Inside Iraq - The media's role in Iraq's election.

Were Iraqi newspapers and TV stations helping the voters to make an informed decision?

Information first, freedom & protection next

While most of the Wikileaks debate is focused on the protection of journalists and freedom of expression, a similar debate is underway here – but in a rather different environment.
An environment, where an important prerequisite of freedom of press and protection of journalists is missing – the right to information or freedom of information.
In Iraq, the government, the public and the journalists view the media in a very traditional way. The solutions that they seek to create the right environment for good journalism are not much better.
The various drafts of the journalist protection and other media-related legislation that are in the Baghdad parliament, all share one common thing; their view is that the journalist is part of the conflict and hence needs protection. On the other hand, they see the journalist as part of the state and hence needs privileges.
The press law of the Kurdish Region, for example, was written with only newspapers in the mind of the legislators; more specifically, the anti-government ones!
This is happening at a time when we claim to be in a democracy that has a strong fourth estate – a free, professional and responsible media.
Good journalism can only flourish in the right legal, political and cultural environment. If the current thinking of the nature and role of media prevails in parliament we will end up with a legal framework that divides journalists to pro and anti-government ones; those who attack the establishment and those who defend it.
The main reason for this is that all thinking about the future of media is revolving around freedom and protection. Very little, so far, has been said about information and transparency.
It is true that freedom and protection are two important pillars for good journalism but one must ask: the freedom to do or say what? Protection from what?
A journalist without information is like a doctor who has a patient in front of him and is not allowed to touch him, take any data or test any part of the patient’s body; and at the same time the doctor is trying to treat the patient.
Without information, journalists do one of two things: either attack or insult the subject and subsequently commit libel. The other thing the journalist can do is speculate and run the risk of being wrong and of course risk being taken to court for libel.
All of this is at the expense of the public’s awareness and knowledge of what is going in their life. It also undermines our media and our nascent democracy.
If you hold a map of the world and mark the countries that are most democratic, least corrupt and most transparent, you would find that there is one thing that links these countries together. They all have a freedom of Information legislation. About 85 countries have them – Sweden’s Freedom of the Press Act of 1766 is the oldest.
The legislation is a set of rules that guarantee access to data held by the state. They establish a “right-to-know” legal process by which requests may be made for government-held information,www.ekurd.netto be received freely or at minimal cost, barring standard exceptions.
Although we have constitutional guarantees for the right of access to information; but these rights are unused if specific support legislation does not exist. And the legislation would mean nothing if it is not used by all.
Our leaders, legislators, politicians, government officials, media and civil society need not to worry about regulating the existing media. They need to think about a system whereby information is made available to all.
A system as such, would be the best defence for everyone who means well.
Leaders and officials would be forced to be transparent and open to the public and media.
The media would be forced to professionalize and be responsible with the information they have for the public.
The public would be more aware, more educated and more able to make the right decision.
Only then, would the words protection of journalists and freedom of expression bare meaning in our emerging democracy.

Why Kurdish Media Must Reform

SULAIMANIYAH, Kurdistan region 'Iraq', — The recent election in Iraqi Kurdistan ushered in a new era for the region’s media, posing fresh challenges for news organisations, the government and the parliament.
In the past, the ruling parties were the driving force in the political process. But a formidable opposition emerged on election day, and the political game seems to have changed forever. The main player in the Iraqi Kurdish political scene today is the voter.
Winning the trust of the voter will be everyone’s goal over the coming years.
This imposes new responsibilities on the Kurdish media, which is essentially divided into two camps – one for and one against the political establishment.
Most Iraqi Kurdish political parties have their own media outlets that usually include websites, newspapers and radio and TV stations.
Most of the top parties also have their own influential satellite television channels, which the public widely turns to for regional news. These channels have traditionally been monopolised by the region’s two most powerful parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
More recently, the new opposition group, Change, established its TV channel, the Kurdistan News Network.
Traditionally, party media have put their political agenda and their leaders’ activities ahead of news that is most important to the public.
On the other hand, private media have always claimed independence but in reality function as the voice of the opposition. In their case, the criterion for news is whatever that does not appear in the party media.
This division has clearly created a big gap, and at times tensions, in Iraqi Kurdistan’s burgeoning media scene.
No single outlet is providing comprehensive coverage of most stories, which does not help citizens to understand the political situation. In order to obtain a complete picture, one has to go through five or six media outlets.
It is quite rare these days to find a news report that has both sides of the story. Instead they are split, with the independent media representing the opposition and the party media representing the government.
Following party media alone, one would think that Iraqi Kurdistan has no problems whatsoever. The non-party media suggests that Iraqi Kurdistan is one of the most corrupt, inefficient and failed regions.
The reality is somewhere in between, and balance can only be obtained if media outlets adopt professional standards of objectivity and fairness.
Looking ahead to the next four years, neither type of media can afford to stay the same. Iraqi Kurdistan has a plurality of political perspectives that the region has never seen before, and both party and non-party media will have to work to win the trust of the audience.
For this to happen, it requires a change of heart on behalf of the political parties. They must accept that a party leader may not always headline the news. The top story should instead reflect what impacts the largest number of people in the region.
The first step that they must take is to separate news from opinion. Content needs to be divided into two clear, distinct sections – one that provides news and information and another that provides views and opinions.
Professional news editors also need to be appointed. They can ensure that standards of objectivity, impartiality and fairness are upheld.
Similar values need to be upheld by editors and reporters in independent, or opposition,www.ekurd.net media news organisations. These media outlets must stop ignoring the government’s perspectives and start including in their output some stories that are not critical of the government.
In short, both sides need to be credible sources of news and information, and must resist falling back on their traditional biased content.
As a journalism trainer, I have found that most Iraqi Kurdish journalists agree with the idea that there are two camps for each story – government and opposition. Their challenge is to build an audience of people from both of these camps.
Students are usually eager to learn new methods and understand the concepts of objectivity and impartiality in journalism. But when they go back to their newsrooms, they hit a brick wall with their editors.
What is most needed in Kurdish media today is a change of heart on the part of media managers in political parties and so-called independent outlets.
Media development organisations can support fair and impartial journalism by employing a top-down training approach that targets editors.
This is especially crucial given the new political landscape which has emerged from the election. If the current political situation continues, the opposition is likely to be strong which will create a vibrant and unpredictable parliament.
The need for public affairs and governance reporting has never been higher. Stories that may appear in a reliable media outlet could complement the political process. A story about corruption may lead to the downfall of a government official.
The relationship between the government and the non-party media is quite unhealthy these days. This has paved the way for the emergence of some outlets with extremely poor standards, and libelling government officials has become one of their objectives.
One editor once told a visiting press delegation that his news organisation deliberately publishes lies and waits for government officials to correct them.
On the other hand, non-party media widely complain that they are not given access to government institutions.
The new government, including ministries, will need a strong public relations and communications campaign and will need to treat all news organisations equally.
The government will also need to strengthen their press offices and the skills of their spokespeople to ensure that the information reaches the public.
Legislatively, the next four years will also be crucial for media. The existing laws that govern the work of the media are regarded as archaic and vague.
The press law that was passed last year primarily regulates newspapers, and was largely seen as a way to counter non-party press outlets that are highly critical of the government. The law did not take into account broadcast or online media,www.ekurd.net in part because members of parliament did not think that the likes of the opposition television news station Kurdistan News Network would emerge.
Sections of the law dealing with libel and slander also lack clarity.
Media regulation may soon become an issue that requires the parliament’s attention. The parliament needs to set up a media commission as a professional body that sets standards for good journalism and settles disputes outside the court system.
In this nascent democracy, the elections gave birth to a new opportunity for all. While the government needs to have better communications and the legislature has to come up with a better framework to regulate the media, the media needs to seize this opportunity to professionalise and become a true Fourth Estate.

What Iraq do the Kurds want?

In the absence of a permanent United States presence in Kurdistan--something that would be welcomed by almost every Kurd--the Iraq that the Kurds and most Iraqis want when US troops withdraw is one that is at peace with itself and the world. They want a federal democracy with a good democratic government that upholds the values of the free world: an Iraq where all citizens are equal and their rights are respected.
The elements of this dream are there. The constitution, referred to by many politicians as the cornerstone of the new Iraq, provides for all of the above. The foundations for the new Iraq are being laid now, but the project is not likely to be completed in the near future. The political process still needs to mature. It is still hostage to the principles of quota and consensus among participating parties that are mostly identified along religious and sectarian lines.
This weakens a common national identity and strengthens the sectarian and ethnic divide in society by empowering the political parties that represent these identities, rendering it a lot more difficult to separate religion from the state. In fact, we still depend heavily on the role of religious figures. On many important issues, the final word is still that of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.
While Iraqis realize that a true democratic Iraq will obviously entail the rule of the Shi'ite majority, they are also convinced that the days of exclusive rule by one group are over. The first 80 years of Iraq's history clearly demonstrate that no single group or leader alone can rule the country. The only guarantee for minorities is a federal structure that empowers local and regional governments and allows the various Iraqi communities to conduct their own affairs.
Baghdad does not seem ready to digest the concept of federalism. This is still a new concept for Iraqis. They have become used to a strong central state with a strong leader. The Kurds are the only people who are actively seeking to hammer out a federal structure for the country. Yet federalism should be not only a Kurdish cause,www.ekurd.net but an Iraqi cause. "They seem to have forgotten what strong centers and strong leaders did to them," remarked a Kurdish political analyst recently about Iraqis in general. Thus the current debate between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad is over a true federal status for the region and the shaping of a federal architecture for the new Iraq.
Some in Baghdad feel that over the past few years "concessions" were given to Kurdistan due to Baghdad's weakness and that with the security gains Baghdad is making, "this must stop." This is simply the wrong attitude to take. Powers should be devolved to the regions out of Baghdad's understanding of the strengths involved in having a true federal system. The country will be owned by all, as opposed to being owned by the center only.
The Kurds still need some time to develop confidence in Baghdad. Talks over oil contracts, the share of the budget and the status of Peshmerga forces are all issues whose settlement will provide the Kurds with assurances that the old days are not going to be repeated. For example, the dispute over oil contracts is not about the size of the revenue the Kurds want to get. Rather, to the Kurds, a national oil policy rather than a central one will enable the Kurdish areas to benefit from developing the oil industry of Iraq.
The Kurds realize that they are in a marriage with Baghdad and divorce is not an option. At the same time, they feel disappointed by their allies and counter-signatories to the constitution. They feel they have performed their obligation toward Baghdad. "When they need us to fight terrorists, we are their partners, but when it comes to our rights in deciding for ourselves, we become adversaries," said a Kurdish politician involved in the talks with Baghdad recently.
Ironing out the differences and reaching a workable relationship with Baghdad will need some time. The help and presence of the US is vital to settle these issues. A federal structure will allow more room for development and good governance and less room for corruption and putting the blame on the other side. Iraqis are still picking up the rubble of the destruction caused by the former regime, the terror campaign and the internal fighting that followed. In this process, people usually look for someone to put the blame on. But when people are busy building their own regions, they don't usually ask whether the builder is Shi'ite or Sunni,www.ekurd.net Kurd or Arab. Rather the test is, can they do the job or not. Of course corruption and mismanagement may take place, but it is a lot easier to fight them at the regional rather than the national level, provided there exist the right anti-corruption bodies and they are not politicized.
While the Kurds are looking at internal arrangements for their future, they are also mindful of the regional dynamics that could dictate the future of Iraq as a whole and the Kurdistan region in particular. They are quietly eyeing the showdown between Iran and the international community. If Iran survives this, it will have a huge say in the future shape and nature of Iraq and the Middle East.
The Kurds also realize the importance of their neighbor Turkey. It is key to a peaceful future that Turkey be at peace with a Kurdish federal region on its border. Similarly, the Kurds will have to assure the Turks that they are not a threat to them. They will have to demonstrate that they serve as a factor of stability rather than irritation.
After all and if all else fails, Turkey is the only access the Kurds have to the free world.
This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.

Maliki bolstered by sweep

The Iraqi PM's recent move to restore order in Basra may have been successful, but extending that success to Mosul will prove difficult.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent crackdown on militias in Basra has opened a fresh chapter in Iraqi politics, given the army new impetus, and restored a degree of public confidence in the state's ability to enforce the rule of law.
But building on this success will depends greatly on his next move, an operation to clear the northern city of Mosul of al-Qaeda and Baathist militants.
When the operation codenamed "Charge of the Knights" was launched in Basra around the beginning of April, many saw it as a make-or-break moment for the prime minister and for the Iraqi army.
Maliki's declaration that he would pursue the "outlaws" to the end won him new allies and rallied the country's political leaders behind him.
His Sunni opponents, in particular, hailed the assault on the lawless paramilitary groups that effectively controlled Basra as a bold step in the right direction.
The major Sunni political bloc, the Accord Front, had withdrawn from the cabinet, but has signalled its desire to return to government as a result of the Basra operation.
As Accord Front leader Adnan al-Dulaimi made clear, one of the bloc's demands was to "hunt down and disband the militias and curb the outlaws."
Sunni leaders have since indicated that the Maliki government has taken sufficient action on addressing their concerns to allow them to end their boycott.
Another gain for the prime minister was the rapprochement he achieved with Iraqi vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi, one of the most prominent and powerful Sunni figures engaged in the political process. The often strained relationship between the two men was one of the factors that led to the Sunni boycott of the cabinet.
Hashimi has publicly backed the Basra assault, and now sits together with the prime minister in the crisis operations room that is considering how to handle the next issue on Maliki's agenda – Mosul.
Maliki has also won broader backing, reflected in a declaration issued by the Political Council for National Security, a 19-member body that brings together the three-member presidency including the Iraqi president himself, the prime minister and deputy premiers, the speaker of parliament and his deputies, the heads of the various blocs in the legislature, the president of the Kurdistan region and the head of the Iraqi judiciary.
The document, which outlines the principles by which Iraq's political system should operate, is broadly supportive of Maliki.
Significantly, the only reservations were expressed by the Sadrists, the supporters of radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr whose armed faction, the Mahdi Army, was one of the groups targeted in Basra.
From a military perspective, analysts and local army commanders agree that the Basra operation was poorly prepared.
Nevertheless, as the first real test of the new Iraqi army, it was overall a resounding success.
By and large, the troops obeyed orders to fight militiamen even when they shared the same Shia affiliation.
There were some deserters, reluctant to fight against fellow-Shia and Sadrists. Yet at 1,500 out of the 30,000 men deployed for the operation, the incidence of desertion was viewed as insignificant and no cause for alarm.
Defense sources in Baghdad even welcomed the fact. As one source close to the defense ministry put it, "It was a good way to weed out the bad elements and the unprofessional soldiers."
At the same time, the desertions highlighted the military's need for more training, as well for a proper vetting system during the recruitment process.
All in all, though, the operation represented an important step towards establishing a truly national, professional army.
The government was given a further boost when Sadr issued a statement urging the government to accept the deserters to return to their army duties.
More recently, Sadr's appeal for calm and the avoidance of bloodshed has generally been interpreted as an admission of failure, and as a sign that Maliki's drive to control Basra has been at least partly successful.
Although the government now controls large areas of the city including the port areas, there are still parts of Basra that remain beyond its reach, and many of the militia leaders are still at large.
After Basra, the prime minister has ordered similar operations against Shia militias in other parts of Iraq, in the face of repeated calls – largely prompted by Iran – for an end to the campaign.
If he wants to maintain the current level of support he is getting from across the political spectrum, Maliki will have to show continued resolve to go after the militias wherever they are. That will be no easy task, since it will be unpopular among the prime minister's own Shia constituency.
Maliki's leadership qualities both as prime minister and commander-in-chief of the armed force are being put to the test.
He was elevated to power in 2006 as the result of a political deal between the diverse political blocs that had won seats in parliament. Over the past two years, however, many questions have been raised about his capacity to lead a government of national unity and to act as a truly non-sectarian prime minister.
To an extent, the Basra operation has quelled those doubts.
By the time he embarks on a military operation to regain control over Mosul, he will need to have removed the last traces of doubt that he is a prime minister for all Iraqis, and that Shia and Sunni "outlaws" are to be dealt with in exactly the same manner.
By the same token, the current level of Sunni support will need to be sustained when it comes to the Mosul operation, especially as it is expected to be a lot more difficult than Basra was.
Winning the backing of leading Sunni politicians to take on wayward Shia militias is one thing; asking them to approve military action in a city regarded as a hotbed of Sunni Islamists and Arab nationalists is quite another.
In Mosul, the enemy is an amalgam of al-Qaida and diehard Baathists. These forces are a lot less visible, and a good deal more effective, than the Mahdi Army.
Another problem is that unlike the western Sunni provinces, Mosul has not seen the emergence of strong "awakening councils" – the local groups which have taken up arms against al-Qaida.
In short, much of what was achieved in Basra is going to be sorely tested in the Mosul operation.
Basra was about demonstrating that Iraq has one army and one commander-in-chief. Mosul will test whether Sunni political groups really subscribe to this notion.