A Stillborn Initiative

The Saudi king’s invitation to the Iraqi parties to hold talks in Riyadh after Hajj raises numerous questions and alarm bells for the Iraqi people about their future. It also serves as a reminder of the dangers and challenges that lie ahead for the new Iraq.
On Saturday, 30 October 2010, as the various Iraqi parties were preparing to meet in Arbil and Baghdad to settle the political crisis and form a government, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia invited President Jalal Talabani and other Iraqi leaders for talks in Riyadh after Eid Al-Adha.
The irony here is that a country which has never seen an election, does not allow for a Shia presence, and does not have, or recognize, any ethnic minorities is trying to fix the problems of a new democracy with a Shia majority and a sizeable Kurdish, Turkoman and Chaldo-Assyrian population.
The manner in which the invitation was drafted was a clear indication that the Saudis do not have a clue about the new Iraq, nor do they intend to solve the country’s problems.
The invitation mentions President Jalal Talabani by name and “the rest of the parties that took part in the election” -- as if the problem here is President Talabani and the other parties, or is over the presidential post, or is between Kurds and Arabs.
The reality is that the dispute is between the Arabs. One day it is an internal conflict between the Shia; another day it is between the Sunnis; and at other times, it is between Shia and Sunnis.
Given their impartial position, the Kurds were paving the way for a settlement of the dispute.
Many here in Iraq recognize that the Saudi invitation was timed to spoil these attempts by driving a deeper wedge between the Arabs and the Kurds of Iraq while at the same time prolonging and deepening the Sunni-Shia conflict.
By its very nature, Saudi Arabia is not fit to either mediate in Iraq or even understand the nuances of this complex and diverse country.
Their predominant position is an anti-Shia one. During his entire time as prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, who is Shia, did not receive a single invitation to visit Saudi Arabia. Given examples such as this, how can Saudi Arabia overnight become a mediator or an arbitrator between the Shia and the Sunnis?
The Iraqi reactions to the initiative were a clear demonstration of the limited credibility Saudi enjoys. The Shia and the Kurds refused the mediation, while the Sunnis welcomed it.
Every now and then, the people of Iraq hear of Saudi preachers insulting Shia symbols, including the revered Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, as well as disparaging comments toward the Shia faith in Saudi Arabia’s mosques and satellite TV channels. Most Iraqis believe that ending these practices would be a goodwill gesture before helping to form the government.
As opposed to dressing their initiatives with an all-Iraqi solution to form the government, the Saudis would have been much better off if they were more open and truthful by solely expressing concerns about the status of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. They could have also been more open in expressing their concerns about the extent of Iran’s influence or interference in Iraq.
The initiative also could have been better prepared. As things stand, it seems that Saudi minimized Iraqiya’s chances of positioning themselves well in the next government. They instead managed to draw the Kurds and the Shia closer to each other, while further enhancing Iran’s role in Iraq.
If tomorrow Mahmoud Ahmadinajad makes a similar invitation as the one extended by King Abullah (who, it should be noted, has not even appointed an ambassador to Iraq) surely many more people -- including Sunnis -- would attend the Tehran meeting rather than one in Riyadh.
But Ahmadinajad would not interfere so blatantly, because he seems to understand the new Iraq better than the Saudis. The past seven months have proven that any interference in negotiations over the government formation will only further complicate Iraq’s deeply polarized political environment.
When the people of Iraq went to the polls to vote for their MPs, they did so with the understanding that the Iraqis are the only ones who should form the government, and that the only place where it can be formed is Iraq. If Iraq veers from this principle, the political blocs will be responsible – and the citizens will be the ones to pay the price.

Kingmakers again!

The Kurds have once again found themselves the kingmakers of Iraq, but this time, the stakes are much higher. Iraq’s political paralysis has earned it the world record for the longest period of time in which a country has gone without forming a government after holding an election. Given that all of the other parties have taken sides, it is clear that it is up to the Kurds to decide who will lead the country.
The good news is that this time, the political picture and the leadership options are clearer. After months of indecision, incumbent Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki finally won his battle to secure the National Alliance’s nomination for the premiership. Two months ago, I wrote about players and spectators and encouraged the Kurds and other smaller blocs to make up their mind about the next prime minister. The Sadrists and the others seem to have made their decision by nominating Maliki; luckily for the Kurds, it did not change the equation much.
To be sure, Iraqi politics remains dysfunctional and paralyzed. The country is unable to move in any definitive direction because of its politics. The Kurds should not be influenced by the political quagmire, however. Their choices are simple today: Allawi or Maliki.
The ongoing conflict over the prime minister’s post was a clear symptom of the paralyzed politics of Baghdad. It became clear that the conflict is one between lists, and not about policies. Sadly, the conflict is centered on the interests of the blocs rather than to the public interest.
Breaking the world record and not feeling the sense of urgency to form the government or make concessions is a clear example.
The Kurds are different from other blocs because they are not embroiled in Baghdad’s difficult and divisive politics.
External pressures could be placed on the Kurds to not support a seemingly sectarian government led by powerful Shia parties. But the reality is the other options are not much better.
In the early stages of negotiations, a national unity government could have been an answer. But today it is not. The bad relationship created over the past six months has in my opinion destroyed any potential for trust between the two main lists to create a national unity government. Maliki remained a strong candidate so did Allawi.
As one of the more neutral groups in Baghdad’s vicious political fight, the Kurds have an opportunity today to make a real difference in the political process and for themselves.
Although they are a list and an alliance, their politics are more mature and clearer in terms of hierarchy, goals, interests and objectives. The main reason for this is that they are from one region. Their aims and demands were not created yesterday; they were developed after decades of struggle.
Many observers believe that the ball is in the Kurds’ court, but this should not be seen as a burden. In fact, it could be an opportunity.
The Kurds cannot afford to play the political game without having a clear idea as to their demands. The 19-point list should be the basis for the Kurds to negotiate a deal with either Allawi or Maliki.
Other characteristics, like the leadership, vision, strength of the candidates, should also be considered.
In dealing with the blocs, the Kurds should consider the composition, unity and sustainability of each bloc and their historic relationship with -- or animosity toward -- the Kurds and their demands.
During the months-long political game, the Kurds have thus far been spectators. As we approach the final stretch, it is now their time to play, and to score the winning goal.

A digital democracy is emerging

A pioneering conference in Erbil last week provided a much-needed look at Iraq’s technological future.
It offered unprecedented discussion of how Iraq can use technology, information and e-governance to re-establish its strong economic, intellectual and political standing in the region.
The two-day conference, organized by international media development agencies the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) and IREX, explored the innumerable ways Iraq can develop its emerging democracy by utilizing technology to harness the information revolution.
Information and communication are keys to creating a healthy society; one in which the public is engaged, informed and empowered, while the government is responsive, transparent and accountable.
At the heart of this “revolution” is a free and unfettered flow of information to the public. This info-stream cannot happen by leaving technological advancement to take its own course; the process must be managed.
The use of communication technologies is increasing by the second. Iraq is well placed to benefit from this accelerated pace. By handling this transition wisely, chaos and confusion can be avoided.
It is the duty of the government, the media and the public to see this transition through and develop Iraq’s “digital democracy.”
This new technological landscape is changing old ways of receiving and transmitting information. We, too, should change. The public, the media and government can all play important roles in shaping the future.
Information empowers the public and enables individuals to learn their rights as well as how exercise and protect them. Information is always a key tool in combating corruption.
With today’s technologies, individuals have increasingly become information providers. Any citizen can take a picture, record a video or write something, and then post it immediately on the Internet for the entire world to see.
The media in Iraq can promote public awareness about the need for information and its benefits. It can also disseminate information on public services and rights awareness.
Public media provide a forum to voice dissatisfaction, as well as demand accountability and action. It is, after all, a forum for public debate. The most important role of media, however, is to create a public that is informed enough to be critical and analytical of any information received.
Our media market is saturated with low quality, and often downright bad, products. Even so, no authority can or should close them down.
The only party that can do this is the public. If credible and professional media creates a media-literate public that can interpret, analyze and use the information, there would be no market for bad media in Iraq.
The best avenue for the government to take is to lift all obstacles on communication and access to information. For example, develop legislation for the people’s right to information, strengthen the mechanisms for access to information through e-governance, and work on increasing Internet access by allowing the private sector to enter the service provision market.
In the new technological landscape, fair play is the only way to win in the long run.

Human Rights - Iraq's first post withdrawal test

As fallout of America’s withdrawal from Iraq begins to take shape, it looks as if it will be some time before the "new Iraq" can truly stand on its own.
One scathing example of Iraq's political immaturity was brought to light last week by an Amnesty International report on the state of the country's prison system.
The disappointing and confusing reactions to the report from Iraq's government, security apparatus and civil society have made it clear that human rights in Iraq is still an abstract concept. This needs to change.
The Amnesty report "New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq" claimed that an estimated 30,000 detainees are being held without trial in Iraqi prisons. It also found that "Some detainees have been held in secret detention facilities and tortured."
Many prisoners face violence, psychological abuse as well as other forms of gross mistreatment, according to the study which was compiled from interviews with detainees, prison directors, refugees and activists.
The scope of prisoner abuse listed in the report underscores the need for a better understanding of human rights by correctional institutions and personnel, as well Iraqi politicians and the public. But that's not all.
The findings serve as a direct contradiction to the repeated statements of government officials who have stressed a commitment to uphold the human rights of Iraqi citizens. In fact, Iraqi officials were quick to dismiss either the sources or numbers mentioned in the report.
Although the judiciary, ministry of justice, security officials, politicians and rights groups all reacted with different shades of denial, one point became clear: no official mechanism exists in Iraq to monitor and report human rights violations.
As it stands, there is no state-run watchdog that assures the accurate flow of information on rights abuses to the public, the government and international community.
An organization such as this would institutionalise the concept of human rights into the security culture, and could be a move towards adopting international humanitarian standards.
A key issue in the debate over the report was the number of detainees. This should never have happened. The Iraqi government should have a record of everyone in custody and make this list available to the likes of Amnesty and Human Rights Watch. After all, transparency is a key guarantor of good practice, good governance and accountability.
Ambiguity, stark denials and lack of access can have damaging effects, especially with reputable international organizations. Iraqis should not forget that it was these same organisations that helped expose the former regime and his crimes against the people of Iraq.
The United States can play an effective role in preventing Iraq from reverting to its awful past. Although many in Iraq argue that the human rights situation was worse when the US forces were in Iraq, at least they were seen as monitors and enforcers of due process and procedure.
US military spokesman in Baghdad, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Owen, said after the release of the Amnesty report that the Iraqi detention facilities were "inspected frequently and abide by the rule of law and international standards for detainee care and management."
US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley’s remarks on the report were welcomed by many Iraqis who fear that the human rights situation could deteriorate further. Crowley said that respect for human rights is an important issue in relations between Washington and Baghdad. "Human rights are a critical component" of US work "to build up institutions of the Iraqi government," he added.
One of the things that we in the new Iraq take pride in is that we are striving to uphold the values of the free world. America can help us reach this goal. Washington can help the Iraqi government - and at times put pressure on it - to uphold the values that both American and Iraqi blood was shed for.
But this cannot be done by simply dismissing and denying unpleasant reports. This is achieved through engaging seriously with rights organizations, responding positively to their recommendations, and demonstrating solid steps to prevent further abuse.
The US should encourage the Iraqi government to study the Amnesty prison report carefully. The allegations of this study, and previous reports, must to be taken very seriously to make sure that the next report is not as damning as this one.

US-Kurdish relations, short term venture or a long term partnership

The visit of US vice-president Joe Biden to Arbil was an important recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan and president Barzani and the role the region plays in Iraq’s political process.
It was also seen as a reassurance that US relations with Kurdistan region are intact. But what type of relations exist today?
Depending on the size and gravity of the problem, the level of contact between the two have ranged between the Americans inviting Kurdish leaders to the White House to a phone call or meeting in Baghdad when the American president is in town.
Other means of contact are usually left up to the vice-president or the secretaries of state or defense, who call Kurdish leaders and occasionally visit Kurdistan.
Thus far, Kurdish-US relations have fluctuated based on the issue at hand – with the problem usually involving Baghdad, Kirkuk or Turkey.
The typical scenario is that the Kurds are adamant about a certain issue, and the US steps in with either a visit, invitation or a phone call. The Kurdish stance softens soon afterwards.
A key issue that the Kurds are debating now is whether they are getting their money’s worth out of this relationship.
Some Kurds say that the US needs Iraqi Kurdistan more than Iraqi Kurdistan needs the US today, as Iraqi Kurdistan is the only success story of the US liberation of Iraq.
This may not be a very popular statement amongst the Kurds in general. Many still want to believe that the US is Iraqi Kurdistan’s key partner and ally.
But this could change. Relations are usually based on give and take. The Kurds maintain that despite positively responding to all of America’s requests, the US is not as responsive when the Kurds ask for help on any their issues.
The issues of article 140, revenue-sharing, relations with Turkey and the constant shelling of borders are all issues that the Kurds believe that the US could play a more effective role in solving.
Thus far, on the surface at least, America’s high-profile political engagement with Kurdistan came during crises, when they wanted the Kurds to soften their position.
While it is clear that the Kurdish relationship with the US is a valuable, strategic option that the Kurds cannot abandon, they can certainly manage it better. Relations with the United States are deeply rooted and long-term – they are not just with the administration that happens to be in power.
America’s pride in Iraqi Kurdistan’s achievements is mostly limited to security and stability. They are still hesitant to speak out when it comes to democracy, good governance, transparency, anti corruption, freedom of speech and human rights.
While steps have been taken on a democratic path, Iraqi Kurdistan still has some way to go.
It is not difficult to become an ally of the United States, but it may be more of a challenge to become a true ally and partner.
Measures to combat corruption, promote transparency and good governance, and uphold human rights and freedom of speech are all steps that Iraqi Kurdistan’s leadership can take.
This would create a much more solid foundation for Kurdish-US relations. It would also open the scope for more partners. Let’s not forget that some Kurds argue that compared to its neighbors, Iraqi Kurdistan is much better off in terms of democratic progress.
But this comparison doesn’t stand because no country in the region constitutes a good example of democracy, human rights and good governance. The Kurdistan region should look at the European democracies as a model.
Kurdish-US relations are at a crossroads. They can either resemble US relations with its pseudo allies in the region like Egypt or Saudi Arabia, or they can be modeled after America’s relations with democracies in Europe.
It is now up to the Kurds and the US to decide which way it will go.