SULAIMANIYAH, Kurdistan region 'Iraq', — The recent election in Iraqi Kurdistan ushered in a new era for the region’s media, posing fresh challenges for news organisations, the government and the parliament.
In the past, the ruling parties were the driving force in the political process. But a formidable opposition emerged on election day, and the political game seems to have changed forever. The main player in the Iraqi Kurdish political scene today is the voter.
Winning the trust of the voter will be everyone’s goal over the coming years.
This imposes new responsibilities on the Kurdish media, which is essentially divided into two camps – one for and one against the political establishment.
Most Iraqi Kurdish political parties have their own media outlets that usually include websites, newspapers and radio and TV stations.
Most of the top parties also have their own influential satellite television channels, which the public widely turns to for regional news. These channels have traditionally been monopolised by the region’s two most powerful parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
More recently, the new opposition group, Change, established its TV channel, the Kurdistan News Network.
Traditionally, party media have put their political agenda and their leaders’ activities ahead of news that is most important to the public.
On the other hand, private media have always claimed independence but in reality function as the voice of the opposition. In their case, the criterion for news is whatever that does not appear in the party media.
This division has clearly created a big gap, and at times tensions, in Iraqi Kurdistan’s burgeoning media scene.
No single outlet is providing comprehensive coverage of most stories, which does not help citizens to understand the political situation. In order to obtain a complete picture, one has to go through five or six media outlets.
It is quite rare these days to find a news report that has both sides of the story. Instead they are split, with the independent media representing the opposition and the party media representing the government.
Following party media alone, one would think that Iraqi Kurdistan has no problems whatsoever. The non-party media suggests that Iraqi Kurdistan is one of the most corrupt, inefficient and failed regions.
The reality is somewhere in between, and balance can only be obtained if media outlets adopt professional standards of objectivity and fairness.
Looking ahead to the next four years, neither type of media can afford to stay the same. Iraqi Kurdistan has a plurality of political perspectives that the region has never seen before, and both party and non-party media will have to work to win the trust of the audience.
For this to happen, it requires a change of heart on behalf of the political parties. They must accept that a party leader may not always headline the news. The top story should instead reflect what impacts the largest number of people in the region.
The first step that they must take is to separate news from opinion. Content needs to be divided into two clear, distinct sections – one that provides news and information and another that provides views and opinions.
Professional news editors also need to be appointed. They can ensure that standards of objectivity, impartiality and fairness are upheld.
Similar values need to be upheld by editors and reporters in independent, or opposition,www.ekurd.net media news organisations. These media outlets must stop ignoring the government’s perspectives and start including in their output some stories that are not critical of the government.
In short, both sides need to be credible sources of news and information, and must resist falling back on their traditional biased content.
As a journalism trainer, I have found that most Iraqi Kurdish journalists agree with the idea that there are two camps for each story – government and opposition. Their challenge is to build an audience of people from both of these camps.
Students are usually eager to learn new methods and understand the concepts of objectivity and impartiality in journalism. But when they go back to their newsrooms, they hit a brick wall with their editors.
What is most needed in Kurdish media today is a change of heart on the part of media managers in political parties and so-called independent outlets.
Media development organisations can support fair and impartial journalism by employing a top-down training approach that targets editors.
This is especially crucial given the new political landscape which has emerged from the election. If the current political situation continues, the opposition is likely to be strong which will create a vibrant and unpredictable parliament.
The need for public affairs and governance reporting has never been higher. Stories that may appear in a reliable media outlet could complement the political process. A story about corruption may lead to the downfall of a government official.
The relationship between the government and the non-party media is quite unhealthy these days. This has paved the way for the emergence of some outlets with extremely poor standards, and libelling government officials has become one of their objectives.
One editor once told a visiting press delegation that his news organisation deliberately publishes lies and waits for government officials to correct them.
On the other hand, non-party media widely complain that they are not given access to government institutions.
The new government, including ministries, will need a strong public relations and communications campaign and will need to treat all news organisations equally.
The government will also need to strengthen their press offices and the skills of their spokespeople to ensure that the information reaches the public.
Legislatively, the next four years will also be crucial for media. The existing laws that govern the work of the media are regarded as archaic and vague.
The press law that was passed last year primarily regulates newspapers, and was largely seen as a way to counter non-party press outlets that are highly critical of the government. The law did not take into account broadcast or online media,www.ekurd.net in part because members of parliament did not think that the likes of the opposition television news station Kurdistan News Network would emerge.
Sections of the law dealing with libel and slander also lack clarity.
Media regulation may soon become an issue that requires the parliament’s attention. The parliament needs to set up a media commission as a professional body that sets standards for good journalism and settles disputes outside the court system.
In this nascent democracy, the elections gave birth to a new opportunity for all. While the government needs to have better communications and the legislature has to come up with a better framework to regulate the media, the media needs to seize this opportunity to professionalise and become a true Fourth Estate.
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
Friday, September 5, 2008
What Iraq do the Kurds want?
In the absence of a permanent United States presence in Kurdistan--something that would be welcomed by almost every Kurd--the Iraq that the Kurds and most Iraqis want when US troops withdraw is one that is at peace with itself and the world. They want a federal democracy with a good democratic government that upholds the values of the free world: an Iraq where all citizens are equal and their rights are respected.
The elements of this dream are there. The constitution, referred to by many politicians as the cornerstone of the new Iraq, provides for all of the above. The foundations for the new Iraq are being laid now, but the project is not likely to be completed in the near future. The political process still needs to mature. It is still hostage to the principles of quota and consensus among participating parties that are mostly identified along religious and sectarian lines.
This weakens a common national identity and strengthens the sectarian and ethnic divide in society by empowering the political parties that represent these identities, rendering it a lot more difficult to separate religion from the state. In fact, we still depend heavily on the role of religious figures. On many important issues, the final word is still that of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.
While Iraqis realize that a true democratic Iraq will obviously entail the rule of the Shi'ite majority, they are also convinced that the days of exclusive rule by one group are over. The first 80 years of Iraq's history clearly demonstrate that no single group or leader alone can rule the country. The only guarantee for minorities is a federal structure that empowers local and regional governments and allows the various Iraqi communities to conduct their own affairs.
Baghdad does not seem ready to digest the concept of federalism. This is still a new concept for Iraqis. They have become used to a strong central state with a strong leader. The Kurds are the only people who are actively seeking to hammer out a federal structure for the country. Yet federalism should be not only a Kurdish cause,www.ekurd.net but an Iraqi cause. "They seem to have forgotten what strong centers and strong leaders did to them," remarked a Kurdish political analyst recently about Iraqis in general. Thus the current debate between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad is over a true federal status for the region and the shaping of a federal architecture for the new Iraq.
Some in Baghdad feel that over the past few years "concessions" were given to Kurdistan due to Baghdad's weakness and that with the security gains Baghdad is making, "this must stop." This is simply the wrong attitude to take. Powers should be devolved to the regions out of Baghdad's understanding of the strengths involved in having a true federal system. The country will be owned by all, as opposed to being owned by the center only.
The Kurds still need some time to develop confidence in Baghdad. Talks over oil contracts, the share of the budget and the status of Peshmerga forces are all issues whose settlement will provide the Kurds with assurances that the old days are not going to be repeated. For example, the dispute over oil contracts is not about the size of the revenue the Kurds want to get. Rather, to the Kurds, a national oil policy rather than a central one will enable the Kurdish areas to benefit from developing the oil industry of Iraq.
The Kurds realize that they are in a marriage with Baghdad and divorce is not an option. At the same time, they feel disappointed by their allies and counter-signatories to the constitution. They feel they have performed their obligation toward Baghdad. "When they need us to fight terrorists, we are their partners, but when it comes to our rights in deciding for ourselves, we become adversaries," said a Kurdish politician involved in the talks with Baghdad recently.
Ironing out the differences and reaching a workable relationship with Baghdad will need some time. The help and presence of the US is vital to settle these issues. A federal structure will allow more room for development and good governance and less room for corruption and putting the blame on the other side. Iraqis are still picking up the rubble of the destruction caused by the former regime, the terror campaign and the internal fighting that followed. In this process, people usually look for someone to put the blame on. But when people are busy building their own regions, they don't usually ask whether the builder is Shi'ite or Sunni,www.ekurd.net Kurd or Arab. Rather the test is, can they do the job or not. Of course corruption and mismanagement may take place, but it is a lot easier to fight them at the regional rather than the national level, provided there exist the right anti-corruption bodies and they are not politicized.
While the Kurds are looking at internal arrangements for their future, they are also mindful of the regional dynamics that could dictate the future of Iraq as a whole and the Kurdistan region in particular. They are quietly eyeing the showdown between Iran and the international community. If Iran survives this, it will have a huge say in the future shape and nature of Iraq and the Middle East.
The Kurds also realize the importance of their neighbor Turkey. It is key to a peaceful future that Turkey be at peace with a Kurdish federal region on its border. Similarly, the Kurds will have to assure the Turks that they are not a threat to them. They will have to demonstrate that they serve as a factor of stability rather than irritation.
After all and if all else fails, Turkey is the only access the Kurds have to the free world.
This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
The elements of this dream are there. The constitution, referred to by many politicians as the cornerstone of the new Iraq, provides for all of the above. The foundations for the new Iraq are being laid now, but the project is not likely to be completed in the near future. The political process still needs to mature. It is still hostage to the principles of quota and consensus among participating parties that are mostly identified along religious and sectarian lines.
This weakens a common national identity and strengthens the sectarian and ethnic divide in society by empowering the political parties that represent these identities, rendering it a lot more difficult to separate religion from the state. In fact, we still depend heavily on the role of religious figures. On many important issues, the final word is still that of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.
While Iraqis realize that a true democratic Iraq will obviously entail the rule of the Shi'ite majority, they are also convinced that the days of exclusive rule by one group are over. The first 80 years of Iraq's history clearly demonstrate that no single group or leader alone can rule the country. The only guarantee for minorities is a federal structure that empowers local and regional governments and allows the various Iraqi communities to conduct their own affairs.
Baghdad does not seem ready to digest the concept of federalism. This is still a new concept for Iraqis. They have become used to a strong central state with a strong leader. The Kurds are the only people who are actively seeking to hammer out a federal structure for the country. Yet federalism should be not only a Kurdish cause,www.ekurd.net but an Iraqi cause. "They seem to have forgotten what strong centers and strong leaders did to them," remarked a Kurdish political analyst recently about Iraqis in general. Thus the current debate between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad is over a true federal status for the region and the shaping of a federal architecture for the new Iraq.
Some in Baghdad feel that over the past few years "concessions" were given to Kurdistan due to Baghdad's weakness and that with the security gains Baghdad is making, "this must stop." This is simply the wrong attitude to take. Powers should be devolved to the regions out of Baghdad's understanding of the strengths involved in having a true federal system. The country will be owned by all, as opposed to being owned by the center only.
The Kurds still need some time to develop confidence in Baghdad. Talks over oil contracts, the share of the budget and the status of Peshmerga forces are all issues whose settlement will provide the Kurds with assurances that the old days are not going to be repeated. For example, the dispute over oil contracts is not about the size of the revenue the Kurds want to get. Rather, to the Kurds, a national oil policy rather than a central one will enable the Kurdish areas to benefit from developing the oil industry of Iraq.
The Kurds realize that they are in a marriage with Baghdad and divorce is not an option. At the same time, they feel disappointed by their allies and counter-signatories to the constitution. They feel they have performed their obligation toward Baghdad. "When they need us to fight terrorists, we are their partners, but when it comes to our rights in deciding for ourselves, we become adversaries," said a Kurdish politician involved in the talks with Baghdad recently.
Ironing out the differences and reaching a workable relationship with Baghdad will need some time. The help and presence of the US is vital to settle these issues. A federal structure will allow more room for development and good governance and less room for corruption and putting the blame on the other side. Iraqis are still picking up the rubble of the destruction caused by the former regime, the terror campaign and the internal fighting that followed. In this process, people usually look for someone to put the blame on. But when people are busy building their own regions, they don't usually ask whether the builder is Shi'ite or Sunni,www.ekurd.net Kurd or Arab. Rather the test is, can they do the job or not. Of course corruption and mismanagement may take place, but it is a lot easier to fight them at the regional rather than the national level, provided there exist the right anti-corruption bodies and they are not politicized.
While the Kurds are looking at internal arrangements for their future, they are also mindful of the regional dynamics that could dictate the future of Iraq as a whole and the Kurdistan region in particular. They are quietly eyeing the showdown between Iran and the international community. If Iran survives this, it will have a huge say in the future shape and nature of Iraq and the Middle East.
The Kurds also realize the importance of their neighbor Turkey. It is key to a peaceful future that Turkey be at peace with a Kurdish federal region on its border. Similarly, the Kurds will have to assure the Turks that they are not a threat to them. They will have to demonstrate that they serve as a factor of stability rather than irritation.
After all and if all else fails, Turkey is the only access the Kurds have to the free world.
This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Maliki bolstered by sweep
The Iraqi PM's recent move to restore order in Basra may have been successful, but extending that success to Mosul will prove difficult.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent crackdown on militias in Basra has opened a fresh chapter in Iraqi politics, given the army new impetus, and restored a degree of public confidence in the state's ability to enforce the rule of law.
But building on this success will depends greatly on his next move, an operation to clear the northern city of Mosul of al-Qaeda and Baathist militants.
When the operation codenamed "Charge of the Knights" was launched in Basra around the beginning of April, many saw it as a make-or-break moment for the prime minister and for the Iraqi army.
Maliki's declaration that he would pursue the "outlaws" to the end won him new allies and rallied the country's political leaders behind him.
His Sunni opponents, in particular, hailed the assault on the lawless paramilitary groups that effectively controlled Basra as a bold step in the right direction.
The major Sunni political bloc, the Accord Front, had withdrawn from the cabinet, but has signalled its desire to return to government as a result of the Basra operation.
As Accord Front leader Adnan al-Dulaimi made clear, one of the bloc's demands was to "hunt down and disband the militias and curb the outlaws."
Sunni leaders have since indicated that the Maliki government has taken sufficient action on addressing their concerns to allow them to end their boycott.
Another gain for the prime minister was the rapprochement he achieved with Iraqi vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi, one of the most prominent and powerful Sunni figures engaged in the political process. The often strained relationship between the two men was one of the factors that led to the Sunni boycott of the cabinet.
Hashimi has publicly backed the Basra assault, and now sits together with the prime minister in the crisis operations room that is considering how to handle the next issue on Maliki's agenda – Mosul.
Maliki has also won broader backing, reflected in a declaration issued by the Political Council for National Security, a 19-member body that brings together the three-member presidency including the Iraqi president himself, the prime minister and deputy premiers, the speaker of parliament and his deputies, the heads of the various blocs in the legislature, the president of the Kurdistan region and the head of the Iraqi judiciary.
The document, which outlines the principles by which Iraq's political system should operate, is broadly supportive of Maliki.
Significantly, the only reservations were expressed by the Sadrists, the supporters of radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr whose armed faction, the Mahdi Army, was one of the groups targeted in Basra.
From a military perspective, analysts and local army commanders agree that the Basra operation was poorly prepared.
Nevertheless, as the first real test of the new Iraqi army, it was overall a resounding success.
By and large, the troops obeyed orders to fight militiamen even when they shared the same Shia affiliation.
There were some deserters, reluctant to fight against fellow-Shia and Sadrists. Yet at 1,500 out of the 30,000 men deployed for the operation, the incidence of desertion was viewed as insignificant and no cause for alarm.
Defense sources in Baghdad even welcomed the fact. As one source close to the defense ministry put it, "It was a good way to weed out the bad elements and the unprofessional soldiers."
At the same time, the desertions highlighted the military's need for more training, as well for a proper vetting system during the recruitment process.
All in all, though, the operation represented an important step towards establishing a truly national, professional army.
The government was given a further boost when Sadr issued a statement urging the government to accept the deserters to return to their army duties.
More recently, Sadr's appeal for calm and the avoidance of bloodshed has generally been interpreted as an admission of failure, and as a sign that Maliki's drive to control Basra has been at least partly successful.
Although the government now controls large areas of the city including the port areas, there are still parts of Basra that remain beyond its reach, and many of the militia leaders are still at large.
After Basra, the prime minister has ordered similar operations against Shia militias in other parts of Iraq, in the face of repeated calls – largely prompted by Iran – for an end to the campaign.
If he wants to maintain the current level of support he is getting from across the political spectrum, Maliki will have to show continued resolve to go after the militias wherever they are. That will be no easy task, since it will be unpopular among the prime minister's own Shia constituency.
Maliki's leadership qualities both as prime minister and commander-in-chief of the armed force are being put to the test.
He was elevated to power in 2006 as the result of a political deal between the diverse political blocs that had won seats in parliament. Over the past two years, however, many questions have been raised about his capacity to lead a government of national unity and to act as a truly non-sectarian prime minister.
To an extent, the Basra operation has quelled those doubts.
By the time he embarks on a military operation to regain control over Mosul, he will need to have removed the last traces of doubt that he is a prime minister for all Iraqis, and that Shia and Sunni "outlaws" are to be dealt with in exactly the same manner.
By the same token, the current level of Sunni support will need to be sustained when it comes to the Mosul operation, especially as it is expected to be a lot more difficult than Basra was.
Winning the backing of leading Sunni politicians to take on wayward Shia militias is one thing; asking them to approve military action in a city regarded as a hotbed of Sunni Islamists and Arab nationalists is quite another.
In Mosul, the enemy is an amalgam of al-Qaida and diehard Baathists. These forces are a lot less visible, and a good deal more effective, than the Mahdi Army.
Another problem is that unlike the western Sunni provinces, Mosul has not seen the emergence of strong "awakening councils" – the local groups which have taken up arms against al-Qaida.
In short, much of what was achieved in Basra is going to be sorely tested in the Mosul operation.
Basra was about demonstrating that Iraq has one army and one commander-in-chief. Mosul will test whether Sunni political groups really subscribe to this notion.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent crackdown on militias in Basra has opened a fresh chapter in Iraqi politics, given the army new impetus, and restored a degree of public confidence in the state's ability to enforce the rule of law.
But building on this success will depends greatly on his next move, an operation to clear the northern city of Mosul of al-Qaeda and Baathist militants.
When the operation codenamed "Charge of the Knights" was launched in Basra around the beginning of April, many saw it as a make-or-break moment for the prime minister and for the Iraqi army.
Maliki's declaration that he would pursue the "outlaws" to the end won him new allies and rallied the country's political leaders behind him.
His Sunni opponents, in particular, hailed the assault on the lawless paramilitary groups that effectively controlled Basra as a bold step in the right direction.
The major Sunni political bloc, the Accord Front, had withdrawn from the cabinet, but has signalled its desire to return to government as a result of the Basra operation.
As Accord Front leader Adnan al-Dulaimi made clear, one of the bloc's demands was to "hunt down and disband the militias and curb the outlaws."
Sunni leaders have since indicated that the Maliki government has taken sufficient action on addressing their concerns to allow them to end their boycott.
Another gain for the prime minister was the rapprochement he achieved with Iraqi vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi, one of the most prominent and powerful Sunni figures engaged in the political process. The often strained relationship between the two men was one of the factors that led to the Sunni boycott of the cabinet.
Hashimi has publicly backed the Basra assault, and now sits together with the prime minister in the crisis operations room that is considering how to handle the next issue on Maliki's agenda – Mosul.
Maliki has also won broader backing, reflected in a declaration issued by the Political Council for National Security, a 19-member body that brings together the three-member presidency including the Iraqi president himself, the prime minister and deputy premiers, the speaker of parliament and his deputies, the heads of the various blocs in the legislature, the president of the Kurdistan region and the head of the Iraqi judiciary.
The document, which outlines the principles by which Iraq's political system should operate, is broadly supportive of Maliki.
Significantly, the only reservations were expressed by the Sadrists, the supporters of radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr whose armed faction, the Mahdi Army, was one of the groups targeted in Basra.
From a military perspective, analysts and local army commanders agree that the Basra operation was poorly prepared.
Nevertheless, as the first real test of the new Iraqi army, it was overall a resounding success.
By and large, the troops obeyed orders to fight militiamen even when they shared the same Shia affiliation.
There were some deserters, reluctant to fight against fellow-Shia and Sadrists. Yet at 1,500 out of the 30,000 men deployed for the operation, the incidence of desertion was viewed as insignificant and no cause for alarm.
Defense sources in Baghdad even welcomed the fact. As one source close to the defense ministry put it, "It was a good way to weed out the bad elements and the unprofessional soldiers."
At the same time, the desertions highlighted the military's need for more training, as well for a proper vetting system during the recruitment process.
All in all, though, the operation represented an important step towards establishing a truly national, professional army.
The government was given a further boost when Sadr issued a statement urging the government to accept the deserters to return to their army duties.
More recently, Sadr's appeal for calm and the avoidance of bloodshed has generally been interpreted as an admission of failure, and as a sign that Maliki's drive to control Basra has been at least partly successful.
Although the government now controls large areas of the city including the port areas, there are still parts of Basra that remain beyond its reach, and many of the militia leaders are still at large.
After Basra, the prime minister has ordered similar operations against Shia militias in other parts of Iraq, in the face of repeated calls – largely prompted by Iran – for an end to the campaign.
If he wants to maintain the current level of support he is getting from across the political spectrum, Maliki will have to show continued resolve to go after the militias wherever they are. That will be no easy task, since it will be unpopular among the prime minister's own Shia constituency.
Maliki's leadership qualities both as prime minister and commander-in-chief of the armed force are being put to the test.
He was elevated to power in 2006 as the result of a political deal between the diverse political blocs that had won seats in parliament. Over the past two years, however, many questions have been raised about his capacity to lead a government of national unity and to act as a truly non-sectarian prime minister.
To an extent, the Basra operation has quelled those doubts.
By the time he embarks on a military operation to regain control over Mosul, he will need to have removed the last traces of doubt that he is a prime minister for all Iraqis, and that Shia and Sunni "outlaws" are to be dealt with in exactly the same manner.
By the same token, the current level of Sunni support will need to be sustained when it comes to the Mosul operation, especially as it is expected to be a lot more difficult than Basra was.
Winning the backing of leading Sunni politicians to take on wayward Shia militias is one thing; asking them to approve military action in a city regarded as a hotbed of Sunni Islamists and Arab nationalists is quite another.
In Mosul, the enemy is an amalgam of al-Qaida and diehard Baathists. These forces are a lot less visible, and a good deal more effective, than the Mahdi Army.
Another problem is that unlike the western Sunni provinces, Mosul has not seen the emergence of strong "awakening councils" – the local groups which have taken up arms against al-Qaida.
In short, much of what was achieved in Basra is going to be sorely tested in the Mosul operation.
Basra was about demonstrating that Iraq has one army and one commander-in-chief. Mosul will test whether Sunni political groups really subscribe to this notion.
Thursday, April 17, 2008
A time for moderates?
The twenty fifth Turkish military incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan to root out the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) and the way it ended proved that that there can be no military solution to this issue. It has been tried 25 times, with and without the help of the Iraqi Kurds and the United States, and it has not worked. The few times where a ceasefire was mediated--secretly or openly--have yielded some results. But they were not capitalized on or followed with other steps.
An opportunity is emerging this time. It should not be spoiled. The Kurds of Iraq are more and more convinced that the PKK issue is an irritating factor that is hampering progress in relations with their much-needed neighbor Turkey.
For Iraq, Turkey is an important neighbor. For the Kurdistan region, Turkey is the only neighbor with access to the outside world. The Kurds appreciate the importance of long-term strategic ties with Turkey. US troops will one day leave; Turkey is staying. Similarly, a day will come when the PKK presence ends, but the Iraqi Kurds are staying.
Since the early 1990s, the Kurds of Iraq understand that Turkey is a red line that cannot be crossed. They also now know that the United States is not "like a man with two wives" as an Iraqi Kurd in Sulaimaniya told the New York Times in the run-up to the Turkish military incursion into the region. Yet the events that followed and the level of US cooperation proved that this was wrong. America does have two allies: a long-standing Turkish one and a nascent Iraqi one.
The Kurds of Iraq are part of the Iraqi ally. But a military operation against the PKK is not an option for them. Their previous experience of fighting the PKK illustrates this clearly. Since the mid-1990s many operations, joint and unilateral, were conducted against the PKK. The result was bitter memories and a great loss of life. Now, a few thousand lives later, the Kurds of Iraq are not willing to repeat the same military and political mistake.
"I am amazed how short-spanned is their memory," a local Peshmerga commander said after the failure of the last military operation and the quick pull out by Turkey. "They forgot how difficult the area of the PKK is. They can try for 25 more times. All they can catch is partridges in these mountains," he added.
The PKK area is an impossible one. It is now dubbed the Tora Bora of Kurdistan. A Kurdish military operation to root the PKK out will only strengthen them and rally people to their cause at a time when their popularity is waning and more calls are raised for them to stop attacking Turkey.
The PKK themselves are looking for a way out of this dilemma. They feel that Iraqi Kurdish public opinion is becoming less tolerant of their presence. No demonstrations were held this time in Iraqi Kurdistan in their support. Also, the PKK has come to terms with the reality that it cannot change Turkey by force. Hence its demands have been minimized to cultural, democratic and political rights for the Kurds of Turkey.
The Turkish stance on dealing with the Kurdish issue has been oscillating between radicals who want the eradication of the PKK militarily and moderates who want to deal with the Kurdish issue politically. Allowing a bigger Kurdish cultural, political and democratic breathing space in Turkey would certainly close down the PKK on both sides of the border.
The Kurds of Iraq do not want to pay the price for, nor do they want to be a party to, Turkey's internal differences on this issue. But a political step as such would make their lives much easier. It would enable them to rally the public (on both sides of the border) in favor of pushing the PKK into further isolation. Turkey does not need 25 more incursions to accept that a political course of action is the roadmap for a solution and the most effective way to end the PKK issue.
The situation is ripe for a face-saving solution for all parties. The key is direct talks between Ankara and Arbil. The US called for this when Vice-President Dick Cheney visited Ankara and Arbil last month. Earlier, President Jalal Talabani's visit to Ankara was an icebreaker and a catalyst for a new page in Iraqi-Turkish relations.
A solution is needed today more than any other time. All sides realize that they have a lot to lose if the situation escalates and deteriorates. There are radicals and moderates on all sides. The radicals had their time, and failed. Perhaps it is time that the moderates take the lead.
An opportunity is emerging this time. It should not be spoiled. The Kurds of Iraq are more and more convinced that the PKK issue is an irritating factor that is hampering progress in relations with their much-needed neighbor Turkey.
For Iraq, Turkey is an important neighbor. For the Kurdistan region, Turkey is the only neighbor with access to the outside world. The Kurds appreciate the importance of long-term strategic ties with Turkey. US troops will one day leave; Turkey is staying. Similarly, a day will come when the PKK presence ends, but the Iraqi Kurds are staying.
Since the early 1990s, the Kurds of Iraq understand that Turkey is a red line that cannot be crossed. They also now know that the United States is not "like a man with two wives" as an Iraqi Kurd in Sulaimaniya told the New York Times in the run-up to the Turkish military incursion into the region. Yet the events that followed and the level of US cooperation proved that this was wrong. America does have two allies: a long-standing Turkish one and a nascent Iraqi one.
The Kurds of Iraq are part of the Iraqi ally. But a military operation against the PKK is not an option for them. Their previous experience of fighting the PKK illustrates this clearly. Since the mid-1990s many operations, joint and unilateral, were conducted against the PKK. The result was bitter memories and a great loss of life. Now, a few thousand lives later, the Kurds of Iraq are not willing to repeat the same military and political mistake.
"I am amazed how short-spanned is their memory," a local Peshmerga commander said after the failure of the last military operation and the quick pull out by Turkey. "They forgot how difficult the area of the PKK is. They can try for 25 more times. All they can catch is partridges in these mountains," he added.
The PKK area is an impossible one. It is now dubbed the Tora Bora of Kurdistan. A Kurdish military operation to root the PKK out will only strengthen them and rally people to their cause at a time when their popularity is waning and more calls are raised for them to stop attacking Turkey.
The PKK themselves are looking for a way out of this dilemma. They feel that Iraqi Kurdish public opinion is becoming less tolerant of their presence. No demonstrations were held this time in Iraqi Kurdistan in their support. Also, the PKK has come to terms with the reality that it cannot change Turkey by force. Hence its demands have been minimized to cultural, democratic and political rights for the Kurds of Turkey.
The Turkish stance on dealing with the Kurdish issue has been oscillating between radicals who want the eradication of the PKK militarily and moderates who want to deal with the Kurdish issue politically. Allowing a bigger Kurdish cultural, political and democratic breathing space in Turkey would certainly close down the PKK on both sides of the border.
The Kurds of Iraq do not want to pay the price for, nor do they want to be a party to, Turkey's internal differences on this issue. But a political step as such would make their lives much easier. It would enable them to rally the public (on both sides of the border) in favor of pushing the PKK into further isolation. Turkey does not need 25 more incursions to accept that a political course of action is the roadmap for a solution and the most effective way to end the PKK issue.
The situation is ripe for a face-saving solution for all parties. The key is direct talks between Ankara and Arbil. The US called for this when Vice-President Dick Cheney visited Ankara and Arbil last month. Earlier, President Jalal Talabani's visit to Ankara was an icebreaker and a catalyst for a new page in Iraqi-Turkish relations.
A solution is needed today more than any other time. All sides realize that they have a lot to lose if the situation escalates and deteriorates. There are radicals and moderates on all sides. The radicals had their time, and failed. Perhaps it is time that the moderates take the lead.
Thursday, May 5, 2005
What Do the Insurgents Want? Different Visions, Same Bloody Tactics
The 60-wheel trailer was carrying a giant power generator on the highway to Musayyib, 30-odd miles south of Baghdad, last week. Guarded by six cars carrying police and the Iraqi National Guard, the convoy was passing along the notorious Baghdad road near Lutifiyah, a hotbed of insurgent activity where many kidnappings and attacks on military and civilian cars take place.
A banner hung from the generator, like an amulet to ward off evil. Sprayed across it in big bold letters were the words: "To the Musayyib power plant. God is great. Long live the Mujaheddin."
The sign was an appeal to Iraq's insurgents, urging them not to attack the convoy and deprive the people of Musayyib of electricity. Whether it was thanks to the banner, to luck, or to the absence of insurgents on the road that day, the generator and the 28 security personnel made it safely to their destination.
Like the people in that convoy, Iraqis are wondering why the diverse people known by the shorthand phrase "insurgents" continue to attack and what they hope to achieve. In the week since a new cabinet was formed, about 250 Iraqis have been slaughtered in car bombings and other bloody attacks, a pace as relentless and heartless as any since the fall of Saddam Hussein more than two years ago. And while on the ground the attacks seem indiscriminate, there is a strategy behind them.
In fact, there's more than one. That's because the insurgents are actually several groups of people who might share tactics, but possess different motivations and long-term objectives. Thus the appeal on the side of the generator in transit might have had an effect with one group of the insurgency: those who were fired from their jobs in the military and other government institutions for being members of the Baath party but who don't really believe in Saddam Hussein's doddering old brand of Arab socialism. But two other important factions of the insurgency -- the die-hard Baathists and the pro-al Qaeda Islamist militants -- would not hesitate to attack what they would see as a perfect target: a giant generator, 12 policemen and 16 Iraqi national guardsmen. Promoting instability by disrupting public services and crippling the security apparatus of the new Iraq is the heart of their strategy.
Understanding the different strains of the insurgency is essential to fighting them. Two years after the war and three months after national elections that appeared to be a referendum in favor of peaceful politics, the violent insurgents remain an unyielding stumbling block in the path to a new Iraq. The country can never move ahead until this revolt is dealt with decisively.
The backbone of the insurgency appears to be an alliance between the die-hard Baathists and the network of terrorists mostly under the command of Abu Musab Zarqawi. It is a partnership of convenience; both groups are fighting the same battle, but for different reasons and with different goals.
The foot soldiers who make up the Baathist part of the alliance have a military background. They are former members of Saddam's army, where they served as low-ranking soldiers, or in the security and intelligence fields. They lost their jobs shortly after the war, when the coalition forces dissolved the army, security and intelligence apparatuses. They were also brainwashed by ideas of Arab nationalism and anti-Americanism during the Saddam years. Being sacked from their jobs only reinforced the conspiracy theories they had been led to believe and it strengthened their anti-Americanism.
Many of them would gladly go back to their jobs in order to have a better standard of living and avoid risking their lives to lob a mortar or fire a missile at a military or civilian target in return for $200, the going rate for such deeds. A former Iraqi army officer, who now works as a translator and is hiding from insurgents, told me that when Saddam was in power, the army trained security, intelligence and Baath party members in conventional urban warfare methods. So with the high unemployment rate, there is no shortage of men able to use hand-held missiles and automatic weapons to mount simple raids.
Directing these lower-level combatants are the former high-ranking army, security and intelligence officers of the Baathist regime, who lost all the privileges and power they enjoyed under Saddam. They have managed to reassemble some of their old spy networks, recruiting former employees to gather intelligence and paying those willing to carry out assassinations and attacks on military and civilian targets.
Their ability to instill fear is evident. A Baghdad resident who visited Ghazi Yawar, then interim president, in the Green Zone told me that when Yawar's bodyguards picked him up they told him to put his head down as they were entering the U.S. and Iraqi government compound. "They said that I better not be noticed by the terrorists," he said. The bodyguards said the insurgents "would kill me on my way out if they recognized me."
They have also infiltrated government institutions, facilitating assassination attempts in Baghdad and other cities of the Sunni triangle. Many government ministers and public officials have been stuck in their houses for weeks, even months. Some do not even visit their ministries.
Their goal is simple: The return of Baathist rule through a military coup. E-mailing from his hideout last month, a former high-ranking member of the military put it simply: "Once we kick the occupation out, we will have enough power and a strong will to resume the leadership of Iraq." He added, "We were able to do it in 1963 and in 1968. We can do it again," referring to the dates of the party's two seizures of power.
To do that, they are willing to make common cause with people who do not share their secular outlook. Asked how Baathists view the Islamist militants of al Qaeda, senior Baath party official Salah al-Mukhtar told a local Iraqi newspaper earlier this year that the Baathists will "support anyone who carries arms against the Americans."
The Islamist militants have their own foot soldiers in this unholy alliance: supporters who have poured across the mostly open borders from neighboring countries. I believe it is these people who are particularly useful to the Baathists, because they provide a supply of willing suicide bombers.
Suicide attacks are not, in all likelihood, Iraqi operations. "Thirty-five years of Saddam's brutal repression did not produce a single suicide bomber," says a former military officer who is now working as a driver.
Syria has been an important base and way station for these foreign fighters. Interviews with arrested "jihadis" and transcripts of interrogations obtained from Iraqi security and intelligence show that a typical jihadi's journey from his city in Syria, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen or any other Arab country until the moment he blows himself up goes something like this: After deciding that he wants to fight the Americans in Iraq, he contacts mosques in Damascus known for recruiting mujaheddin for the holy war in Iraq. Often these recruitment campaigns are funded by senior Syrian officials.
After deciding that a person is fit to conduct a "martyrdom operation," Syrian intelligence trains him on how to disguise his identity and how to handle explosives and ammunitions. Radical mullahs supplement this with heavy doses of hard-line religious teaching. The volunteer is then taken across the desert in eastern Syria, through the porous borders, into the Sunni triangle in Iraq, where he is housed by members of the former Baathist intelligence and security network. The second leg of the journey is to a safe house in Baghdad, where he is assigned a target to blow up or sent to certain areas to fight the Americans or the new Iraqi army and police forces.
Last year, the Iraqi government published a list of foreign fighters caught in Iraq. The father of one of the fighters contacted one of the ministers and said that when his son left home he told his parents he was going to Syria for a holiday. A month later he called his parents and said that he was in Fallujah for jihad against the Americans.
Before the American offensive in Fallujah, foreign militants used to go there to join the local insurgency in conducting conventional attacks on Iraqi police, national guards and the U.S. military. Iraqi journalists working for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) reported that Syrian militias were openly operating in various areas of the Sunni triangle. One Syrian combatant told a reporter, who was posing as a local resident, that he was in Iraq fighting the United States because "if we don't fight them here, we will have to fight them in Syria."
Money also flows in from Syria. I spoke with an Iraqi journalist who recently visited Syria. He said being there felt like being back in Saddam's Iraq. "The place was heaving with sons of Baathists and former regime officials," he observed.
Iran is also harboring and training members of other militant groups. IWPR revealed a few months ago that Iran is assisting the radical Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, a large, mostly Iraqi Kurdish affiliate group of al Qaeda, and the Ansar Al-Sunnah, which claimed responsibility for the suicide attack in Irbil that killed more than 50 people and injured 70 police recruits last week.
Although the disparate insurgent allies are fighting different wars for different reasons, for now they are fighting the same battle -- destroying the current Iraqi government and driving out the Americans. One wants a return to rule by Saddam or some other Baathist; another wants a Taliban-style Iraq. But they're all waiting for the United States to leave.
The relative hiatus in violence that took place after the January elections is over. It would be naive to think that these groups can be neutralized by inviting them to join the political process. Bringing a few Sunni faces into the cabinet with the hope that they would end the insurgency is like expecting plastic surgery to cure stomach cancer. The war against this insurgency may be unappetizing, but it's one that cannot be avoided. And its first aim must be to break the Baathist-al Qaeda alliance.
To do that, the war has to be fought on two fronts. The international community must issue an ultimatum to Iraq's neighbors, Syria and Iran, to cut the insurgents' supply lines. Although Iraq has an elected government and president, the country is still on its knees and does not have the clout that others have over these states. The reluctant withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon provides a model of how the United States and the international community can exert their influence on Damascus. Iraqis are hoping for a similar show of strength on its behalf.
In Iraq, the war can be fought by recognizing that the country is composed of three competing zones. Ultimately the people of the Sunni triangle will rise up against the insurgency so that they can catch up with the northern and southern regions of Iraq, which are safer than the center. Meanwhile, though, there is no alternative to a carrot-and-stick policy aimed at capturing or killing the most recalcitrant Baathists and offering lower-level, non-criminal Baathist party members jobs and bringing them into the political process.
Only then will Iraqis be able to put away their submissive banners and drive into the government compound sitting upright, instead of cowering in the back seat of a heavily guarded car.
This commentary first appeared at Washington Posts outlook section.
A banner hung from the generator, like an amulet to ward off evil. Sprayed across it in big bold letters were the words: "To the Musayyib power plant. God is great. Long live the Mujaheddin."
The sign was an appeal to Iraq's insurgents, urging them not to attack the convoy and deprive the people of Musayyib of electricity. Whether it was thanks to the banner, to luck, or to the absence of insurgents on the road that day, the generator and the 28 security personnel made it safely to their destination.
Like the people in that convoy, Iraqis are wondering why the diverse people known by the shorthand phrase "insurgents" continue to attack and what they hope to achieve. In the week since a new cabinet was formed, about 250 Iraqis have been slaughtered in car bombings and other bloody attacks, a pace as relentless and heartless as any since the fall of Saddam Hussein more than two years ago. And while on the ground the attacks seem indiscriminate, there is a strategy behind them.
In fact, there's more than one. That's because the insurgents are actually several groups of people who might share tactics, but possess different motivations and long-term objectives. Thus the appeal on the side of the generator in transit might have had an effect with one group of the insurgency: those who were fired from their jobs in the military and other government institutions for being members of the Baath party but who don't really believe in Saddam Hussein's doddering old brand of Arab socialism. But two other important factions of the insurgency -- the die-hard Baathists and the pro-al Qaeda Islamist militants -- would not hesitate to attack what they would see as a perfect target: a giant generator, 12 policemen and 16 Iraqi national guardsmen. Promoting instability by disrupting public services and crippling the security apparatus of the new Iraq is the heart of their strategy.
Understanding the different strains of the insurgency is essential to fighting them. Two years after the war and three months after national elections that appeared to be a referendum in favor of peaceful politics, the violent insurgents remain an unyielding stumbling block in the path to a new Iraq. The country can never move ahead until this revolt is dealt with decisively.
The backbone of the insurgency appears to be an alliance between the die-hard Baathists and the network of terrorists mostly under the command of Abu Musab Zarqawi. It is a partnership of convenience; both groups are fighting the same battle, but for different reasons and with different goals.
The foot soldiers who make up the Baathist part of the alliance have a military background. They are former members of Saddam's army, where they served as low-ranking soldiers, or in the security and intelligence fields. They lost their jobs shortly after the war, when the coalition forces dissolved the army, security and intelligence apparatuses. They were also brainwashed by ideas of Arab nationalism and anti-Americanism during the Saddam years. Being sacked from their jobs only reinforced the conspiracy theories they had been led to believe and it strengthened their anti-Americanism.
Many of them would gladly go back to their jobs in order to have a better standard of living and avoid risking their lives to lob a mortar or fire a missile at a military or civilian target in return for $200, the going rate for such deeds. A former Iraqi army officer, who now works as a translator and is hiding from insurgents, told me that when Saddam was in power, the army trained security, intelligence and Baath party members in conventional urban warfare methods. So with the high unemployment rate, there is no shortage of men able to use hand-held missiles and automatic weapons to mount simple raids.
Directing these lower-level combatants are the former high-ranking army, security and intelligence officers of the Baathist regime, who lost all the privileges and power they enjoyed under Saddam. They have managed to reassemble some of their old spy networks, recruiting former employees to gather intelligence and paying those willing to carry out assassinations and attacks on military and civilian targets.
Their ability to instill fear is evident. A Baghdad resident who visited Ghazi Yawar, then interim president, in the Green Zone told me that when Yawar's bodyguards picked him up they told him to put his head down as they were entering the U.S. and Iraqi government compound. "They said that I better not be noticed by the terrorists," he said. The bodyguards said the insurgents "would kill me on my way out if they recognized me."
They have also infiltrated government institutions, facilitating assassination attempts in Baghdad and other cities of the Sunni triangle. Many government ministers and public officials have been stuck in their houses for weeks, even months. Some do not even visit their ministries.
Their goal is simple: The return of Baathist rule through a military coup. E-mailing from his hideout last month, a former high-ranking member of the military put it simply: "Once we kick the occupation out, we will have enough power and a strong will to resume the leadership of Iraq." He added, "We were able to do it in 1963 and in 1968. We can do it again," referring to the dates of the party's two seizures of power.
To do that, they are willing to make common cause with people who do not share their secular outlook. Asked how Baathists view the Islamist militants of al Qaeda, senior Baath party official Salah al-Mukhtar told a local Iraqi newspaper earlier this year that the Baathists will "support anyone who carries arms against the Americans."
The Islamist militants have their own foot soldiers in this unholy alliance: supporters who have poured across the mostly open borders from neighboring countries. I believe it is these people who are particularly useful to the Baathists, because they provide a supply of willing suicide bombers.
Suicide attacks are not, in all likelihood, Iraqi operations. "Thirty-five years of Saddam's brutal repression did not produce a single suicide bomber," says a former military officer who is now working as a driver.
Syria has been an important base and way station for these foreign fighters. Interviews with arrested "jihadis" and transcripts of interrogations obtained from Iraqi security and intelligence show that a typical jihadi's journey from his city in Syria, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen or any other Arab country until the moment he blows himself up goes something like this: After deciding that he wants to fight the Americans in Iraq, he contacts mosques in Damascus known for recruiting mujaheddin for the holy war in Iraq. Often these recruitment campaigns are funded by senior Syrian officials.
After deciding that a person is fit to conduct a "martyrdom operation," Syrian intelligence trains him on how to disguise his identity and how to handle explosives and ammunitions. Radical mullahs supplement this with heavy doses of hard-line religious teaching. The volunteer is then taken across the desert in eastern Syria, through the porous borders, into the Sunni triangle in Iraq, where he is housed by members of the former Baathist intelligence and security network. The second leg of the journey is to a safe house in Baghdad, where he is assigned a target to blow up or sent to certain areas to fight the Americans or the new Iraqi army and police forces.
Last year, the Iraqi government published a list of foreign fighters caught in Iraq. The father of one of the fighters contacted one of the ministers and said that when his son left home he told his parents he was going to Syria for a holiday. A month later he called his parents and said that he was in Fallujah for jihad against the Americans.
Before the American offensive in Fallujah, foreign militants used to go there to join the local insurgency in conducting conventional attacks on Iraqi police, national guards and the U.S. military. Iraqi journalists working for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) reported that Syrian militias were openly operating in various areas of the Sunni triangle. One Syrian combatant told a reporter, who was posing as a local resident, that he was in Iraq fighting the United States because "if we don't fight them here, we will have to fight them in Syria."
Money also flows in from Syria. I spoke with an Iraqi journalist who recently visited Syria. He said being there felt like being back in Saddam's Iraq. "The place was heaving with sons of Baathists and former regime officials," he observed.
Iran is also harboring and training members of other militant groups. IWPR revealed a few months ago that Iran is assisting the radical Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, a large, mostly Iraqi Kurdish affiliate group of al Qaeda, and the Ansar Al-Sunnah, which claimed responsibility for the suicide attack in Irbil that killed more than 50 people and injured 70 police recruits last week.
Although the disparate insurgent allies are fighting different wars for different reasons, for now they are fighting the same battle -- destroying the current Iraqi government and driving out the Americans. One wants a return to rule by Saddam or some other Baathist; another wants a Taliban-style Iraq. But they're all waiting for the United States to leave.
The relative hiatus in violence that took place after the January elections is over. It would be naive to think that these groups can be neutralized by inviting them to join the political process. Bringing a few Sunni faces into the cabinet with the hope that they would end the insurgency is like expecting plastic surgery to cure stomach cancer. The war against this insurgency may be unappetizing, but it's one that cannot be avoided. And its first aim must be to break the Baathist-al Qaeda alliance.
To do that, the war has to be fought on two fronts. The international community must issue an ultimatum to Iraq's neighbors, Syria and Iran, to cut the insurgents' supply lines. Although Iraq has an elected government and president, the country is still on its knees and does not have the clout that others have over these states. The reluctant withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon provides a model of how the United States and the international community can exert their influence on Damascus. Iraqis are hoping for a similar show of strength on its behalf.
In Iraq, the war can be fought by recognizing that the country is composed of three competing zones. Ultimately the people of the Sunni triangle will rise up against the insurgency so that they can catch up with the northern and southern regions of Iraq, which are safer than the center. Meanwhile, though, there is no alternative to a carrot-and-stick policy aimed at capturing or killing the most recalcitrant Baathists and offering lower-level, non-criminal Baathist party members jobs and bringing them into the political process.
Only then will Iraqis be able to put away their submissive banners and drive into the government compound sitting upright, instead of cowering in the back seat of a heavily guarded car.
This commentary first appeared at Washington Posts outlook section.
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