and freedoms to economic prosperity and transparency.
The longer the current uncertainty continues, the more divided society will become and the less room there will be for a common platform that all Iraqis can agree on.
The longer it takes to name a PM, the more external interference is allowed in the country’s affairs, making the choice of leader less representative of Iraqi interests.
Putting the Iraqi people’s representatives in one room to agree on a common platform for the country would contribute greatly to reducing the differences between them. It would give the people a clearer vision as to what the next government should do for them.
A national charter would in effect be an important cornerstone for national consensus over the next four years. It would be an important step away from the polarisation and personalization that Iraqi politics is seeing now.
It would also reduce the amount of opposition to the next PM by blocs that would not take part in government. The argument would be that although they did not nominate the PM, they had a say in drafting his job description.
If such a charter is not drafted for the next government, there is a risk that whoever is leading the country will have to make up the steps as they go along, especially when it comes to the first challenge – handling the withdrawal of the US forces that Biden has promised.

A Turkish Schizophrenia

The people in Iraqi Kurdistan lost count of the times that Turkey and Iran, “in pursuit of PKK or PEJAK fighters”, bombed their villages and areas.
Every few weeks, we hear news of Turkish aircraft bombing border areas and Iranian artillery shelling the other side.
Hours later, we hear a few Kurdish condemnations, nothing from Baghdad or any other capital. A day later, we see many villagers whose homes were destroyed telling horror stories of the bombardment.
All of this happens and hardly any PKK or PEJAK casualty is reported.
The recent Turkish bombing and Iranian shelling of border areas of Iraqi Kurdistan is another episode in this endless soap opera.
This and the silence of Baghdad and other capitals should present an opportunity for the Kurdish leadership to review their policy and act accordingly towards their friends and foes.
While we hear the news of an intense debate inside Turkey on the role of the military and constitutional reforms, we see no reflection of that on the ground here. Especially, since most of the debate is sparked by the Kurdish issue and the “situation in northern Iraq”.
With all the talk of reforms and openness in Turkey, one would expect that these attacks be stopped. But they say one thing and do the other.
This clearly indicates that there are two Turkeys; one in Ankara and one on the border.
One that sends its ambassador to the president of the region and invites him to Ankara and another that bombs his region and probably still considers him a terrorist or at least a friend of them!
One that sends business people and another that sends soldiers.
This Turkish schizophrenia towards Kurdistan must stop. Turkey’s strength in the region is that it endeavors to be a democratic model in the Middle East. Their talk of openness and reform is setting Turkey in that direction.
Turkey’s regional peacemaking efforts, in conflicts that are not that different from that of its own, are also an indication of their will to assume a strong regional role.
Their behavior on the Iraqi border makes them no different to Iran, who is a master of saying one thing and doing the other.
Turkey must decide if this is a model they want to follow.
The grounds for putting an end to this issue are there.
The Kurds consistently say that they genuinely want to be friends with Turkey.
As a result, they say that they respect international borders and will not allow any attacks on Turkey, or Iran, from their land.
They have offered in the past the presence of observers along the border. This offer still stands.
While all of these offers are there, the Kurds say that in return Turkey should stop these futile attacks and incursions and act in accordance with the rhetoric used inside Turkey.
The Kurds also wonder if Turkey and Iran are testing the viability of the Iraqi state by these attacks.
This question should be answered by Baghdad and namely by the non-Kurdish political blocs who are now vying for power.
The blocs’ response to these attacks could be a decisive factor in who the Kurds should support in forming the government.
A Kurdish observer said that “we still remember the loud noise made by all when Iran seized the Fakka oil fields in the south of Iraq, where are these voices today?”
With every new attack, the people of Kurdistan are getting more and more convinced that the target of these operations is not the PKK or PEJAK. It is them and the rest who are supposed to be allies are watching.

Failings of Kurdish Media Exposed

Press reaction to shocking killing of young journalist underlines the need for substantive reforms.
If as many suspect Sardasht Osman was killed because of what he wrote, this should really serve as a reminder for us all of the dire state of our media and the urgent need to reform it.
The reaction to his shocking death in both pro-government and opposition media has been depressing and sadly predictable.
Osman, a student journalist who had criticised the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, was abducted in the regional capital, Erbil, on May 4. His body was found a day later in the nearby city of Mosul.
Politicising this killing, and trying to put the blame before the real facts are known will not serve anyone.
It complicates things more, because in a sense, the government, the opposition and the media must all share some responsibility for the unhealthy environment for public discourse in which a murder such as this could take place.
If no real and practical steps are taken to address the shortcomings of the government, the opposition and the media, then it is likely that a tragedy such as this will reoccur.
Just before his re-election, President Massoud Barzani invited a number of journalists to speak to them about the issues of the day. At the end of the meeting, Barzani said, “You have been asking me questions. Now it is my turn.” He asked, “What makes someone a journalist?”
A few tried to answer his question but no answer was really satisfactory.
“So anyone who publishes a paper and insults people becomes a journalist?” the president asked. Nobody disagreed.
Unfortunately, this is part of the reality in today’s Kurdistan. But not every media outlet here is a place for trading insults and not every journalist is an insult trader.
The majority of our journalists want to be professionals, informing and provoking thought in the public and holding those in power to account.
But the onus to do this is on the media itself. This is not an easy task and it will not happen overnight. The media outlets need to persevere in maintaining high professional standards and not get driven by profit or political propaganda regardless of the quality of the content.
Likewise, the government and the political establishment here need to realise that providing factual information to the public will only help their task of governing and not diminish it.
The ruling parties and the opposition have also contributed to getting to this stage. The ruling parties encourage and promote “red-carpet” or pro-government journalism, while the opposition encourages the journalism of dissent.
This unwholesome atmosphere in which the Kurdish media operates makes it easy for people to just defame, insult or praise others with complete disregard to any code of ethics or professional standards. As a result, there is less room for real professional journalists to work up to a good international professional standard.
At the same time, they both encourage and fund shadowy low-level, at times satirical, websites and magazines to say whatever they cannot say in their official media.
Sardasht Osman’s case holds up a mirror to the current sad state of affairs. He wrote for a shadowy outlet, his killing was reported in various ways depending on the media, and the campaign that followed was seized on as an opportunity to make political attacks.
An international journalist based in Erbil, who has been following the development of Sardasht’s case closely, told me, “In Iraqi Kurdistan everyone is shouting and no one is listening.”
This environment is further aggravated by the institutional failure to provide information that the public needs. This ranges from information about the smallest of projects to the top political developments of the region that affect the livelihood of the public.
The government needs to be forthcoming in providing the information to the public. The more information is made available, the less room there will be for rumour and innuendo on the news pages. The more accurate the information, the more sound and professional the analysis and the commentary would be.
It sometimes seems that even basic information about government is regarded as a state secret.
An editor-in-chief of a publication, now supported by the opposition, once told a visiting British parliamentary delegation, “We deliberately publish lies when the official concerned does not respond to us.
“We publish the lie with the hope that he/she comes out with the truth once the lie is published.”
This is a disgrace to journalism, government and the opposition. But this is the reality of the current state of affairs.
Changing this is the responsibility of all and whoever takes the first step would be the knight in shining armour.
The media needs to provide a high professional standard of journalism that makes the outlet a provider of information, news, analysis and informed and valued views and comments. Not a platform where you are free to say anything you want to.
Both the government and the opposition need to support the media in professionalising and raising the level of the game.
The Kurdistan region’s parliament has to create a legislative, regulatory and institutional framework for the media to evolve from its partisan role to providing a service to the general public.
When the press law was passed in 2008, it was rushed and it was not well studied.
The parliament needs to provide a legal framework that guarantees the right to information and the right to free speech. It also needs to provide a regulatory framework through establishing a media commission for the region.
This commission would be an important step in the right direction. It would be a creature of parliament and it would support the media in the development of free and responsible journalism.
The purpose of the commission will be to defend press freedom and freedom of expression. It will promote the best international standards of news and information gathering, reporting, and editorial commentary. It will do so through a code of ethics and standards, and through the development of realistic professional training.
Another important function for such a commission would be to arbitrate in disputes involving the media, and its decisions would have the force of law.
The commission’s first task would be to propose a local code for journalism that complies with the United Nations Convention on Human Rights and that can be offered for ratification by the Kurdish parliament.
It can also work with the parliament to legislate for the freedom of speech and freedom of information: two key components for creating a good and healthy environment for the media.
All of this does not happen overnight. But the first step of the process must be taken. Otherwise, it is only a matter of time before we see another Sardasht Osman.

Iraq at Crossroads

As Iraqis remember the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime this month, they are ready to usher in a new era that marks the end of extremism and the beginning of good governance and national reconciliation.
Iraqi leaders must now decide whether to spearhead these efforts with the support of the international community, a decision that could seal their political fate.
We have held democratic elections, bravely combated extremist atrocities and averted the danger of a civil war. We are now starting to be able to stand on our own.
Despite the recent spate of violence, the worst days are behind us. It is now time for Iraq to enter a new phase of its history by moving forward and facing the challenges of establishing a true democracy.
This will be an era that requires good governance and national reconciliation. Implementing these will be major tests for Iraq’s leaders, who will be held to account by an electorate that has proven both vocal and powerful.
While Iraq still faces challenges, the achievements have been monumental. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime was followed by a bloody and emotional period of uncertainty, the traces of which are still present today.
This is perfectly understandable in a country with the baggage of 80 years of bloodshed, dictatorship, discrimination and intolerance.
Iraq was in fragments, with the Shia afraid of the past, the Sunni of the future and the Kurds afraid of both.
Despite the divisions, Iraqi leaders managed to sit down under one roof and agree to a constitution – one that was approved by 79 per cent of voters. Five elections have been held and three different prime ministers have held office, all vital signs of a vibrant democracy.
The power shift to the individual has been equally impressive. While most of our politicians emerged as strong leaders, they were humbled by the power of the voter and their decision to oust many incumbents, including leaders who were symbols of divisiveness.
The unpredictability of any political process is a sign of a healthy democracy. After last month’s parliamentary election, we still don’t know who the prime minister is.
The changes in government have empowered the people and emboldened democracy. In most Middle Eastern countries, citizens are stuck with their leaders for life. The source of strength of Iraqis is that we can – and do - change our representatives.
It is time for Iraqi leaders to step up by promoting national reconciliation and good governance. These should be the priorities of the next government, and require the strong backing of the international community.
On April 9, Iraq as a country was completely destroyed – not just the society, but also the state. Iraqis had the monumental task of rebuilding everything from scratch. It was, and is, not easy. We’re still not there. We have too many enemies, among them extremism and corruption.
Thanks to the brave soldiers of both Iraq and the United States, extremist acts are subsiding. But corruption is still rife. Unfortunately, the two feed off each other.
The primary way for us to rid the country of corruption is to promote good governance. This is obtained through the true separation of powers, greater transparency and a strong and free independent media that holds officials accountable.
Iraq’s new leadership will need to take strong decisions to promote national reconciliation, which will be the last nail in the coffin that ends extremism.
For Iraq to tackle these challenges, we need the international community to support civil society and the Iraqi media. The international community can work with Iraqi institutions to promote good governance through strengthening the media, civil society and state institutions to encourage a culture of transparency and accountability.
The more milestones that are reached, the easier it will be for Iraq to be a healthy state in the Middle East and a viable political and economic partner for anyone seeking an ally in the region.
Iraq can be the example that shows the world that Islam and democracy are not mutually exclusive. Unlike some of America’s pseudo-friends in the region, Iraq can be Islamic and a true friend of the United States.
America can be an especially strong partner as Iraq addresses some of its biggest challenges yet. With the emergence of a new government, elected officials will have just four years to tackle corruption and national reconciliation.
If leaders achieve these important milestones, they will win over Iraqis and lead the country on the path of a true democracy. If they fail, however, Iraqis will not hesitate to escort them out the door.