Forty days have passed since the murder of zardasht othman. Regardless of the reasons and the circumstances that led to the killing which is open for interpretation. Nobody still knows what has actually happened.
The public is still looking for answers, while the authorities are still trying to fend off the allegations of their involvement in the murder. The decisive factor in this is the work and findings of the committee established to investigate the murder.
The security service in the region has a good track record for its professionalism and efficiency in protecting the region and its inhabitants, especially in recent years.
It has undergone significant transformation from the days of the civil war to the phase of professional security.
In many ways, one of the main things that the Kurdistan region shows for with the rest of the country is its security.
On many occasions it proved capable of hunting down culprits or those who disturbed peace in the region.
A key element in their work is the steady flaw of information to the public about the case in question.
The key factor for this is people’s sense of ownership of the place and as a result their cooperation with the security services.
The killing of Zardasht presented a new challenge for the security service’s professionalism. By modern standards, it has so far failed to be up to the task.
When the murder was discovered, all, including the security services, condemned it.
This is fine but not enough for the public. Instead of just condemning, the public was expecting information about the circumstances of the killing.
Usually, a the security agency provides the public with detailed information available to them up to the time of the announcement and encourages the public to help with the investigation by contacting them if they have any leads on the crime.
Although a committee was set up to investigate the killing but no information was provided to the public yet about its work and findings
The committee so far has not come up with any new evidence that leads to the culprits or to the understanding of why this murder was perpetrated.
Providing the public with regular updates that contain as much information available as possible is the key factor in preventing rumors and innuendos prevailing and the accusations and counteraccusations of the politicians would still continue.
At times of crisis, the security agency is usually the one that rallies public support and confidence in the state institutions it is also the one that creates a sense of ownership of the process.
The committee has the opportunity to depoliticize the case and put the case in the hands of the people of security and law and not people of politics.
Friday, June 25, 2010
Friday, June 18, 2010
New Shia bloc: deadlock or breakthrough
The new shia bloc formed recently brings good news and bad news to other blocs and to the political process.
it further adds a new complication to the ongoing issue of naming the pm.
It brings good news to the kurds because they cease to be the fourth bloc in parliament and they would be dealt with as a component of the Iraqi society.
This will strengthen their standing in parliament because they would not be seen for their seat numbers when it comes to the naming of the PM their consent to the next pm would have to be a condition.
The bad news for them is that they would be stuck between Iran and the Arab world.
One of the key issues on the agenda for the kurds over the next four years is the disputed areas and they are controlled by al-Iraqiya.
They would be stuck between history and geography. Historically and politically, they would have an easier deal with the Shia blocs, or bloc. But their geographic proximity to areas dominated by al-Iraqiya would make it difficult for them to strike a strong deal with the Shia only.
So their choice of naming the PM will strongly be influenced by the relationship between Al-Iraqiya and the shia bloc.
As for the Shia bloc, their unification seems to be a good step in the direction of keeping the premiership with the Shias, but it is strongly undermined by their internal differences and their external pressure mostly from Iran to stay united.
Their differences stem mostly from the fact that they are not united over the name of the next pm and the fact that each group of them has a different option of who from the Sunnis they should ally with outside the bloc.
By unifying they took the first step of undoing what the new election law was about. It was intended to break the sectarian and ethnic nature of voting in Iraq. But putting all the shia in one group proves that the political process of Iraq is still far from being based on real political issues. It is still very much divided along sectarian and ethnic lines.
Although the unification makes them the biggest player, it also makes it more difficult for them to ally themselves with just on of the two other blocs, Al-Iraqiya and the kurds. Since they opted for the shia identity to be in one group , they have to chose both, the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs as partners.
Since national politics in the country is still ethnic and sectarian, all three main components need to be running the affairs of the country.
As for Iraqiya, tacitly they are split. Those who want a position in the next government are not so keen for Allawi to become a PM. Because, if he is appointed as PM, they would lose some strong ministries for that position.
Allawi himself seems to settle for nothing less than the PM post.
The formation of the new Shia bloc provides them with the assurances that they would not be ousted but it also send allawi the bad news of losing his chance to form the next government.
In short, the formation of the new shia group presents every one with two options to ally with. Each one of the choices is not viable on its own. Given all the challenges and the tasks that lie ahead, the only way forward is to form a national unity government.
But the stumbling block still is the name of the pm. It is obvious that it would be a Shia, but the two other lists would be better of with a weak compromise candidate to be appointed. It could even be good for a better federal system of the country.
it further adds a new complication to the ongoing issue of naming the pm.
It brings good news to the kurds because they cease to be the fourth bloc in parliament and they would be dealt with as a component of the Iraqi society.
This will strengthen their standing in parliament because they would not be seen for their seat numbers when it comes to the naming of the PM their consent to the next pm would have to be a condition.
The bad news for them is that they would be stuck between Iran and the Arab world.
One of the key issues on the agenda for the kurds over the next four years is the disputed areas and they are controlled by al-Iraqiya.
They would be stuck between history and geography. Historically and politically, they would have an easier deal with the Shia blocs, or bloc. But their geographic proximity to areas dominated by al-Iraqiya would make it difficult for them to strike a strong deal with the Shia only.
So their choice of naming the PM will strongly be influenced by the relationship between Al-Iraqiya and the shia bloc.
As for the Shia bloc, their unification seems to be a good step in the direction of keeping the premiership with the Shias, but it is strongly undermined by their internal differences and their external pressure mostly from Iran to stay united.
Their differences stem mostly from the fact that they are not united over the name of the next pm and the fact that each group of them has a different option of who from the Sunnis they should ally with outside the bloc.
By unifying they took the first step of undoing what the new election law was about. It was intended to break the sectarian and ethnic nature of voting in Iraq. But putting all the shia in one group proves that the political process of Iraq is still far from being based on real political issues. It is still very much divided along sectarian and ethnic lines.
Although the unification makes them the biggest player, it also makes it more difficult for them to ally themselves with just on of the two other blocs, Al-Iraqiya and the kurds. Since they opted for the shia identity to be in one group , they have to chose both, the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs as partners.
Since national politics in the country is still ethnic and sectarian, all three main components need to be running the affairs of the country.
As for Iraqiya, tacitly they are split. Those who want a position in the next government are not so keen for Allawi to become a PM. Because, if he is appointed as PM, they would lose some strong ministries for that position.
Allawi himself seems to settle for nothing less than the PM post.
The formation of the new Shia bloc provides them with the assurances that they would not be ousted but it also send allawi the bad news of losing his chance to form the next government.
In short, the formation of the new shia group presents every one with two options to ally with. Each one of the choices is not viable on its own. Given all the challenges and the tasks that lie ahead, the only way forward is to form a national unity government.
But the stumbling block still is the name of the pm. It is obvious that it would be a Shia, but the two other lists would be better of with a weak compromise candidate to be appointed. It could even be good for a better federal system of the country.
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Put Policy Before Personality
It seems the new Iraqi state still has some way to go before the interests of the public are put above those of its leaders.
There does not seem to be any sense of urgency among the leaders in Baghdad to settle the ongoing saga of who is going to form the next government, despite US Vice President Joseph Biden’s recent statement affirming his country’s determination to withdraw most of its troop after two months.
The March election proved that politics in our society is still very much polarised and personalised. No one managed to get enough seats to form a majority government.
The attempted alliances, the talks over forming new blocs and the dispute over the results are all centered around the issue of who should lead the country.
They do not address the questions the electorate is most interested in – how will the next government work, and what will it do.
The partisan divisions and personality politics that flourish in Iraq have caused the delay in forming the government. Almost three months have elapsed and we still do not seem to be any closer to having a new administration.
With every day that passes, the electorate is losing faith in representatives it recently elected to office.
While these representatives fight over who is to be the next PM, they could also work towards bringing the views of the people to the foreground.
This can be done by seeking to build a national consensus over the issues that are important for the Iraqi voter over the next four years.
A team of elected representatives who are not seeking cabinet posts could get together to produce a national charter that sets the roadmap for the country over the next four years. It can also serve as the political programme for the next government.
This would be a step to assure the public that Iraq’s political process is about policy, not personalities.
The charter can address issues on which there is some consensus, ranging from security and national reconciliation to public services and good governance; from guaranteeing democratic rights and freedoms to economic prosperity and transparency.
The longer the current uncertainty continues, the more divided society will become and the less room there will be for a common platform that all Iraqis can agree on.
The longer it takes to name a PM, the more external interference is allowed in the country’s affairs, making the choice of leader less representative of Iraqi interests.
Putting the Iraqi people’s representatives in one room to agree on a common platform for the country would contribute greatly to reducing the differences between them. It would give the people a clearer vision as to what the next government should do for them.
A national charter would in effect be an important cornerstone for national consensus over the next four years. It would be an important step away from the polarisation and personalization that Iraqi politics is seeing now.
It would also reduce the amount of opposition to the next PM by blocs that would not take part in government. The argument would be that although they did not nominate the PM, they had a say in drafting his job description.
If such a charter is not drafted for the next government, there is a risk that whoever is leading the country will have to make up the steps as they go along, especially when it comes to the first challenge – handling the withdrawal of the US forces that Biden has promised.
There does not seem to be any sense of urgency among the leaders in Baghdad to settle the ongoing saga of who is going to form the next government, despite US Vice President Joseph Biden’s recent statement affirming his country’s determination to withdraw most of its troop after two months.
The March election proved that politics in our society is still very much polarised and personalised. No one managed to get enough seats to form a majority government.
The attempted alliances, the talks over forming new blocs and the dispute over the results are all centered around the issue of who should lead the country.
They do not address the questions the electorate is most interested in – how will the next government work, and what will it do.
The partisan divisions and personality politics that flourish in Iraq have caused the delay in forming the government. Almost three months have elapsed and we still do not seem to be any closer to having a new administration.
With every day that passes, the electorate is losing faith in representatives it recently elected to office.
While these representatives fight over who is to be the next PM, they could also work towards bringing the views of the people to the foreground.
This can be done by seeking to build a national consensus over the issues that are important for the Iraqi voter over the next four years.
A team of elected representatives who are not seeking cabinet posts could get together to produce a national charter that sets the roadmap for the country over the next four years. It can also serve as the political programme for the next government.
This would be a step to assure the public that Iraq’s political process is about policy, not personalities.
The charter can address issues on which there is some consensus, ranging from security and national reconciliation to public services and good governance; from guaranteeing democratic rights and freedoms to economic prosperity and transparency.
The longer the current uncertainty continues, the more divided society will become and the less room there will be for a common platform that all Iraqis can agree on.
The longer it takes to name a PM, the more external interference is allowed in the country’s affairs, making the choice of leader less representative of Iraqi interests.
Putting the Iraqi people’s representatives in one room to agree on a common platform for the country would contribute greatly to reducing the differences between them. It would give the people a clearer vision as to what the next government should do for them.
A national charter would in effect be an important cornerstone for national consensus over the next four years. It would be an important step away from the polarisation and personalization that Iraqi politics is seeing now.
It would also reduce the amount of opposition to the next PM by blocs that would not take part in government. The argument would be that although they did not nominate the PM, they had a say in drafting his job description.
If such a charter is not drafted for the next government, there is a risk that whoever is leading the country will have to make up the steps as they go along, especially when it comes to the first challenge – handling the withdrawal of the US forces that Biden has promised.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
A Turkish Schizophrenia
The people in Iraqi Kurdistan lost count of the times that Turkey and Iran, “in pursuit of PKK or PEJAK fighters”, bombed their villages and areas.
Every few weeks, we hear news of Turkish aircraft bombing border areas and Iranian artillery shelling the other side.
Hours later, we hear a few Kurdish condemnations, nothing from Baghdad or any other capital. A day later, we see many villagers whose homes were destroyed telling horror stories of the bombardment.
All of this happens and hardly any PKK or PEJAK casualty is reported.
The recent Turkish bombing and Iranian shelling of border areas of Iraqi Kurdistan is another episode in this endless soap opera.
This and the silence of Baghdad and other capitals should present an opportunity for the Kurdish leadership to review their policy and act accordingly towards their friends and foes.
While we hear the news of an intense debate inside Turkey on the role of the military and constitutional reforms, we see no reflection of that on the ground here. Especially, since most of the debate is sparked by the Kurdish issue and the “situation in northern Iraq”.
With all the talk of reforms and openness in Turkey, one would expect that these attacks be stopped. But they say one thing and do the other.
This clearly indicates that there are two Turkeys; one in Ankara and one on the border.
One that sends its ambassador to the president of the region and invites him to Ankara and another that bombs his region and probably still considers him a terrorist or at least a friend of them!
One that sends business people and another that sends soldiers.
This Turkish schizophrenia towards Kurdistan must stop. Turkey’s strength in the region is that it endeavors to be a democratic model in the Middle East. Their talk of openness and reform is setting Turkey in that direction.
Turkey’s regional peacemaking efforts, in conflicts that are not that different from that of its own, are also an indication of their will to assume a strong regional role.
Their behavior on the Iraqi border makes them no different to Iran, who is a master of saying one thing and doing the other.
Turkey must decide if this is a model they want to follow.
The grounds for putting an end to this issue are there.
The Kurds consistently say that they genuinely want to be friends with Turkey.
As a result, they say that they respect international borders and will not allow any attacks on Turkey, or Iran, from their land.
They have offered in the past the presence of observers along the border. This offer still stands.
While all of these offers are there, the Kurds say that in return Turkey should stop these futile attacks and incursions and act in accordance with the rhetoric used inside Turkey.
The Kurds also wonder if Turkey and Iran are testing the viability of the Iraqi state by these attacks.
This question should be answered by Baghdad and namely by the non-Kurdish political blocs who are now vying for power.
The blocs’ response to these attacks could be a decisive factor in who the Kurds should support in forming the government.
A Kurdish observer said that “we still remember the loud noise made by all when Iran seized the Fakka oil fields in the south of Iraq, where are these voices today?”
With every new attack, the people of Kurdistan are getting more and more convinced that the target of these operations is not the PKK or PEJAK. It is them and the rest who are supposed to be allies are watching.
Every few weeks, we hear news of Turkish aircraft bombing border areas and Iranian artillery shelling the other side.
Hours later, we hear a few Kurdish condemnations, nothing from Baghdad or any other capital. A day later, we see many villagers whose homes were destroyed telling horror stories of the bombardment.
All of this happens and hardly any PKK or PEJAK casualty is reported.
The recent Turkish bombing and Iranian shelling of border areas of Iraqi Kurdistan is another episode in this endless soap opera.
This and the silence of Baghdad and other capitals should present an opportunity for the Kurdish leadership to review their policy and act accordingly towards their friends and foes.
While we hear the news of an intense debate inside Turkey on the role of the military and constitutional reforms, we see no reflection of that on the ground here. Especially, since most of the debate is sparked by the Kurdish issue and the “situation in northern Iraq”.
With all the talk of reforms and openness in Turkey, one would expect that these attacks be stopped. But they say one thing and do the other.
This clearly indicates that there are two Turkeys; one in Ankara and one on the border.
One that sends its ambassador to the president of the region and invites him to Ankara and another that bombs his region and probably still considers him a terrorist or at least a friend of them!
One that sends business people and another that sends soldiers.
This Turkish schizophrenia towards Kurdistan must stop. Turkey’s strength in the region is that it endeavors to be a democratic model in the Middle East. Their talk of openness and reform is setting Turkey in that direction.
Turkey’s regional peacemaking efforts, in conflicts that are not that different from that of its own, are also an indication of their will to assume a strong regional role.
Their behavior on the Iraqi border makes them no different to Iran, who is a master of saying one thing and doing the other.
Turkey must decide if this is a model they want to follow.
The grounds for putting an end to this issue are there.
The Kurds consistently say that they genuinely want to be friends with Turkey.
As a result, they say that they respect international borders and will not allow any attacks on Turkey, or Iran, from their land.
They have offered in the past the presence of observers along the border. This offer still stands.
While all of these offers are there, the Kurds say that in return Turkey should stop these futile attacks and incursions and act in accordance with the rhetoric used inside Turkey.
The Kurds also wonder if Turkey and Iran are testing the viability of the Iraqi state by these attacks.
This question should be answered by Baghdad and namely by the non-Kurdish political blocs who are now vying for power.
The blocs’ response to these attacks could be a decisive factor in who the Kurds should support in forming the government.
A Kurdish observer said that “we still remember the loud noise made by all when Iran seized the Fakka oil fields in the south of Iraq, where are these voices today?”
With every new attack, the people of Kurdistan are getting more and more convinced that the target of these operations is not the PKK or PEJAK. It is them and the rest who are supposed to be allies are watching.
Failings of Kurdish Media Exposed
Press reaction to shocking killing of young journalist underlines the need for substantive reforms.
If as many suspect Sardasht Osman was killed because of what he wrote, this should really serve as a reminder for us all of the dire state of our media and the urgent need to reform it.
The reaction to his shocking death in both pro-government and opposition media has been depressing and sadly predictable.
Osman, a student journalist who had criticised the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, was abducted in the regional capital, Erbil, on May 4. His body was found a day later in the nearby city of Mosul.
Politicising this killing, and trying to put the blame before the real facts are known will not serve anyone.
It complicates things more, because in a sense, the government, the opposition and the media must all share some responsibility for the unhealthy environment for public discourse in which a murder such as this could take place.
If no real and practical steps are taken to address the shortcomings of the government, the opposition and the media, then it is likely that a tragedy such as this will reoccur.
Just before his re-election, President Massoud Barzani invited a number of journalists to speak to them about the issues of the day. At the end of the meeting, Barzani said, “You have been asking me questions. Now it is my turn.” He asked, “What makes someone a journalist?”
A few tried to answer his question but no answer was really satisfactory.
“So anyone who publishes a paper and insults people becomes a journalist?” the president asked. Nobody disagreed.
Unfortunately, this is part of the reality in today’s Kurdistan. But not every media outlet here is a place for trading insults and not every journalist is an insult trader.
The majority of our journalists want to be professionals, informing and provoking thought in the public and holding those in power to account.
But the onus to do this is on the media itself. This is not an easy task and it will not happen overnight. The media outlets need to persevere in maintaining high professional standards and not get driven by profit or political propaganda regardless of the quality of the content.
Likewise, the government and the political establishment here need to realise that providing factual information to the public will only help their task of governing and not diminish it.
The ruling parties and the opposition have also contributed to getting to this stage. The ruling parties encourage and promote “red-carpet” or pro-government journalism, while the opposition encourages the journalism of dissent.
This unwholesome atmosphere in which the Kurdish media operates makes it easy for people to just defame, insult or praise others with complete disregard to any code of ethics or professional standards. As a result, there is less room for real professional journalists to work up to a good international professional standard.
At the same time, they both encourage and fund shadowy low-level, at times satirical, websites and magazines to say whatever they cannot say in their official media.
Sardasht Osman’s case holds up a mirror to the current sad state of affairs. He wrote for a shadowy outlet, his killing was reported in various ways depending on the media, and the campaign that followed was seized on as an opportunity to make political attacks.
An international journalist based in Erbil, who has been following the development of Sardasht’s case closely, told me, “In Iraqi Kurdistan everyone is shouting and no one is listening.”
This environment is further aggravated by the institutional failure to provide information that the public needs. This ranges from information about the smallest of projects to the top political developments of the region that affect the livelihood of the public.
The government needs to be forthcoming in providing the information to the public. The more information is made available, the less room there will be for rumour and innuendo on the news pages. The more accurate the information, the more sound and professional the analysis and the commentary would be.
It sometimes seems that even basic information about government is regarded as a state secret.
An editor-in-chief of a publication, now supported by the opposition, once told a visiting British parliamentary delegation, “We deliberately publish lies when the official concerned does not respond to us.
“We publish the lie with the hope that he/she comes out with the truth once the lie is published.”
This is a disgrace to journalism, government and the opposition. But this is the reality of the current state of affairs.
Changing this is the responsibility of all and whoever takes the first step would be the knight in shining armour.
The media needs to provide a high professional standard of journalism that makes the outlet a provider of information, news, analysis and informed and valued views and comments. Not a platform where you are free to say anything you want to.
Both the government and the opposition need to support the media in professionalising and raising the level of the game.
The Kurdistan region’s parliament has to create a legislative, regulatory and institutional framework for the media to evolve from its partisan role to providing a service to the general public.
When the press law was passed in 2008, it was rushed and it was not well studied.
The parliament needs to provide a legal framework that guarantees the right to information and the right to free speech. It also needs to provide a regulatory framework through establishing a media commission for the region.
This commission would be an important step in the right direction. It would be a creature of parliament and it would support the media in the development of free and responsible journalism.
The purpose of the commission will be to defend press freedom and freedom of expression. It will promote the best international standards of news and information gathering, reporting, and editorial commentary. It will do so through a code of ethics and standards, and through the development of realistic professional training.
Another important function for such a commission would be to arbitrate in disputes involving the media, and its decisions would have the force of law.
The commission’s first task would be to propose a local code for journalism that complies with the United Nations Convention on Human Rights and that can be offered for ratification by the Kurdish parliament.
It can also work with the parliament to legislate for the freedom of speech and freedom of information: two key components for creating a good and healthy environment for the media.
All of this does not happen overnight. But the first step of the process must be taken. Otherwise, it is only a matter of time before we see another Sardasht Osman.
If as many suspect Sardasht Osman was killed because of what he wrote, this should really serve as a reminder for us all of the dire state of our media and the urgent need to reform it.
The reaction to his shocking death in both pro-government and opposition media has been depressing and sadly predictable.
Osman, a student journalist who had criticised the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, was abducted in the regional capital, Erbil, on May 4. His body was found a day later in the nearby city of Mosul.
Politicising this killing, and trying to put the blame before the real facts are known will not serve anyone.
It complicates things more, because in a sense, the government, the opposition and the media must all share some responsibility for the unhealthy environment for public discourse in which a murder such as this could take place.
If no real and practical steps are taken to address the shortcomings of the government, the opposition and the media, then it is likely that a tragedy such as this will reoccur.
Just before his re-election, President Massoud Barzani invited a number of journalists to speak to them about the issues of the day. At the end of the meeting, Barzani said, “You have been asking me questions. Now it is my turn.” He asked, “What makes someone a journalist?”
A few tried to answer his question but no answer was really satisfactory.
“So anyone who publishes a paper and insults people becomes a journalist?” the president asked. Nobody disagreed.
Unfortunately, this is part of the reality in today’s Kurdistan. But not every media outlet here is a place for trading insults and not every journalist is an insult trader.
The majority of our journalists want to be professionals, informing and provoking thought in the public and holding those in power to account.
But the onus to do this is on the media itself. This is not an easy task and it will not happen overnight. The media outlets need to persevere in maintaining high professional standards and not get driven by profit or political propaganda regardless of the quality of the content.
Likewise, the government and the political establishment here need to realise that providing factual information to the public will only help their task of governing and not diminish it.
The ruling parties and the opposition have also contributed to getting to this stage. The ruling parties encourage and promote “red-carpet” or pro-government journalism, while the opposition encourages the journalism of dissent.
This unwholesome atmosphere in which the Kurdish media operates makes it easy for people to just defame, insult or praise others with complete disregard to any code of ethics or professional standards. As a result, there is less room for real professional journalists to work up to a good international professional standard.
At the same time, they both encourage and fund shadowy low-level, at times satirical, websites and magazines to say whatever they cannot say in their official media.
Sardasht Osman’s case holds up a mirror to the current sad state of affairs. He wrote for a shadowy outlet, his killing was reported in various ways depending on the media, and the campaign that followed was seized on as an opportunity to make political attacks.
An international journalist based in Erbil, who has been following the development of Sardasht’s case closely, told me, “In Iraqi Kurdistan everyone is shouting and no one is listening.”
This environment is further aggravated by the institutional failure to provide information that the public needs. This ranges from information about the smallest of projects to the top political developments of the region that affect the livelihood of the public.
The government needs to be forthcoming in providing the information to the public. The more information is made available, the less room there will be for rumour and innuendo on the news pages. The more accurate the information, the more sound and professional the analysis and the commentary would be.
It sometimes seems that even basic information about government is regarded as a state secret.
An editor-in-chief of a publication, now supported by the opposition, once told a visiting British parliamentary delegation, “We deliberately publish lies when the official concerned does not respond to us.
“We publish the lie with the hope that he/she comes out with the truth once the lie is published.”
This is a disgrace to journalism, government and the opposition. But this is the reality of the current state of affairs.
Changing this is the responsibility of all and whoever takes the first step would be the knight in shining armour.
The media needs to provide a high professional standard of journalism that makes the outlet a provider of information, news, analysis and informed and valued views and comments. Not a platform where you are free to say anything you want to.
Both the government and the opposition need to support the media in professionalising and raising the level of the game.
The Kurdistan region’s parliament has to create a legislative, regulatory and institutional framework for the media to evolve from its partisan role to providing a service to the general public.
When the press law was passed in 2008, it was rushed and it was not well studied.
The parliament needs to provide a legal framework that guarantees the right to information and the right to free speech. It also needs to provide a regulatory framework through establishing a media commission for the region.
This commission would be an important step in the right direction. It would be a creature of parliament and it would support the media in the development of free and responsible journalism.
The purpose of the commission will be to defend press freedom and freedom of expression. It will promote the best international standards of news and information gathering, reporting, and editorial commentary. It will do so through a code of ethics and standards, and through the development of realistic professional training.
Another important function for such a commission would be to arbitrate in disputes involving the media, and its decisions would have the force of law.
The commission’s first task would be to propose a local code for journalism that complies with the United Nations Convention on Human Rights and that can be offered for ratification by the Kurdish parliament.
It can also work with the parliament to legislate for the freedom of speech and freedom of information: two key components for creating a good and healthy environment for the media.
All of this does not happen overnight. But the first step of the process must be taken. Otherwise, it is only a matter of time before we see another Sardasht Osman.
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