The recent tour of President Barzani to the arab neighbourhood was a new reminder to the arab world that Iraqi Kurdistan is not against being part of its arab surrounding and that Iraq’s Arab component is the one that has arab phobia not the Kurdish one.
Since the beginning of the new Iraq, ie, 2003 many attempts were made to ostracise the kurds and create the anti-arab beast out of the new Iraq.
The majority of those who were trying to do so were people who were part of the old regime or those who cannot bare the view of a pluralistic Iraq.
But the key issue here is that the Kurds should not display any behaviour that that they are an anti-Arab component of the new Iraq.
One of the key aims of Al-qaida and the enemies of the new Iraq is to drive a strong wedge between the Kurds and Arabs and put all the other ethnic minorities on the Arab side of the divide. The Kurds should be careful not to fall into that trap.
While the Kurds and especially their leadership always emphasises that the new Iraq is one of equality and fraternity, there still are some traces of xenophobic and racist behaviour in certain parts of Kurdistan.
This has to change and especially in certain apects of the public service and its political setup in Iraqi Kurdistan. Already some damage was made on this front. And the sooner the Kurds act the quicker they can restore their status as a key player in the new Iraq. The results of the recent election and the declining number of the Kurdish lists in the Arab areas of Iraq should serve as weak up call.
There are a few measures that can be taken in Kurdistan and a some in Baghdad.
In Kurdistan, although there is words of praise from a lot of the large Arab community in Kurdistan that ran away from the violence in the centre and south and the treatment is largely satisfactory but there still are some pockets of racist and unwelcoming remarks that could create the wrong tension between the people.
This is mostly seen at checkpoints and at some government offices. Interestingly enough the business people seem to have a much better relationship than that of the politicians and the public servants.
The Arab community of Iraq is now going through tough times, sooner or later they would restore their powerful position in the new democratic Iraq. The stories of today are the ones that would make their minds tomorrow.
At the end of the day, the Kurds of Iraq are in more need of the Arabs than the Arabs of the Kurds.
One key element here is also the treatment of the other ethnicities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Again the kurds should not just talk about equality they should also do it. Although religious and ethnic tolerance is at a good stage in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The region should also send the following message to Iraq and the rest of the world: Kurds, Turkomans, Kaldo-assyrians, arabs and others make todays Iraqi Kurdistan. This should also be reflected in their policies and behaviour not only in Kurdistan but also in Baghdad.
Politically speaking, the Kurds should also take a more active role in Baghdad. They should transform their role from being representatives of the Kurdish region in Baghdad to being an active Kurdish partner in running the affairs of the country.
Over the past few years, every Thursday afternoon, Baghdad’s airport is heaving with Kurdish officials; ministers, deputy ministers, mp’s, DG’s you name it. The time that is usually used to socialise and creat a stronger network in Baghdad is usually spent in Arbil or Sulaymaniya.
As a result, relationship with the political establishment in Baghdad remained very official and stayed in meeting rooms.
Now is the time for the Kurds to have a good role in Baghdad. They can move their centre of political gravity to Baghdad and be able to be at the centre of events.
Many anti-Kurds say that Iraq was taken away from its Arab surrounding, now is the chance for the Kurdish leadership to bring Iraq back to its arab surrounding through arbil.
Saturday, July 10, 2010
Friday, July 2, 2010
An ambassator to Iraq ... at Iran!
The new US ambassador to Baghdad, James F Jeffery, would have a tough task ahead of him. Not only should he keep focused on Baghdad, he should also look at Tehran too.
While he would have to oversee a new phase of relationship between DC and Baghdad, he would also have to establish a new standing for the USA in Iraq.
The withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq would place Iraq and the US in front of the real challenge of making sure that Iraq would not descend into real chaos and would not slip quietly into Tehran’s hands.
This would be based on two key policies; the first is not interfering in government formation; the second is to interfere in preventing Tehran from doing so.
These two concepts should be translated into two clear messages from day one. First message; “It is not our business who forms the government, just form one”. Second; No dodgy deals with Tehran.
The various political blocs who are vying for government formation are hoping that the new ambassador would tip the balance in favour of one side against the other.
When Ambassador Jeffery starts his job, each group would try to convince him of supporting them to form the next government. But he should stay away from this.
He should only make sure that the process is as Iraqi as possible by communicating clearly that the US would not support the candidate of a regional capital.
The reality is that Iraq’s dysfunctional politics cannot move forward with outside interference. It makes things worse.
Historically, Iraq’s neighbours always preferred to see politics in Iraq as dysfunctional as possible, as this gives them more room for interference.
After about two years of work on Iraq, in 2006, Ambassador Jeffrey became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
He led the Bureau's Iran Policy Team and coordinated the Bureau public diplomacy at a time when Iran’s interference in Iraq was at its peak.
The key question here is how to stop Iraq from being another battleground between Iran and the US.
When Ambassador Jeffery submits his credentials to President Talabani, he should ask him this question. As he is known to be almost the only man in Baghdad who stands at an equal distance from Iran and the USA. Describing the earlier as brothers and the later as friends.
Iranians always posed privately and sometimes publically by saying: in Iraq, the US provides security and we provide politics and we are always a step ahead.
It is ambassador Jeffery’s chance to turn this around.
While he would have to oversee a new phase of relationship between DC and Baghdad, he would also have to establish a new standing for the USA in Iraq.
The withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq would place Iraq and the US in front of the real challenge of making sure that Iraq would not descend into real chaos and would not slip quietly into Tehran’s hands.
This would be based on two key policies; the first is not interfering in government formation; the second is to interfere in preventing Tehran from doing so.
These two concepts should be translated into two clear messages from day one. First message; “It is not our business who forms the government, just form one”. Second; No dodgy deals with Tehran.
The various political blocs who are vying for government formation are hoping that the new ambassador would tip the balance in favour of one side against the other.
When Ambassador Jeffery starts his job, each group would try to convince him of supporting them to form the next government. But he should stay away from this.
He should only make sure that the process is as Iraqi as possible by communicating clearly that the US would not support the candidate of a regional capital.
The reality is that Iraq’s dysfunctional politics cannot move forward with outside interference. It makes things worse.
Historically, Iraq’s neighbours always preferred to see politics in Iraq as dysfunctional as possible, as this gives them more room for interference.
After about two years of work on Iraq, in 2006, Ambassador Jeffrey became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
He led the Bureau's Iran Policy Team and coordinated the Bureau public diplomacy at a time when Iran’s interference in Iraq was at its peak.
The key question here is how to stop Iraq from being another battleground between Iran and the US.
When Ambassador Jeffery submits his credentials to President Talabani, he should ask him this question. As he is known to be almost the only man in Baghdad who stands at an equal distance from Iran and the USA. Describing the earlier as brothers and the later as friends.
Iranians always posed privately and sometimes publically by saying: in Iraq, the US provides security and we provide politics and we are always a step ahead.
It is ambassador Jeffery’s chance to turn this around.
Friday, June 25, 2010
Kurdish security agencies and the public
Forty days have passed since the murder of zardasht othman. Regardless of the reasons and the circumstances that led to the killing which is open for interpretation. Nobody still knows what has actually happened.
The public is still looking for answers, while the authorities are still trying to fend off the allegations of their involvement in the murder. The decisive factor in this is the work and findings of the committee established to investigate the murder.
The security service in the region has a good track record for its professionalism and efficiency in protecting the region and its inhabitants, especially in recent years.
It has undergone significant transformation from the days of the civil war to the phase of professional security.
In many ways, one of the main things that the Kurdistan region shows for with the rest of the country is its security.
On many occasions it proved capable of hunting down culprits or those who disturbed peace in the region.
A key element in their work is the steady flaw of information to the public about the case in question.
The key factor for this is people’s sense of ownership of the place and as a result their cooperation with the security services.
The killing of Zardasht presented a new challenge for the security service’s professionalism. By modern standards, it has so far failed to be up to the task.
When the murder was discovered, all, including the security services, condemned it.
This is fine but not enough for the public. Instead of just condemning, the public was expecting information about the circumstances of the killing.
Usually, a the security agency provides the public with detailed information available to them up to the time of the announcement and encourages the public to help with the investigation by contacting them if they have any leads on the crime.
Although a committee was set up to investigate the killing but no information was provided to the public yet about its work and findings
The committee so far has not come up with any new evidence that leads to the culprits or to the understanding of why this murder was perpetrated.
Providing the public with regular updates that contain as much information available as possible is the key factor in preventing rumors and innuendos prevailing and the accusations and counteraccusations of the politicians would still continue.
At times of crisis, the security agency is usually the one that rallies public support and confidence in the state institutions it is also the one that creates a sense of ownership of the process.
The committee has the opportunity to depoliticize the case and put the case in the hands of the people of security and law and not people of politics.
The public is still looking for answers, while the authorities are still trying to fend off the allegations of their involvement in the murder. The decisive factor in this is the work and findings of the committee established to investigate the murder.
The security service in the region has a good track record for its professionalism and efficiency in protecting the region and its inhabitants, especially in recent years.
It has undergone significant transformation from the days of the civil war to the phase of professional security.
In many ways, one of the main things that the Kurdistan region shows for with the rest of the country is its security.
On many occasions it proved capable of hunting down culprits or those who disturbed peace in the region.
A key element in their work is the steady flaw of information to the public about the case in question.
The key factor for this is people’s sense of ownership of the place and as a result their cooperation with the security services.
The killing of Zardasht presented a new challenge for the security service’s professionalism. By modern standards, it has so far failed to be up to the task.
When the murder was discovered, all, including the security services, condemned it.
This is fine but not enough for the public. Instead of just condemning, the public was expecting information about the circumstances of the killing.
Usually, a the security agency provides the public with detailed information available to them up to the time of the announcement and encourages the public to help with the investigation by contacting them if they have any leads on the crime.
Although a committee was set up to investigate the killing but no information was provided to the public yet about its work and findings
The committee so far has not come up with any new evidence that leads to the culprits or to the understanding of why this murder was perpetrated.
Providing the public with regular updates that contain as much information available as possible is the key factor in preventing rumors and innuendos prevailing and the accusations and counteraccusations of the politicians would still continue.
At times of crisis, the security agency is usually the one that rallies public support and confidence in the state institutions it is also the one that creates a sense of ownership of the process.
The committee has the opportunity to depoliticize the case and put the case in the hands of the people of security and law and not people of politics.
Friday, June 18, 2010
New Shia bloc: deadlock or breakthrough
The new shia bloc formed recently brings good news and bad news to other blocs and to the political process.
it further adds a new complication to the ongoing issue of naming the pm.
It brings good news to the kurds because they cease to be the fourth bloc in parliament and they would be dealt with as a component of the Iraqi society.
This will strengthen their standing in parliament because they would not be seen for their seat numbers when it comes to the naming of the PM their consent to the next pm would have to be a condition.
The bad news for them is that they would be stuck between Iran and the Arab world.
One of the key issues on the agenda for the kurds over the next four years is the disputed areas and they are controlled by al-Iraqiya.
They would be stuck between history and geography. Historically and politically, they would have an easier deal with the Shia blocs, or bloc. But their geographic proximity to areas dominated by al-Iraqiya would make it difficult for them to strike a strong deal with the Shia only.
So their choice of naming the PM will strongly be influenced by the relationship between Al-Iraqiya and the shia bloc.
As for the Shia bloc, their unification seems to be a good step in the direction of keeping the premiership with the Shias, but it is strongly undermined by their internal differences and their external pressure mostly from Iran to stay united.
Their differences stem mostly from the fact that they are not united over the name of the next pm and the fact that each group of them has a different option of who from the Sunnis they should ally with outside the bloc.
By unifying they took the first step of undoing what the new election law was about. It was intended to break the sectarian and ethnic nature of voting in Iraq. But putting all the shia in one group proves that the political process of Iraq is still far from being based on real political issues. It is still very much divided along sectarian and ethnic lines.
Although the unification makes them the biggest player, it also makes it more difficult for them to ally themselves with just on of the two other blocs, Al-Iraqiya and the kurds. Since they opted for the shia identity to be in one group , they have to chose both, the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs as partners.
Since national politics in the country is still ethnic and sectarian, all three main components need to be running the affairs of the country.
As for Iraqiya, tacitly they are split. Those who want a position in the next government are not so keen for Allawi to become a PM. Because, if he is appointed as PM, they would lose some strong ministries for that position.
Allawi himself seems to settle for nothing less than the PM post.
The formation of the new Shia bloc provides them with the assurances that they would not be ousted but it also send allawi the bad news of losing his chance to form the next government.
In short, the formation of the new shia group presents every one with two options to ally with. Each one of the choices is not viable on its own. Given all the challenges and the tasks that lie ahead, the only way forward is to form a national unity government.
But the stumbling block still is the name of the pm. It is obvious that it would be a Shia, but the two other lists would be better of with a weak compromise candidate to be appointed. It could even be good for a better federal system of the country.
it further adds a new complication to the ongoing issue of naming the pm.
It brings good news to the kurds because they cease to be the fourth bloc in parliament and they would be dealt with as a component of the Iraqi society.
This will strengthen their standing in parliament because they would not be seen for their seat numbers when it comes to the naming of the PM their consent to the next pm would have to be a condition.
The bad news for them is that they would be stuck between Iran and the Arab world.
One of the key issues on the agenda for the kurds over the next four years is the disputed areas and they are controlled by al-Iraqiya.
They would be stuck between history and geography. Historically and politically, they would have an easier deal with the Shia blocs, or bloc. But their geographic proximity to areas dominated by al-Iraqiya would make it difficult for them to strike a strong deal with the Shia only.
So their choice of naming the PM will strongly be influenced by the relationship between Al-Iraqiya and the shia bloc.
As for the Shia bloc, their unification seems to be a good step in the direction of keeping the premiership with the Shias, but it is strongly undermined by their internal differences and their external pressure mostly from Iran to stay united.
Their differences stem mostly from the fact that they are not united over the name of the next pm and the fact that each group of them has a different option of who from the Sunnis they should ally with outside the bloc.
By unifying they took the first step of undoing what the new election law was about. It was intended to break the sectarian and ethnic nature of voting in Iraq. But putting all the shia in one group proves that the political process of Iraq is still far from being based on real political issues. It is still very much divided along sectarian and ethnic lines.
Although the unification makes them the biggest player, it also makes it more difficult for them to ally themselves with just on of the two other blocs, Al-Iraqiya and the kurds. Since they opted for the shia identity to be in one group , they have to chose both, the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs as partners.
Since national politics in the country is still ethnic and sectarian, all three main components need to be running the affairs of the country.
As for Iraqiya, tacitly they are split. Those who want a position in the next government are not so keen for Allawi to become a PM. Because, if he is appointed as PM, they would lose some strong ministries for that position.
Allawi himself seems to settle for nothing less than the PM post.
The formation of the new Shia bloc provides them with the assurances that they would not be ousted but it also send allawi the bad news of losing his chance to form the next government.
In short, the formation of the new shia group presents every one with two options to ally with. Each one of the choices is not viable on its own. Given all the challenges and the tasks that lie ahead, the only way forward is to form a national unity government.
But the stumbling block still is the name of the pm. It is obvious that it would be a Shia, but the two other lists would be better of with a weak compromise candidate to be appointed. It could even be good for a better federal system of the country.
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Put Policy Before Personality
It seems the new Iraqi state still has some way to go before the interests of the public are put above those of its leaders.
There does not seem to be any sense of urgency among the leaders in Baghdad to settle the ongoing saga of who is going to form the next government, despite US Vice President Joseph Biden’s recent statement affirming his country’s determination to withdraw most of its troop after two months.
The March election proved that politics in our society is still very much polarised and personalised. No one managed to get enough seats to form a majority government.
The attempted alliances, the talks over forming new blocs and the dispute over the results are all centered around the issue of who should lead the country.
They do not address the questions the electorate is most interested in – how will the next government work, and what will it do.
The partisan divisions and personality politics that flourish in Iraq have caused the delay in forming the government. Almost three months have elapsed and we still do not seem to be any closer to having a new administration.
With every day that passes, the electorate is losing faith in representatives it recently elected to office.
While these representatives fight over who is to be the next PM, they could also work towards bringing the views of the people to the foreground.
This can be done by seeking to build a national consensus over the issues that are important for the Iraqi voter over the next four years.
A team of elected representatives who are not seeking cabinet posts could get together to produce a national charter that sets the roadmap for the country over the next four years. It can also serve as the political programme for the next government.
This would be a step to assure the public that Iraq’s political process is about policy, not personalities.
The charter can address issues on which there is some consensus, ranging from security and national reconciliation to public services and good governance; from guaranteeing democratic rights and freedoms to economic prosperity and transparency.
The longer the current uncertainty continues, the more divided society will become and the less room there will be for a common platform that all Iraqis can agree on.
The longer it takes to name a PM, the more external interference is allowed in the country’s affairs, making the choice of leader less representative of Iraqi interests.
Putting the Iraqi people’s representatives in one room to agree on a common platform for the country would contribute greatly to reducing the differences between them. It would give the people a clearer vision as to what the next government should do for them.
A national charter would in effect be an important cornerstone for national consensus over the next four years. It would be an important step away from the polarisation and personalization that Iraqi politics is seeing now.
It would also reduce the amount of opposition to the next PM by blocs that would not take part in government. The argument would be that although they did not nominate the PM, they had a say in drafting his job description.
If such a charter is not drafted for the next government, there is a risk that whoever is leading the country will have to make up the steps as they go along, especially when it comes to the first challenge – handling the withdrawal of the US forces that Biden has promised.
There does not seem to be any sense of urgency among the leaders in Baghdad to settle the ongoing saga of who is going to form the next government, despite US Vice President Joseph Biden’s recent statement affirming his country’s determination to withdraw most of its troop after two months.
The March election proved that politics in our society is still very much polarised and personalised. No one managed to get enough seats to form a majority government.
The attempted alliances, the talks over forming new blocs and the dispute over the results are all centered around the issue of who should lead the country.
They do not address the questions the electorate is most interested in – how will the next government work, and what will it do.
The partisan divisions and personality politics that flourish in Iraq have caused the delay in forming the government. Almost three months have elapsed and we still do not seem to be any closer to having a new administration.
With every day that passes, the electorate is losing faith in representatives it recently elected to office.
While these representatives fight over who is to be the next PM, they could also work towards bringing the views of the people to the foreground.
This can be done by seeking to build a national consensus over the issues that are important for the Iraqi voter over the next four years.
A team of elected representatives who are not seeking cabinet posts could get together to produce a national charter that sets the roadmap for the country over the next four years. It can also serve as the political programme for the next government.
This would be a step to assure the public that Iraq’s political process is about policy, not personalities.
The charter can address issues on which there is some consensus, ranging from security and national reconciliation to public services and good governance; from guaranteeing democratic rights and freedoms to economic prosperity and transparency.
The longer the current uncertainty continues, the more divided society will become and the less room there will be for a common platform that all Iraqis can agree on.
The longer it takes to name a PM, the more external interference is allowed in the country’s affairs, making the choice of leader less representative of Iraqi interests.
Putting the Iraqi people’s representatives in one room to agree on a common platform for the country would contribute greatly to reducing the differences between them. It would give the people a clearer vision as to what the next government should do for them.
A national charter would in effect be an important cornerstone for national consensus over the next four years. It would be an important step away from the polarisation and personalization that Iraqi politics is seeing now.
It would also reduce the amount of opposition to the next PM by blocs that would not take part in government. The argument would be that although they did not nominate the PM, they had a say in drafting his job description.
If such a charter is not drafted for the next government, there is a risk that whoever is leading the country will have to make up the steps as they go along, especially when it comes to the first challenge – handling the withdrawal of the US forces that Biden has promised.
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