Maliki bolstered by sweep

The Iraqi PM's recent move to restore order in Basra may have been successful, but extending that success to Mosul will prove difficult.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent crackdown on militias in Basra has opened a fresh chapter in Iraqi politics, given the army new impetus, and restored a degree of public confidence in the state's ability to enforce the rule of law.
But building on this success will depends greatly on his next move, an operation to clear the northern city of Mosul of al-Qaeda and Baathist militants.
When the operation codenamed "Charge of the Knights" was launched in Basra around the beginning of April, many saw it as a make-or-break moment for the prime minister and for the Iraqi army.
Maliki's declaration that he would pursue the "outlaws" to the end won him new allies and rallied the country's political leaders behind him.
His Sunni opponents, in particular, hailed the assault on the lawless paramilitary groups that effectively controlled Basra as a bold step in the right direction.
The major Sunni political bloc, the Accord Front, had withdrawn from the cabinet, but has signalled its desire to return to government as a result of the Basra operation.
As Accord Front leader Adnan al-Dulaimi made clear, one of the bloc's demands was to "hunt down and disband the militias and curb the outlaws."
Sunni leaders have since indicated that the Maliki government has taken sufficient action on addressing their concerns to allow them to end their boycott.
Another gain for the prime minister was the rapprochement he achieved with Iraqi vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi, one of the most prominent and powerful Sunni figures engaged in the political process. The often strained relationship between the two men was one of the factors that led to the Sunni boycott of the cabinet.
Hashimi has publicly backed the Basra assault, and now sits together with the prime minister in the crisis operations room that is considering how to handle the next issue on Maliki's agenda – Mosul.
Maliki has also won broader backing, reflected in a declaration issued by the Political Council for National Security, a 19-member body that brings together the three-member presidency including the Iraqi president himself, the prime minister and deputy premiers, the speaker of parliament and his deputies, the heads of the various blocs in the legislature, the president of the Kurdistan region and the head of the Iraqi judiciary.
The document, which outlines the principles by which Iraq's political system should operate, is broadly supportive of Maliki.
Significantly, the only reservations were expressed by the Sadrists, the supporters of radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr whose armed faction, the Mahdi Army, was one of the groups targeted in Basra.
From a military perspective, analysts and local army commanders agree that the Basra operation was poorly prepared.
Nevertheless, as the first real test of the new Iraqi army, it was overall a resounding success.
By and large, the troops obeyed orders to fight militiamen even when they shared the same Shia affiliation.
There were some deserters, reluctant to fight against fellow-Shia and Sadrists. Yet at 1,500 out of the 30,000 men deployed for the operation, the incidence of desertion was viewed as insignificant and no cause for alarm.
Defense sources in Baghdad even welcomed the fact. As one source close to the defense ministry put it, "It was a good way to weed out the bad elements and the unprofessional soldiers."
At the same time, the desertions highlighted the military's need for more training, as well for a proper vetting system during the recruitment process.
All in all, though, the operation represented an important step towards establishing a truly national, professional army.
The government was given a further boost when Sadr issued a statement urging the government to accept the deserters to return to their army duties.
More recently, Sadr's appeal for calm and the avoidance of bloodshed has generally been interpreted as an admission of failure, and as a sign that Maliki's drive to control Basra has been at least partly successful.
Although the government now controls large areas of the city including the port areas, there are still parts of Basra that remain beyond its reach, and many of the militia leaders are still at large.
After Basra, the prime minister has ordered similar operations against Shia militias in other parts of Iraq, in the face of repeated calls – largely prompted by Iran – for an end to the campaign.
If he wants to maintain the current level of support he is getting from across the political spectrum, Maliki will have to show continued resolve to go after the militias wherever they are. That will be no easy task, since it will be unpopular among the prime minister's own Shia constituency.
Maliki's leadership qualities both as prime minister and commander-in-chief of the armed force are being put to the test.
He was elevated to power in 2006 as the result of a political deal between the diverse political blocs that had won seats in parliament. Over the past two years, however, many questions have been raised about his capacity to lead a government of national unity and to act as a truly non-sectarian prime minister.
To an extent, the Basra operation has quelled those doubts.
By the time he embarks on a military operation to regain control over Mosul, he will need to have removed the last traces of doubt that he is a prime minister for all Iraqis, and that Shia and Sunni "outlaws" are to be dealt with in exactly the same manner.
By the same token, the current level of Sunni support will need to be sustained when it comes to the Mosul operation, especially as it is expected to be a lot more difficult than Basra was.
Winning the backing of leading Sunni politicians to take on wayward Shia militias is one thing; asking them to approve military action in a city regarded as a hotbed of Sunni Islamists and Arab nationalists is quite another.
In Mosul, the enemy is an amalgam of al-Qaida and diehard Baathists. These forces are a lot less visible, and a good deal more effective, than the Mahdi Army.
Another problem is that unlike the western Sunni provinces, Mosul has not seen the emergence of strong "awakening councils" – the local groups which have taken up arms against al-Qaida.
In short, much of what was achieved in Basra is going to be sorely tested in the Mosul operation.
Basra was about demonstrating that Iraq has one army and one commander-in-chief. Mosul will test whether Sunni political groups really subscribe to this notion.

A time for moderates?

The twenty fifth Turkish military incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan to root out the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) and the way it ended proved that that there can be no military solution to this issue. It has been tried 25 times, with and without the help of the Iraqi Kurds and the United States, and it has not worked. The few times where a ceasefire was mediated--secretly or openly--have yielded some results. But they were not capitalized on or followed with other steps.
An opportunity is emerging this time. It should not be spoiled. The Kurds of Iraq are more and more convinced that the PKK issue is an irritating factor that is hampering progress in relations with their much-needed neighbor Turkey.
For Iraq, Turkey is an important neighbor. For the Kurdistan region, Turkey is the only neighbor with access to the outside world. The Kurds appreciate the importance of long-term strategic ties with Turkey. US troops will one day leave; Turkey is staying. Similarly, a day will come when the PKK presence ends, but the Iraqi Kurds are staying.
Since the early 1990s, the Kurds of Iraq understand that Turkey is a red line that cannot be crossed. They also now know that the United States is not "like a man with two wives" as an Iraqi Kurd in Sulaimaniya told the New York Times in the run-up to the Turkish military incursion into the region. Yet the events that followed and the level of US cooperation proved that this was wrong. America does have two allies: a long-standing Turkish one and a nascent Iraqi one.
The Kurds of Iraq are part of the Iraqi ally. But a military operation against the PKK is not an option for them. Their previous experience of fighting the PKK illustrates this clearly. Since the mid-1990s many operations, joint and unilateral, were conducted against the PKK. The result was bitter memories and a great loss of life. Now, a few thousand lives later, the Kurds of Iraq are not willing to repeat the same military and political mistake.
"I am amazed how short-spanned is their memory," a local Peshmerga commander said after the failure of the last military operation and the quick pull out by Turkey. "They forgot how difficult the area of the PKK is. They can try for 25 more times. All they can catch is partridges in these mountains," he added.
The PKK area is an impossible one. It is now dubbed the Tora Bora of Kurdistan. A Kurdish military operation to root the PKK out will only strengthen them and rally people to their cause at a time when their popularity is waning and more calls are raised for them to stop attacking Turkey.
The PKK themselves are looking for a way out of this dilemma. They feel that Iraqi Kurdish public opinion is becoming less tolerant of their presence. No demonstrations were held this time in Iraqi Kurdistan in their support. Also, the PKK has come to terms with the reality that it cannot change Turkey by force. Hence its demands have been minimized to cultural, democratic and political rights for the Kurds of Turkey.
The Turkish stance on dealing with the Kurdish issue has been oscillating between radicals who want the eradication of the PKK militarily and moderates who want to deal with the Kurdish issue politically. Allowing a bigger Kurdish cultural, political and democratic breathing space in Turkey would certainly close down the PKK on both sides of the border.
The Kurds of Iraq do not want to pay the price for, nor do they want to be a party to, Turkey's internal differences on this issue. But a political step as such would make their lives much easier. It would enable them to rally the public (on both sides of the border) in favor of pushing the PKK into further isolation. Turkey does not need 25 more incursions to accept that a political course of action is the roadmap for a solution and the most effective way to end the PKK issue.
The situation is ripe for a face-saving solution for all parties. The key is direct talks between Ankara and Arbil. The US called for this when Vice-President Dick Cheney visited Ankara and Arbil last month. Earlier, President Jalal Talabani's visit to Ankara was an icebreaker and a catalyst for a new page in Iraqi-Turkish relations.
A solution is needed today more than any other time. All sides realize that they have a lot to lose if the situation escalates and deteriorates. There are radicals and moderates on all sides. The radicals had their time, and failed. Perhaps it is time that the moderates take the lead.