As things stand today, all indications suggest that the revived Iraqi National Alliance, INA, will form the government under the leadership of current prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and will be joined by the Kurds.
Iraqiya has declared that if this scenario occurs, they will denounce the process as illegal. Some Iraqiya leaders even suggested that they would boycott the political process.
A boycott would send the political process in Baghdad back to square one, throwing Iraq back into the political turmoil it faced 2005.
At that time, the Shias and Kurds were leading Iraq while the Sunnis remained on the sidelines. This led to a three-year-long wave of violence, terrorism and extremism that swept Baghdad and stretched into other provinces. It was a truly sectarian civil war, the traces of which continue to haunt and threaten us today.
To be sure, the same turmoil would emerge if Iraqiya formed the government on its own with Ayad Allawi as the prime minister, alienating the Shia-dominated lists. And let’s not forget the Kurds -- they would join his government as well.
A closer look at the two options makes it clear that there is a serious mistrust not between Allawi and Maliki -- or even between the Iraqiya and the INA ¬– but rather between the Shia and Sunni Arabs of Iraq.
In addition to the discrimination, injustice and atrocities committed against Iraq’s Shia before the fall of Saddam, the lack of clarity and progress in national reconciliation by today’s rulers have also contributed to deepening the mistrust between the two communities.
No concrete steps have been taken to achieve a true national reconciliation. On the contrary, in the weeks before the last election, the de-Ba’thification committee headed by a leading Iraqi National Congress member, Ali Allami – who is accused of strong ties with Iran -- disqualified a number of candidates for their past involvement with the Ba’th Party. Most were from Iraqiya.
If there was a true will to move forward and a confidence in a democratic system based on equality, these candidates – who after all were entering the democratic process through elections -- should have been commended and brought into the fold of the new Iraq rather than being driven back to the Baath Party.
Although the Shia and Sunni communities lived peacefully as neighbours in many regions of Iraq, each appears to mistrust the political leadership and military force of the other. Hence, both sides fear or reject being ruled by the other.
But the dilemma for today’s Iraq is that a government based in Baghdad would have to rule the entire country -- and it will need to be either INA or Iraqiya.
In any mature democracy, it is usually the case that one bloc is in the government and the other is in the opposition. Iraq’s democracy does not seem to be ready for such a setup yet.
Each bloc fears being in the opposition, as being in power seems to be the only guarantor for protection.
One interesting point to note here is that the Kurds are not afraid of either bloc being in power. The reason is that they rule their region alone and are trying to work out a federal relationship with Baghdad.
If the Sunnis and the Shia of Iraq had their own federal regions, our democracy would have been solid and the bickering over forming the government would not have lasted this long.
The last six months demonstrated that for democracy to be entrenched in Iraq it needs to have a truly federal structure whereby each of Iraq’s communities live in a region or regions that enjoy a federal relationship with Baghdad.
Once this is in place, policies and issues would replace personalities. Each community would worry more about their federal status in Iraq as opposed to who is ruling in Baghdad.
The leadership in Baghdad would worry more about regulating the relationship with (and between) the regions, including managing the delegation of power regionally, as opposed to focusing on consolidating all of the power in one city, in one office and with one man.
The days of one man holding all of the power have long gone. This is confirmed by the constitution, and is something the politicians must come to realize. The irony here is that the same people who are calling for a strong, centralised state are going to be harmed most by this centralisation.
Thursday, September 2, 2010
Friday, August 27, 2010
Iraq After US Withdrawal – End of Era or New Beginning?
As the debate continues over the effects of the United States troop withdrawal from Iraq, there are forces manoeuvring to fill the gap left by the Americans. But they are outsiders, not Iraqis.
The 4th Stryker Brigade made history last week when they withdrew to Kuwait, the last US combat soldiers to leave Iraq.
So what’s next? Iraqis don’t seem to be thinking about the repercussions too much, but regional players are already strategising about how they can gain the upper hand.
Each of Iraq’s neighbours is carefully plotting its own strategy. Every scenario would be detrimental, destabilising and damaging for both Iraq and America.
Iran is trying to frame its relationship with Iraq as one of brotherly concern. As the stalemate in forming a new Iraqi government has continued since the March parliamentary election, Tehran has managed to stall the political process while ensuring that the next government can be only be created with its blessing – and only after the US troop withdrawal.
As Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi’s bid for the premiership gained momentum, Iran quickly forged a new alliance between Iraq’s two main Shia blocs, the Iraqi National Alliance, INA, and State of Law. The goal was to prevent Allawi, who is favoured by Sunnis and enjoys close ties with US and Arab leaders, from become prime minister.
The short-lived alliance between the two rival Shia groups collapsed when Tehran failed to shift INA’s staunch opposition to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s re-election bid. But Iranian influence remains intact, with Tehran reportedly continuing to pressure Shia leaders within INA to accept Maliki, as they hold talks with all the major players.
Iran has made extraordinary efforts to ensure that it has the upper hand in Iraq, and if it brokers the deal that creates the next government, its influence will be assured.
Turkey, meanwhile, has already made it clear that it might intervene to fill the gap created by the departure of the Americans, albeit in an area where the US never had a presence, the Qandil mountains, stronghold of the Kurdish rebel group, the PKK.
The wider Arab world seems to have its own plans for gaining a foothold in Iraq and changing the political landscape. Some Arab states are working quietly, through Turkey, to influence the situation in favour of the Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority.
A recent piece in the London-based, Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, reported that Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries were planning a conference modelled on the 1989 Taef Agreement which ended Lebanon's civil war.
The article said the conference would seek “to resolve issues in Iraq away from Iranian and American influence”, and would take place in Damascus.
The paper quoted Iraqi sources as saying that a government could not be formed without the involvement of Arab states, and set out four different scenarios, all of which excluded Maliki and favoured Allawi to head the government.
Syria seems to be turning a blind eye to al-Qaeda activities, including allowing insurgents to cross into Iraq.
Earlier this year, a joint Iraqi-US special operations team in Mosul killed Abu Khalaf, a top al-Qaeda figure based in Syria who had coordinated suicide bombings in Anbar and Baghdad. In late 2008, a US raid on the Syrian border city of al-Bukamal killed several senior foreign fighters operating against Iraqi targets.
Damascus is also allowing the Baath party to organise and operate freely as it attempts to destabilise Iraq. Fugitive members of the Baath who have been charged with or convicted of various crimes are moving around freely in a number of Arab countries, in some cases with the protection of the host government.
It is clear that al-Qaeda will do whatever it can to capitalise on Iraq’s current vulnerability. The security forces are demoralised, there is no government in place, and the top security officials – the interior and defence ministers – have been undermined by losing their parliamentary bids in the March election.
All the above scenarios are plausible if neither the Iraqis nor the Americans make positive plans for the post-withdrawal phase.
Following the troop withdrawal, the US still needs to ensure that Iraq heads towards becoming a stable, democratic, peaceful and viable partner of the US and the free world. This has not happened yet, and has taken longer than originally anticipated.
For this to happen, the US needs to play an active political role in the country, and to do so in ways that empower the voices of independent Iraqis and groups. The Americans need to promote good governance and support efforts to steer Iraq in the right direction.
Iraqis need to realise that thus far, the doors have been left open to interference by nearly everyone in the region. Now that the American troops have gone, Iraq’s leaders need to understand that the more interference they allow, the less relevant they themselves will become. And in doing so, they will let Iraq become a battleground for regional and international players.
The 4th Stryker Brigade made history last week when they withdrew to Kuwait, the last US combat soldiers to leave Iraq.
So what’s next? Iraqis don’t seem to be thinking about the repercussions too much, but regional players are already strategising about how they can gain the upper hand.
Each of Iraq’s neighbours is carefully plotting its own strategy. Every scenario would be detrimental, destabilising and damaging for both Iraq and America.
Iran is trying to frame its relationship with Iraq as one of brotherly concern. As the stalemate in forming a new Iraqi government has continued since the March parliamentary election, Tehran has managed to stall the political process while ensuring that the next government can be only be created with its blessing – and only after the US troop withdrawal.
As Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi’s bid for the premiership gained momentum, Iran quickly forged a new alliance between Iraq’s two main Shia blocs, the Iraqi National Alliance, INA, and State of Law. The goal was to prevent Allawi, who is favoured by Sunnis and enjoys close ties with US and Arab leaders, from become prime minister.
The short-lived alliance between the two rival Shia groups collapsed when Tehran failed to shift INA’s staunch opposition to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s re-election bid. But Iranian influence remains intact, with Tehran reportedly continuing to pressure Shia leaders within INA to accept Maliki, as they hold talks with all the major players.
Iran has made extraordinary efforts to ensure that it has the upper hand in Iraq, and if it brokers the deal that creates the next government, its influence will be assured.
Turkey, meanwhile, has already made it clear that it might intervene to fill the gap created by the departure of the Americans, albeit in an area where the US never had a presence, the Qandil mountains, stronghold of the Kurdish rebel group, the PKK.
The wider Arab world seems to have its own plans for gaining a foothold in Iraq and changing the political landscape. Some Arab states are working quietly, through Turkey, to influence the situation in favour of the Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority.
A recent piece in the London-based, Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, reported that Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries were planning a conference modelled on the 1989 Taef Agreement which ended Lebanon's civil war.
The article said the conference would seek “to resolve issues in Iraq away from Iranian and American influence”, and would take place in Damascus.
The paper quoted Iraqi sources as saying that a government could not be formed without the involvement of Arab states, and set out four different scenarios, all of which excluded Maliki and favoured Allawi to head the government.
Syria seems to be turning a blind eye to al-Qaeda activities, including allowing insurgents to cross into Iraq.
Earlier this year, a joint Iraqi-US special operations team in Mosul killed Abu Khalaf, a top al-Qaeda figure based in Syria who had coordinated suicide bombings in Anbar and Baghdad. In late 2008, a US raid on the Syrian border city of al-Bukamal killed several senior foreign fighters operating against Iraqi targets.
Damascus is also allowing the Baath party to organise and operate freely as it attempts to destabilise Iraq. Fugitive members of the Baath who have been charged with or convicted of various crimes are moving around freely in a number of Arab countries, in some cases with the protection of the host government.
It is clear that al-Qaeda will do whatever it can to capitalise on Iraq’s current vulnerability. The security forces are demoralised, there is no government in place, and the top security officials – the interior and defence ministers – have been undermined by losing their parliamentary bids in the March election.
All the above scenarios are plausible if neither the Iraqis nor the Americans make positive plans for the post-withdrawal phase.
Following the troop withdrawal, the US still needs to ensure that Iraq heads towards becoming a stable, democratic, peaceful and viable partner of the US and the free world. This has not happened yet, and has taken longer than originally anticipated.
For this to happen, the US needs to play an active political role in the country, and to do so in ways that empower the voices of independent Iraqis and groups. The Americans need to promote good governance and support efforts to steer Iraq in the right direction.
Iraqis need to realise that thus far, the doors have been left open to interference by nearly everyone in the region. Now that the American troops have gone, Iraq’s leaders need to understand that the more interference they allow, the less relevant they themselves will become. And in doing so, they will let Iraq become a battleground for regional and international players.
Sunday, August 22, 2010
A fraudster and some ignorant and malicious media workers are shaping Kurdistan’s freedom of expression
If doctors, engineers, lawyers or members of other professions make mistakes, they are barred from practicing their occupations and their licenses are revoked.
But luckily enough for our media and government employees, these requirements are not applied to them.
Government and media workers are neither accountable nor sackable. In fact, they may be quite similar in many ways.
I often hear our politicians asking: What makes someone a journalist?
I also hear them answer their own question: Well, anyone can be a journalist if they are prepared to swear at the establishment. The best journalist is one who most eloquently insults high-ranking leaders and officials.
Journalists on the other hand ask: What makes someone a government official?
They answer their own question: Anyone can become a government official if they are loyalists of the right person in the right party.
On the face of it, this relationship seems like a formula that some can live with. But in reality it is harming the public and insulting their intelligence.
The last couple of weeks provided good examples as to how this relationship is failing.
If there was an award for the worst media performance, it would have been given to pro- and anti-government media jointly.
To those who don’t know, here is what happened: A magazine called Lvin published an interview with an individual, Qani Fard, who claims to be a historian earning his PhD at Harvard. He made all kinds of allegations against the Kurdish movement’s history and leadership.
He based these claims on alleged documents from Iranian and other countries’ intelligence services, yet provided no documentation to support the accusations.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party was immediately up in arms about the claims and started a campaign against Lvin, stretching from the pages of its newspapers to the pulpit of mosques. This was exactly what Lvin wanted: The interview was clearly published to trigger this controversy and boost the paper’s sales -- nothing else.
A professional and reputable media outlet that cares about its professional and business reputation would take allegations such as these very seriously. They would conduct an internal investigation first and then determine what went wrong and form a position based on their findings.
A professional outlet would usually issue an apology if what they wrote was incorrect, or would stand by every word they wrote if they discovered that their article held water. Lvin’s immediate reaction was a ready-made email to everyone saying “Our lives are in danger.”
It did not take a colleague of mine 30 minutes to find out that Qani Fard has never attended Harvard. Nor has he earned a PhD at Cambridge, as his Wikipedia page claims. Nor did his name show up in any Australian university.
In the case of Xebat and other pro government outlets, they simply published anti-Lvin statements threatening the magazine without verifying the source or looking into the repercussions of it.
So this is what we’re left with: A fraudster of the present and the past, along with several ignorant and malicious media workers, nearly caused another PR disaster for the Kurdistan region.
Each one’s motives were clear: The fraudster wanted to get as many Google hits as possible, while those in the malicious and ignorant camp wanted to sell as many papers as possible and to please their party bosses.
This is all at the expense of freedom of expression in the region.
Our media is a reflection of our politics. “Our politicians are corrupt”, said one journalist, “and so are we”.
But this need not be the case. While politicians may be forced to reform because of electoral pressure, the media is under more pressure to self-regulate.
The fact of the matter is that neither the politics nor the media in Iraqi Kurdistan are regulated. This leaves both with the difficult task of regulating themselves.
I believe that if there is a strong will to develop a healthy media, each sector of society needs to play a role in implementing reforms.
For the media: If the information a source is giving does not make sense, investigate further. If it still does not make sense, don’t use it.
For the politicians: If a headline does not make sense, ignore it -- they want you to react. If you have to react, react directly by writing to the media outlet. The aim of this is to correct the error and raise journalistic standards. If the media outlet does not respond, then ignore them.
For the public: If a headline does not make sense, pick up the newspaper and read the first line or two of the report. If you still aren’t convinced, put the paper down. Do not buy it; try to make it unsellable. Do not even talk about it to your friends.
But luckily enough for our media and government employees, these requirements are not applied to them.
Government and media workers are neither accountable nor sackable. In fact, they may be quite similar in many ways.
I often hear our politicians asking: What makes someone a journalist?
I also hear them answer their own question: Well, anyone can be a journalist if they are prepared to swear at the establishment. The best journalist is one who most eloquently insults high-ranking leaders and officials.
Journalists on the other hand ask: What makes someone a government official?
They answer their own question: Anyone can become a government official if they are loyalists of the right person in the right party.
On the face of it, this relationship seems like a formula that some can live with. But in reality it is harming the public and insulting their intelligence.
The last couple of weeks provided good examples as to how this relationship is failing.
If there was an award for the worst media performance, it would have been given to pro- and anti-government media jointly.
To those who don’t know, here is what happened: A magazine called Lvin published an interview with an individual, Qani Fard, who claims to be a historian earning his PhD at Harvard. He made all kinds of allegations against the Kurdish movement’s history and leadership.
He based these claims on alleged documents from Iranian and other countries’ intelligence services, yet provided no documentation to support the accusations.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party was immediately up in arms about the claims and started a campaign against Lvin, stretching from the pages of its newspapers to the pulpit of mosques. This was exactly what Lvin wanted: The interview was clearly published to trigger this controversy and boost the paper’s sales -- nothing else.
A professional and reputable media outlet that cares about its professional and business reputation would take allegations such as these very seriously. They would conduct an internal investigation first and then determine what went wrong and form a position based on their findings.
A professional outlet would usually issue an apology if what they wrote was incorrect, or would stand by every word they wrote if they discovered that their article held water. Lvin’s immediate reaction was a ready-made email to everyone saying “Our lives are in danger.”
It did not take a colleague of mine 30 minutes to find out that Qani Fard has never attended Harvard. Nor has he earned a PhD at Cambridge, as his Wikipedia page claims. Nor did his name show up in any Australian university.
In the case of Xebat and other pro government outlets, they simply published anti-Lvin statements threatening the magazine without verifying the source or looking into the repercussions of it.
So this is what we’re left with: A fraudster of the present and the past, along with several ignorant and malicious media workers, nearly caused another PR disaster for the Kurdistan region.
Each one’s motives were clear: The fraudster wanted to get as many Google hits as possible, while those in the malicious and ignorant camp wanted to sell as many papers as possible and to please their party bosses.
This is all at the expense of freedom of expression in the region.
Our media is a reflection of our politics. “Our politicians are corrupt”, said one journalist, “and so are we”.
But this need not be the case. While politicians may be forced to reform because of electoral pressure, the media is under more pressure to self-regulate.
The fact of the matter is that neither the politics nor the media in Iraqi Kurdistan are regulated. This leaves both with the difficult task of regulating themselves.
I believe that if there is a strong will to develop a healthy media, each sector of society needs to play a role in implementing reforms.
For the media: If the information a source is giving does not make sense, investigate further. If it still does not make sense, don’t use it.
For the politicians: If a headline does not make sense, ignore it -- they want you to react. If you have to react, react directly by writing to the media outlet. The aim of this is to correct the error and raise journalistic standards. If the media outlet does not respond, then ignore them.
For the public: If a headline does not make sense, pick up the newspaper and read the first line or two of the report. If you still aren’t convinced, put the paper down. Do not buy it; try to make it unsellable. Do not even talk about it to your friends.
Sunday, August 15, 2010
The rule of law and the rule of man
One of the most frequently-raised questions about Iraq is why the country is in such a state of chaos and has not made any real progress.
Seven years after the fall of Saddam, basic services required by every citizen are still far from satisfactory. This is especially true in the south and centre of Iraq.
The airport of Baghdad is a prime example of the failure of the new Iraqi public service sector.
In every other field of service, the excuses of terrorism and bad security can be used. But the airport is still in one of the most heavily-protected areas of the country, and works with regional airports that operate on timetables that are accurate down to the minute. Yet taking off from or arriving on time to Baghdad is almost unheard of.
In terms of all other public services, the track record is just as dismal as that of the airport.
Healthcare, drinking water and sewage systems are among the plethora of concerns that consume the average citizen today. But the reality is that no one is being held accountable for or taking responsibility for the shortcomings.
This is not just in the in the centre and south; it also exists in Kurdistan. The situation there is improving in terms of services, but is nowhere near what it should be.
Corruption is still one of the biggest problems eating away at the state, both in Kurdistan and in the rest of the country.
The fact of the matter is that large parts of the Iraqi public service sector are inefficient and corrupt.
And hence the chaos and lack of progress is evident in many aspects of public services.
Public service employees and officials do not seem to be held accountable, as most appointments are political and are based on ethnic, sectarian or partisan affiliations.
Usually, eradicating corruption and providing better public services are carried out by either the rule of law or the rule of man.
Political analysts define these two systems as follows: the rule of man is any system in which a man directs the course of the nation. That man is usually feared and sometimes loved.
A rule of law system is quite the opposite. In this system the nation possesses a set of guidelines, usually in a constitution, which sets the terms of governing.
Although the constitution provides strong guarantees for the rule of law, in reality it is still far from being implemented in most parts of the country.
As for the rule of man, Iraq seems to have moved from the rule of one strong man to the rule of a number of men scattered across the country. None seem especially interested in building solid foundations for the Iraqi state.
To sum up, in Baghdad there does not seem to be either rule of law or rule of man and hence the high corruption and the bad public service.
In Kurdistan, there seems to be a bit of both and hence the better public service but deeper corruption.
Political analysts argue that any rule of man system, whether by mob or the elites, is destined for failure.
Although rule of man may be necessary for the Iraqi or Kurdish context, liberty and property will not be protected under such systems, and the nation will ultimately suffer under tyranny.
Thus if anyone wishes to help the people of Iraq out of their crises and raise living standards, they need to establish the rule of law as a starting point.
Seven years after the fall of Saddam, basic services required by every citizen are still far from satisfactory. This is especially true in the south and centre of Iraq.
The airport of Baghdad is a prime example of the failure of the new Iraqi public service sector.
In every other field of service, the excuses of terrorism and bad security can be used. But the airport is still in one of the most heavily-protected areas of the country, and works with regional airports that operate on timetables that are accurate down to the minute. Yet taking off from or arriving on time to Baghdad is almost unheard of.
In terms of all other public services, the track record is just as dismal as that of the airport.
Healthcare, drinking water and sewage systems are among the plethora of concerns that consume the average citizen today. But the reality is that no one is being held accountable for or taking responsibility for the shortcomings.
This is not just in the in the centre and south; it also exists in Kurdistan. The situation there is improving in terms of services, but is nowhere near what it should be.
Corruption is still one of the biggest problems eating away at the state, both in Kurdistan and in the rest of the country.
The fact of the matter is that large parts of the Iraqi public service sector are inefficient and corrupt.
And hence the chaos and lack of progress is evident in many aspects of public services.
Public service employees and officials do not seem to be held accountable, as most appointments are political and are based on ethnic, sectarian or partisan affiliations.
Usually, eradicating corruption and providing better public services are carried out by either the rule of law or the rule of man.
Political analysts define these two systems as follows: the rule of man is any system in which a man directs the course of the nation. That man is usually feared and sometimes loved.
A rule of law system is quite the opposite. In this system the nation possesses a set of guidelines, usually in a constitution, which sets the terms of governing.
Although the constitution provides strong guarantees for the rule of law, in reality it is still far from being implemented in most parts of the country.
As for the rule of man, Iraq seems to have moved from the rule of one strong man to the rule of a number of men scattered across the country. None seem especially interested in building solid foundations for the Iraqi state.
To sum up, in Baghdad there does not seem to be either rule of law or rule of man and hence the high corruption and the bad public service.
In Kurdistan, there seems to be a bit of both and hence the better public service but deeper corruption.
Political analysts argue that any rule of man system, whether by mob or the elites, is destined for failure.
Although rule of man may be necessary for the Iraqi or Kurdish context, liberty and property will not be protected under such systems, and the nation will ultimately suffer under tyranny.
Thus if anyone wishes to help the people of Iraq out of their crises and raise living standards, they need to establish the rule of law as a starting point.
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Of players and spectators
Allawi, Maliki and the other blocs are in a game. Allawi is making the best decision he can, holding on to what he believes is his right to form the government. Any move he makes must take into account Maliki’s fight to become the new Shia bloc’s candidate for PM; as well as the decision of the other blocs to stay out of this conflict.
On the other hand, Maliki is also making the best decision he can, insisting on leading the formation of the government. His strategy is taking into account Allawi's intention to be the PM and the other blocs’ intention to stay out of this conflict.
The other blocs are making the best decision they can, staying out of the conflict, taking into account the decisions of both Maliki and Allawi. They say one of them would eventually be the PM and we would then support whoever is chosen.
In game theory this stalemate is called the Nash equilibrium. In 1994, John Nash won the Nobel Prize of economics for a theory he derived about peoples’ decisions when interacting with others.
Nash equilibrium is a concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally.
This seems to be the case in Iraq today – but it need not remain this way.
While Allawi and Maliki have no other choice but to stick to their positions and hence keep the equilibrium, the others, including the Kurds may have an interest in breaking it.
While all the attention is on the two big blocs or the two big names, Maliki and Allawi, the other blocs can have a significant role and can truly be the kingmakers.
So far, the smaller groups have decided on being neutral in the conflict and waiting for a winner.
This may be a sound policy if the conflict is short-lived or relatively superficial.
Not so in Iraq. As the conflict between the two blocs intensifies, those who have kept outside it may run the risk of becoming irrelevant to its settlement.
If a given bloc outside the two main conflicting ones decides to break the stalemate by supporting one of the two lists, they could well tip the balance in favour of their preferred choice, get whatever commitments they want from it and be key players in the political scene.
Given the mathematics of the parliament, even if the preferred option of the smaller bloc did not get the premiership, there would be a political price to be extracted for switching alliances and getting whatever they want from the other side.
The Kurds and other blocs have a true opportunity to be the kingmakers again. They should take the lead and break the deadlock by putting their 60 seat weight behind their preferred choice and get the ball rolling
In situations of conflict, those who stay in the middle or outside gradually become spectators.
And usually, spectators in matches do not get anything at the end.
On the other hand, Maliki is also making the best decision he can, insisting on leading the formation of the government. His strategy is taking into account Allawi's intention to be the PM and the other blocs’ intention to stay out of this conflict.
The other blocs are making the best decision they can, staying out of the conflict, taking into account the decisions of both Maliki and Allawi. They say one of them would eventually be the PM and we would then support whoever is chosen.
In game theory this stalemate is called the Nash equilibrium. In 1994, John Nash won the Nobel Prize of economics for a theory he derived about peoples’ decisions when interacting with others.
Nash equilibrium is a concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally.
This seems to be the case in Iraq today – but it need not remain this way.
While Allawi and Maliki have no other choice but to stick to their positions and hence keep the equilibrium, the others, including the Kurds may have an interest in breaking it.
While all the attention is on the two big blocs or the two big names, Maliki and Allawi, the other blocs can have a significant role and can truly be the kingmakers.
So far, the smaller groups have decided on being neutral in the conflict and waiting for a winner.
This may be a sound policy if the conflict is short-lived or relatively superficial.
Not so in Iraq. As the conflict between the two blocs intensifies, those who have kept outside it may run the risk of becoming irrelevant to its settlement.
If a given bloc outside the two main conflicting ones decides to break the stalemate by supporting one of the two lists, they could well tip the balance in favour of their preferred choice, get whatever commitments they want from it and be key players in the political scene.
Given the mathematics of the parliament, even if the preferred option of the smaller bloc did not get the premiership, there would be a political price to be extracted for switching alliances and getting whatever they want from the other side.
The Kurds and other blocs have a true opportunity to be the kingmakers again. They should take the lead and break the deadlock by putting their 60 seat weight behind their preferred choice and get the ball rolling
In situations of conflict, those who stay in the middle or outside gradually become spectators.
And usually, spectators in matches do not get anything at the end.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)