A new country: Facebookstan, Twitterstan & Wikileakistan

For those who have not been following the back story of Egypt and Tunisia, here it is in a nutshell: Their governments were led by small groups of people who were extremely rich, corrupt, non-transparent, and violent and did not represent the people.
The people in turn were poor, deprived of basic rights, lacked basic services and, most importantly, were ignorant of what was going on around them and in the world.
This setup was very comfortable for the authorities until a new element entered the equation: the Internet, which connected citizens to the outside world.
Because of the Internet, the values of governance, human rights and freedom are global and non-negotiable. There are no more half-corrupt governments or half-corrupt officials. They are either corrupt or not, transparent or not.
As a result, the information vacuum, often created by the government, becomes very visible. If the authorities do not fill it with the correct information, others will – whether it is the likes of organizations, with firm agendas, such as Al-Jazeera, or ordinary citizens.
The new reality of connectivity is creating a new landscape of information, and as a result a new global citizenry.
It is creating a public that is informed and knows what it needs. A public that is not afraid of fighting for its right to live in dignity, prosperity and freedom. A public that is intolerant of poor governance.
This reality unites all of us in one country. This country is called Facebookstan, Twitterstan – or, even better -- Wikileakistan.
This new country is not united by a dictator or by borders; it is united by the values of governance and citizen values around the world.
The global citizens of this country now all have the same high expectations of their governments. At the same time, they are all reporting on the developments in their lives and are comparing notes.
This new reality places a lot more pressure on governments to meet the new standard of good governance. A standard that is set by everyone through Facebook, Twitter and Wikileaks. A standard that does not tolerate any shortcomings, simply because nothing can be hidden anymore.
The people created this new reality, and had a transitionary period to embrace it. This new reality minimized the differences between the public’s aspirations in various parts of the world.
In the future, or soon, it will also eradicate the differences between governments and their standards of governance.
The challenge is now for the governments to adapt. This requires an understanding of the new reality and good governance, and will require them to act fairly and justly. Unlike the past, governments can no longer hide behind history, revolutionary legacy or external threats.
Thanks to the Internet and social networks, the public is well aware of governance, and in most case they can judge which entities or developments are dangerous, and which are not.
Similarly, a corrupt official is a corrupt official, whether he was a war hero in the past or not, a revolutionary or not, the people expect from him to do what he was appointed to do.
The good news for the people is that there is no going back. The more connected our mobile phones and computers are, the better our lives will be.
The bad news for corrupt governments is that life has changed forever. Those who hold or seek government posts solely for their personal gain will soon realize that it is not worth it anymore. They will be held to account, and should start looking for other jobs.
Newly empowered global citizens are the future, and leaders need to take notice. The universal values of good governance, transparency, human rights and freedoms will soon be the code of conduct for any government that wants to stay in power.

Kurdistan's Government & Opposition: an endless cycle

From the start of our new government, new parliament, new presidency and new opposition; the people of Kurdistan have mostly been preoccupied with crisis after crisis between the two.
Most of the time, the crisis gets big when the opposition attacks or seems to attack a “fundamental value” of the people and history of Kurdistan and hence prompting a strong reaction from the government and the ruling parties.
Usually, the reaction comes after a longer campaign from the opposition against the government over things that they can’t defend such as bad public services, corruption, nepotism and political reform.
With every time that a crisis appears, the action and reaction of both sides is disproportionately bigger, more personal and emotional than it should be. As a result, decisions taken are often far from being realistic or based on sound political judgment or practical reasoning.
On of the key reasons for this unhealthy relationship between government and opposition is the disconnect between the ruling parties and the opposition ones as a result of the geographical separation of the constituencies of the ruling and opposition parties.
The geographical distance between government and opposition leaders is an important factor in not creating a better atmosphere between them.
Very rarely in a democracy or an emerging democracy the leaders of the opposition and the ruling parties or the government do not meet when it comes to discussing national security issues, like dissolving the parliament or the government.
The other factor in this is that the geographical distribution of power base of the opposition and the ruling parties is not representative of the political reality of Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
The KDP, the senior partner in the ruling alliance, holds the majority in two governorates, and the opposition group Goran enjoys the majority in the third one.
The PUK, who came second in Sulaymaniya and in Arbil in the elections, is holding the government.
This peculiar setup has driven a wedge between the political parties and their supporters.
It is creating the setup of a strong government in two governorates and a vocal opposition in the third.
Walking through the streets of Sulaymaniyah, one would not think that the KDP is controlling Iraqi Kurdistan. By the same token, very little in Arbil or Dohuk suggest the presence of any Goran opposition.
A situation like this usually creates a much stronger rhetoric when it comes to a conflict and distances the various parties further from each other. This is clearly reflected in every crisis that pops up.
The other important reason is that good government breeds good opposition and vice-versa.
There are a number of important portfolios that the government (the presidency and the council of ministers) has so far failed to tackle.
Fighting corruption and nepotism, political reform and providing public services are all issues that are still waiting to be seriously tackled. So far, they are still talked about and nothing practical is being done about them.
It is only natural from an opposition group to attack the government and its leaders on these issues. Only when real measures are taken to address these portfolios, the government would be able to respond to Goran’s attacks in a more measured way.
Gorran in turn would be able, or forced, to have a more specific and constructive criticism and argument.
This would also pave the way for a more reasonable geographic distribution of government and opposition and real, calm and constructive dialogue and debate between the two.

A Tale Of Two Cities

Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG] Prime Minister Barham Salih’s recent return from Baghdad and the KRG-Baghdad agreement over oil and the budget is yet another episode in the never-ending cycle of tense disagreements between Erbil and Baghdad.
Unfortunately, there is no end in sight for the ongoing disputes between the two cities. Every few months, we see an increase in tensions between Erbil and Baghdad, and an ensuing media war between ministers and other officials who eagerly exchange accusations.
These are usually followed by a meeting of the PMs and the standard statement along the lines of: “It was positive and all ongoing issues were resolved”. But in reality it is just a temporary agreement to settle an issue – one that lasts either a year (when the dispute involves the budget) or for the term of one of the governments – Baghdad or Erbil.

There are various reasons for this fluctuating relationship between the two cities, but these solutions are far from sustainable. What is required is a change in the mentality of both sides to understand the nature of their relationship, to accept the new reality of Iraq and work on true confidence-building measures between the two cities. Historically, Iraq has been defined by a strong Baghdad with a dictator, while Erbil has served as the center of an armed opposition movement.
This has changed; today, Baghdad does not have as much control, and has an elected government in which the Kurds are represented.
Erbil is the capital of a region that is trying to rebuild what Baghdad destroyed over an 80-year period. Both Baghdad and Erbil still don’t digest this reality.
Erbil still sends a “negotiating team” to a government that they are part of; and Baghdad still behaves as if it is giving Erbil a share that it would not otherwise “deserve”.
The two sides are still trying to figure out what federalism means in the new Iraq. The constitution provided guidelines, but day-to-day operations are proving that each has a different understanding.
Miscommunications and misunderstandings on fundamental issues are usually cleared up by two groups: the technocrats and the politicians.
So far, most of the communication between Baghdad and Erbil has been led by politicians, and the delegation that appears on TV newscasts is usually the entire team on both sides.
A government official in Erbil, who is not a politician, said that on “many occasions, our politicians try to solve deep and complex issues with high-level handshakes.” He said that the absence of technocrats on these talks causes serious misunderstandings: “Each side thinks that they have agreed to something different”.
The statements after every breakthrough meeting are nearly identical – they even include the same language — because the talks are always between a small circle of people.
This is creating a strong perception of a lack of transparency amongst the public.
The public in Iraq in general is not clear on exactly what the issues are; what (or who) is causing the tension; how were they solved; or what happened that caused the breakthrough.
As a result, the public sentiment is one of resentment or even rejection of “the other”.
The distance between ordinary Kurds and Arabs should have been a lot closer than what it is today.
The reality is that dialogue between these two cities is quite dysfunctional, to say the least. Relations between the Kurds and Arabs today are reduced to politicians, Arab tourists during holiday seasons and a small amount of business. None of these help the public understand the other side’s reality.
To create permanent solutions, our politicians need to step back a bit and allow for other non-political bridges to be built between the two cities. It’s time to get the technocrats of both sides to iron out the issues, and then bring together political leaders to place their signatures on clear, open and permanent agreements.

Kirkuk: the case for plan B

The way things stand now, one can predict that in the next 50 years Kirkuk will still be one of the sticking points between Baghdad and Erbil.
Today, the rhetoric is that Kirkuk is the heart of Kurdistan — the Quds of Kurdistan. In reality, it is the sick child of Iraq. The whole family is trying to prescribe its own medicine to cure this child, yet no one seems to be succeeding.
Looking at the various positions on Kirkuk, the Kurdish stance seems the most consistent and fixed. The views of the other communities have ranged from denying Kirkuk’s Kurdistani identity to a systematic policy of Arabization and ethnic cleansing.
The Kurdish leadership constantly reminds the world, the Kurdish people and its own officials that Kirkuk has always been the make-or-break issue for Kurdish negotiations, relations and wars with Baghdad.Kirkuk’s status has always been the ultimatum. It has, on many occasions in Kurdish history, destroyed movements or caused major setbacks.
The key reason for this is that the Kurdish popular stance on Kirkuk — including its identity, its people and future — has always been strong and non-negotiable. This was necessary during the days of the revolution, when Kurds were harnessed by Saddam’s regime and international isolation. Today, all three are gone.
Looking at the position today, the leadership, political parties and the public are accepting nothing short of the implementation of article 140. Before that, it was nothing short of article 58 of the transitional administrative law.
Regardless of the historical facts and Kirkuk’s more recent history, there are new facts on the ground today that were placed by the former regime and preserved by the new Iraq. These new realities cannot be removed quickly, to say the least.
Strength is helpful when negotiating issues. But if you look around and see that yours is the least popular and practical position — regardless of whether you are right or not, whether you are strong or not, and whether you have the constitution on your side — you should rethink your stance.
Looking at the non-Kurdish position on Kirkuk, one can see that almost all of the players stand on one side while the Kurds are on the other.
The neighbors and other regional players seem to be actively working to prevent any KRG control over Kirkuk.
Neither the UN nor the US nor any other member of the international community practically support the implementation of 140 or support making Kirkuk as part of the Kurdistan Region. Many of their recommendation publicly and privately confirm this. If fact, some even put the blame on the Kurds for not being able to have Kirkuk.
“The Kurds had the opportunity to reverse this quickly in 2003, but they were too busy with their internal KDP-PUK competition and with looting,” according to one of the US army commanders in Kirkuk at the time.
All of this is happening while the Kurdish leadership is at logger horns with Baghdad over this issue and others. The reality is that implementing 140 is not going to be easy — if not impossible.
With every day that passes, resolving Kirkuk according to the Kurds’ demands gets more difficult. The reason is simple: with every day that passes, more is at stake in the Kurdistan region.
As a revolutionary movement, as an isolated group or in defiance of Saddam’s regime, it was possible to say, “Kirkuk or nothing”. The people would have supported such statement. Today, it is almost impossible to give this ultimatum — it simply isn’t practical. But this is not reflected in our rhetoric. Our mantra is still: all-or-nothing.
But our leaders today are responsible for changing that mentality.
When plan A is not working, then it would be appropriate to look for plan B; to identify it, adopt it and promote it among the people.
Otherwise, when the public is faced with the tough reality that it is impossible to win Kirkuk as had been promised, it will be the leaders who will be pummeled with accusations and blame for failing to deliver on their promises.
A controversial and problematic point in emerging democracies is the “historic legitimacy” of leaders. But it can be particularly helpful in situations such as Kirkuk.
In Palestine for example, Mahmoud Abbas today cannot get away with Yasser Arafat-type statements and actions. Similarly, today’s leaders in Kurdistan cannot get away with what Mullah Mustafa Barzani could say or do. And future leaders will not be able to get away with what Mam Jalal and Kak Masoud can do or say today about Kirkuk.
The sooner the Kirkuk issue has a plan B, the easier it will be to resolve its status once and for all – a feat that will prevent Kirkuk from becoming a source of instability for Kurdistan, Iraq and the Middle East.

Iraq's Najaf: An Iranian shrine or a Middle Eastern Vatican

Walking through the streets of Najaf, the city appears to be just another place in Iraq that requires extensive development and services. But the truth is that this holy city is capable of tipping the political balance in Iraq.
Not many people in the Sunni world appreciate the importance of Najaf. Since 2003 it has been an influential centre of politics in the new Iraq. In many ways, it has served as the country’s premier political resort, with leaders from nearly every Iraqi community visiting the Ayatollahs to win their blessing.
Post-2003, Iraqi political leaders turned it into a powerful locale for politicking: Whenever there was a problem, officials, especially Shia, ran to Najaf to convince the Grand Ayatollahs to be on their side or at least create the impression that the Marjiiyyah – a body that was usually careful not to publicly back one party or leader — was one their side.
As a result, in the eyes of some observers inside Iraq and most outside of the country, Najaf’s religious leadership was made to be part of Iraq’s tumultuous conflicts on many occasions. An important factor that contributed to this was the silence of the Marjiiyyah on non-Iraqi issues, including Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election and the situation in Lebanon.
The presence of the Grand Ayatollahs, the leaders of the Shia faith, makes Najaf not just a holy center for Iraq but for the entirety of the Shia world. Many still remember the role the city played in toppling the regime of the Shah of Iran by hosting the leader of the Islamic revolution. Despite this, there is no question that had it been embraced by the Arab states, Najaf could have had a much more influential role in Middle East politics.
Many call Najaf the “Vatican of the Shia” — and it could become the Vatican of the Middle East rather than a local center for Iraqi politics. The holy city could have this influence if the Arab world approached it differently.
While many Arab countries complain about Iran’s influence in Iraq, they have not been effective in countering it. Rather than considering the Shia of Iraq as part of Iran; turning a blind eye on Al-Qaeda’s attacks on Iraq’s Shia people and shrines; and also allowing outrageous public insults and attacks on the Shia faith and its symbols; the Arab world could have approached Najaf as the centre of gravity for the Shia faith — which is essentially an Arabist faith.
As a consequence of the Sunni Arab neglect of Najaf and the Shia of Iraq, Iran became the de-facto leader of the Shia faith. This naturally turned Najaf into a religious capital,www.ekurd.netor even a shrine, and made Qum the political capital of the Shia world. Many observers and some insiders have confirmed that the last round of negotiations to form the government was held secretly with Muqtada al-Sadr in Qum.
Today, an opportunity presents itself to turn the corner by giving Najaf a different role than the one it had in the past.
But for this to happen, Iraq’s political leaders should stop going to Najaf for arbitration or support, and the Marjiiyyah should take a tougher stance against those who want to drag it into their petty politics. Rather than consider political requests, they can simply close the door.
With the Arab summit approaching and the changed attitude some Arab countries have showed towards Iraq, they too have an opportunity bring the Shia of Iraq into the Arab fold. But this will not happen through statements or a fly-by visit of someone like Arab League secretary-general Amr Mousa — who visited Grand Ayatollah Sistani last week — alone. The Sunni Arab world could declare it’s genuine support for the new Iraq and offer their genuine help to make things work.
For example, the weak infrastructure, the dilapidated buildings and poor services put Najaf in dire need of assistance. Providing this aid could be one way to create a city with remarkable potential, a proud and developed holy place representing the best of both Iraq and Shia Islam. Whoever has the foresight to takes the first step could do much more than build a better metropolis, however – they would be seizing the opportunity to win the hearts, power and minds of one of the world’s most revered holy cities.

Security – a chronic vacuum

Iraq’s failure to appoint its security ministers is a black mark on the new government, and is yet another indication that the country’s politics remain dysfunctional.
The irony here is that security is one of the most urgent challenges for Iraq, and yet it is still the most problematic and controversial portfolio for the government.
Iraq’s politics seem to have turned the country’s priorities upside down. A country with immense security challenges should have appointed its security ministers first, especially given that Iraq is facing a tough deadline to solidify its safety measures as the Arab summit approaches in March.
The sad truth is that with the current state of our politics, fragile security will continue to be a permanent feature of our state.
As things stand today, all of the elements of deteriorating security and even civil war are still there — dysfunctional, divisive politics; a lack of trust between the people; a lack of confidence in the state; and a highly militarized and armed society.
The main reason for the delay in naming the ministers is the lack of trust between the political blocs, which has created a quota system designating certain parties and sects for the security ministries.
Just like many other areas of state-building, security can only be achieved if it is depoliticized.
For security to be realized in Iraq, a number of steps need to be taking. First and foremost, Iraq should strengthen its leadership and rally the public to remain vigilant,www.ekurd.netwhile creating fear amongst those who intend to breach security. So far, Iraq has not managed to produce a leader who can speak for all Iraqis. Unfortunately, there are no signs that we are going to have a leader like this in the foreseeable future.
This can only happen when there is a political process that represents the public’s will and when all citizens feel they have a stake in and ownership of the country. This in turn would contribute to creating a strong sense of loyalty to the state, a culture of rule of law and a common identity amongst all Iraqis.
This type of atmosphere would pave the way for a peaceful and demilitarized society. It would be the start of putting weapons in the hands of the state – an important pre-requisite for any real change in security to take place.
This can only happen if Iraqis who possess weapons are convinced that the state is protecting them. It is imperative that Iraqis have decent incomes and a quality of life, which would stop them from making livings off of their weapons while enabling them to trust their fellow Iraqis, regardless of whether they are from the same sect or ethnicity.
Although these goals may seem unattainable at the present time, substantive efforts should be exerted to generate these conditions. The government has the duty to prevent a security vacuum from being created again. Good governance would guarantee quality living conditions for Iraqis and a true national reconciliation — in addition to promoting a culture of forgiveness and tolerance — and would restore trust amongst Iraqis.

In the new Iraq, some are more equal!

While the international community our leaders, the media and the public are preoccupied with the petty politics of Iraq, a dangerous place is emerging – a society that is intolerant of difference, breeds extremism and is getting more and more isolated in this age of integration.
With every day that passes the signs of this are becoming more and more clear.
One day, a Church is attacked, a few days later the Muslims celebrated Eid al-Adha as if nothing has happened.
A few days later, Baghdad council decided to ban the sale or serving of alcohol in the capital.
Days later, the ministry of education decided to ban theatre and music studies from the institute of fine arts.
Last week, the number of women ministers was reduced to Zero. After starting with seven in the first cabinet in 2004, a womanless government was announced.
This week Muslims are commemorating Ashura, and the Christians did not celebrate Christmas as they are expected to respect the event!
Although the government, the media and public says that we are all the same, the reality today is that there are different Iraqis today. There are Iraqi Sunnis, Iraqi Shia, Iraqi Christians, Iraqi Yezidis, Iraqi Mandaeans and others.
If you happen to be a woman or an artist, a talented person, a secular, a liberal, a Christian or a member any other smaller religious or social group, your space is reducing by the day. Iraq is not yours as much as it is the country of the other. And very little is being done by the authorities to prove the contrary.
While the debate over liberties and the rule of law is usually overshadowed by security in some countries, it is the contrary in Iraq. Curtailing the liberties and undermining the rule of law is happening for the same reasons that the extremists are fighting for and not for security considerations.
In fact it is counterproductive, curtailing liberties, undermining rule of law and discriminating would alienate more people and hence their sense of ownership of the country would be reduced. This in turn would be at the expense of security.
In any society or country, when things start to go wrong, it would be the duty of the leaders of society and politics to bring things back on track.
In Iraq, the challenge is different. Iraq was never a country fit for all its’ people. It is everyone’s duty to prove the contrary. The leaders, the media and the public all bare responsibility to face this challenge.
Neither today seems to be up to the level. But of the three the leaders bare most responsibility.
If on Christmas Eve, a leader attended a church mass, or a leader made a strong statement against those who want to take Iraq back to the dark ages,www.ekurd.netor if PM Maliki does not come back to Parliament without women ministers, the media would report that and the public would follow suit.
It is gestures like these that would turn Iraq from being a theocracy of the dark ages to a country fit for all.

Iraq’s volatile politics, punctuated by a hard-fought national election and protracted negotiations over a new government, dominated the headlines in 2010.

IWPR Iraq senior media adviser Hiwa Osman analyses the performance of Iraq’s party-driven media over the last 12 months.

How would you assess the Iraqi news media’s coverage of politics this year, and how would you compare it with coverage of the parliamentary election in January 2005?

I would say that the coverage was a reflection of politics itself. The media is split along the same political lines that exist in today’s Iraq: sectarian, ethnic, pro- and anti-government. Most media outlets are backed by political parties, and covered events from their own perspective.

This hurt Iraqi citizens, because in order to get a complete picture, you need to rely on more than one news outlet. The media in Iraq still has not made the transition to become a service provider rather than a mouthpiece and a propaganda tool.

That said, there has been some improvement - the coverage was slightly more mature than in 2005. In 2005, the outlets were not as diverse and there were fewer of them, especially television stations. The bias back in 2005 was much clearer and more blatant.

The Iraqi media covers politics almost exclusively, ignoring most other news besides sports. Why do you think this is?

Most media is funded by political parties, not the private sector, and our most powerful political parties still carry their legacy from the past. They were born as opposition or revolutionary groups and used their media outlets as propaganda tools against the regime. While the regime is long gone, their philosophy – that the media should serve party rather than public interests - remains unchanged.

For them, media is a tool in their political campaigns, agendas and aspirations. As a result, the media only concentrates on politics, and the parties think they’re getting their money’s worth by funding coverage of their news. Of course, promoting a party’s agenda provokes a reaction from rival party media, so we end up with non-stop political coverage.

As a result, we end up with uninformed citizens. For example, several months ago a toddler died while in a day-care centre in Erbil. A child’s death in a day-care during office hours raises 100 questions that only the media can raise,www.ekurd.netand they need to provide answers for the public. The media didn’t cover the case at all. I only found out through a friend who lived close to the school. The media should have investigated the case and interviewed the education and health authorities.

This aspect of non-political reporting is being touched on slightly by the online community and social networking. Just the other day, an IWPR journalist posted a picture online of an electricity pole that was placed right in the middle of the street.

But news organisations barely use social media. Why?

Internet penetration in Iraq is very low - although even with this very low internet penetration, something like 90 per cent of internet users in Iraq access social media.
But social media hasn’t found an identity in Iraq yet. In some countries, it’s used to report; in others it’s used to organise, mobilise; in other places it’s just for networking and entertainment. Iraqis simply haven’t figured out how social media can be used here.
However, quite a lot of parliamentary candidates did try to use social media this year, especially in Kurdistan where the penetration is higher.

Polls indicate that Iraqis do not trust the media. What can Iraqi news organisations do to build their credibility with the public?

First of all, they should separate news from opinion. This is a symptom of a partisan media because political parties believe the media’s role is to air their views.
Editors also need to apply professional news judgement by choosing stories that impact on the public, rather than just running stories about leaders’ meetings and press conferences where nothing substantial is said. This would be a step towards having a media that functions as a service provider as opposed to a propaganda tool.
The other thing that can be done is to encourage the private sector to invest in media. If it is an honest investment, and isn’t just a business front for a political party, the media will be in a better position to serve the public.

Iraq’s next election is slated for the spring of 2011, when citizens in Iraqi Kurdistan will vote for local representatives. What lessons can the Kurdish media learn from the coverage of the 2010 parliamentary elections, and how can they better serve the public?

It is unlikely that the media in Iraqi Kurdistan changed anyone’s mind about who they wanted to vote for in the last election. The challenge for them this time is to influence voters by better informing them.
The only way they can do this is if they act as good information service providers. They can still have their opinion section, but they should separate this from the news. The biggest lesson that they can learn is that they should strive to provide quality information, as opposed to being a propaganda tool.
Having said all this, it’s unfair to place the blame entirely on the media. A country’s media is a reflection of its politics, and Iraqi politics are currently divisive and brutal. And in order to create an environment conducive to professional, free and responsible media, legislation is required guaranteeing both the right of information to the public and guaranteeing freedom of expression.
The right to freedom of expression and the press is enshrined in the Iraqi constitution, with the caveat that it “does not violate public order and morality”. In order to create an environment conducive to professional, free and responsible media, we need legislation.

Federalists, Separatists & Unionists

Once again, the people of Kurdistan have realized that neither the media nor those who raised a brouhaha over President Barzani’s statement about self-determination seem to have understood or want to understand what the new Iraq is about.

Barzani has been under fire for publicly stating that Kurds have a right to self-determination, an argument that is not new. He was simply repeating a long-held Kurdish position on self-determination.

This should not have shocked anyone — but the exaggerated, critical response to Barzani’s statement shows that the new reality of Iraq is not accepted by everyone.

Rights are inherent in the Iraqi constitution, and the country is clearly a voluntary union of its people.

The preamble of the constitution states: “We the people of Iraq of all components and shades have taken upon ourselves to decide freely and with our choice to unite our future and to take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, to draft … this lasting constitution.”

Unless this fundamental principle is understood and appreciated by anyone involved in Iraq, proper decisions can never be made about the future of this country.

The irony here is that critics of Barzani’s statement have fiercely opposed suppressing other rights and liberties in other parts of Iraq, including banning alcohol from the capital, out of their “conviction” for human rights.

Instead of worrying about the future of the country, the guardians of Iraq’s unity should focus on the theocracy that is emerging. They, along with their neighbors and allies,www.ekurd.netshould concentrate more on the real dangers: the acts of religious extremists and fascists who are moving Iraq toward tyranny and extremism. Signs of religious bigotry are rising and attempts to drive Iraq back into the dark ages are underway.

The new Iraq is being partitioned and the Kurds are not the ones responsible. Islamic radicals are dividing society along religious and sectarian lines.

Barzani’s leadership in brokering a deal between the various parties to form a national government needs to be recognized. In any other country, a man who played a strategic role in bringing together Iraq’s notoriously fractured parties and leaders would not be considered a threat.

In fact, stating that his region has the right to self-determination should be encouraging and positive, given that the Kurds are exercising their right through remaining within Iraq. They are choosing to be a part of this country.

Still, the Kurds should ask themselves why this statement created such a storm. Was it badly timed, even though it came shortly after Barzani’s national initiative?

Or are the Kurds unable to make their case to Baghdad and the outside world? Do they need a more aggressive campaign to explain who the Kurds are? Or do they need to review their relations with their allies?

Regardless of the answers to these questions, the reality is that once again, the Kurds are being accused of wanting to partition Iraq.

The Kurds should seize this opportunity to clearly state that as Iraqis, they want to be part of the free and modern world – and so should the rest of Iraq.

The values of equality, human rights and freedoms are what keep Iraq together, and they are all enshrined in the constitution.

The last sentence of the constitution’s preamble states: “The adherence to this constitution preserves for Iraq its free union, its people, its land and its sovereignty.”

Detracting from these values would split Iraq, not the Kurds.

A zero-sum game for America

The role of the US in Iraq is becoming less and less relevant, and this is not because of the onslaught of Wikileaks.
Washington’s recent failed attempts to form Iraq’s next government show less interest in the details of Baghdad politics and more concern with finishing what they have at hand.
The eye of the US is mostly on their withdrawal as opposed to the future of the region. Given the fact that this is President Barack Obama’s first term, it is understandable that he is already planning his election campaign and working on gathering numbers and achievement for his re-election bid.
A colleague of mine who is an expert of US policy in the Middle East said that over the next two years, it is best to expect nothing from Obama.
The White House will have a quiet year ahead and will only focus on achievements to boost the campaign in the year that follows.
If this happens, the US will be less and less relevant in Iraq and the region. Other players like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey will take over. The continued disengagement of the US in Iraq would certainly be at the expense of the US’s status and prestige in the region.
As things stand, the US does not scare anyone anymore. In fact, it is much easier to attack the US than most of our neighbors. If you attack the US, they come after you to see what you want. If you attack the others,www.ekurd.netthey come after you and make sure you don’t do it again.
If you are friend of America, they ask you to make concessions. If you are a foe, you are rewarded.
In this respect, some in the US think that if they pull out of Iraq they will have more influence. They are wrong.
The gap the US leaves behind would have to be filled with a functioning state able to respond to various threats and challenges, as well as being strong enough to stand on its own.
Looking at the events of the past year and the challenges that lay ahead, Iraq certainly does not fit this definition of a functioning state.
By all measures, Iraq will not be ready by the time the US forces withdraw in 2011 to withstand external challenges and regional actors will increasingly interfere.
The US disengagement would be the start of real failure and Iraq would slip into the hands of America’s enemies and pseudo allies – both of which are making sure that the US image in their media remains abominable. This factor is contributing to the rise of Islamic extremism in the Middle East.
For the US to withdraw, they need to leave behind a functioning state and a political process that is able to defend itself and stand alone.
What we see on the streets of Baghdad and TV screens does not suggest at all that Iraq is capable of doing so.
The way the Iraqi government is configured is a recipe for dysfunction. Bringing together opposing parties in the same room is a good start for reconciliation, but not for rebuilding a country.
The new Council for Strategic Policies, for example, will only add another bureaucratic layer to the already byzantine political and governmental processes.
The key challenge for all of us is to separate divisive politics from the management of affairs of state.
This is done by strengthening Iraq’s public service sector and working strongly to promote good governance, transparency, anti-corruption, strong media and national reconciliation.
To be blunt, most Iraqis still need of America’s help. We still badly need Washington to help separate politics from governance.
The less politicized our public service and other state institutions become, the more ready they will be take over when the US pulls out.

On Our Media

Last weekend, I conducted a training course for the staff of an emerging Kurdish TV station that says it wants to uphold the values of strong, professional journalism.
News judgment was heavily emphasized in the course. This skill is fundamental for professional journalists and builds a news outlet’s credibility as well as its audience. For those not familiar with the concept, news judgment involves prioritizing the most important news by placing it at the top of a story and running the most important news items in a publication or newscast first.
After a number of discussions, we studied several TV news bulletins on the same day. All of the stations are owned by political parties. The bulletins highlighted the key defect and crippled nature of political party media.
In one of the exercises, I asked the journalists to reorder news items based on the impact it had on the public, and to estimate the number of people affected by the story.
The result was that we turned the original bulletin upside down! Instead of running a story about a leader’s (rather dull and non-newsworthy) official meetings first, as the party media had done, we prioritized stories about mobile petrol stations closing and explosions in Talafar and Jalawla.
For another exercise, we watched bulletins from two party-run TV stations and were able to predict exactly what a third party-affiliated station would run. The stations’ news line-ups were entirely based on the political stance of the parties that own them.
A quick analysis of the stories and issues that news outlets choose to report shows that the coverage is reflective of Iraqi’s divisive politics: pro-government media praises official initiatives while anti-government media is critical. At the end of the day, our media tailgates our politics.
But in every society, the number of people who are interested in politics is much smaller than those who are not. Our media unfortunately caters to politicians and political junkies, and fails to give the public information they need for their daily lives.
Many of my western journalist colleagues have observed that our media has not yet transitioned from acting as a political party’s revolutionary mouthpiece to serving as a mirror of a society that is working to rebuild itself.
Particularly in this delicate phase, the news media should reflect our society and should gauge our progress. So far, this has not occurred. We need to follow stories from multiple news organizations to get a complete picture of what is happening in our country, because most have their own agenda that does not reflect the entire truth.
We still don’t have a single trustworthy news source. This is mainly because our media is either owned by wealthy political parties that are focused on broadcasting their views to the public (as well as the daily schedule of its leaders); or by not-so-wealthy media owners whose outlets primarily criticize the political parties and publish items that the parties won’t.
The result is that neither of the two provides the full picture. In many ways, both operate in the same way but with different content.
This deadlock will not break until one decides to fundamentally shift toward independence. This requires a wealthy investor who wants to change the landscape of media and to serve as the leading news source for the public. Such an investment would be profitable,www.ekurd.netgiven that there is a huge untapped market for credible information. Advertising dollars would follow. If this model were applied, the party media would be left behind as it would be too late for them to catch up.
The other avenue is for the political parties to overhaul their current media policies. This can be done by prioritizing the public’s need for information above the party’s desire to inform the public of its leaders’ meetings.
This is done by separating news from propaganda, i.e. the news division of any media outlet should be completely independent from other departments. It should be managed by professional journalists who are not even members of the party, who prioritize public’s right to know.
It is clear that there is a huge news and information gap in our society. Whoever fills this gap by creating a trustworthy news outlet will reap the benefits –the investors will profit and the political parties will win votes.

An ethno-sectarian democracy!

Even as Iraq’s leaders congratulate each other on resolving bitter disputes over the country’s top executive positions, another battle has emerged for the coveted ministerial posts.
This new round of political jockeying has raised the most pressing question facing the new Iraq: is Iraq a true democracy or an ethno-sectarian system? Is it ruled by elections and votes or is it shackled to the dysfunctional quota system?
Terms, like “power-sharing” and “unity government,” are making headlines, but the reality is much different. Over the next month, the political blocs will try to answer the questions posed above, and, so far, it seems that the ethno-sectarian quota are beating out votes.
One of the key issues around the head of Iraqiya, Ayad Allawi, receiving one of the other two top posts, president or speaker of parliament, was that he was a Shia, even though he headed a mostly Sunni coalition.
The “logic” of Iraqi politics today dictates that the top three slots – prime minister, speaker of parliament and president – are distributed between Shia, Sunni and Kurds. Even so, the divvying up of top slots was still a major hurdle over the past eight months of wrangling.
With that, however, the simple math is over. Observers wishing to decipher the next round of government formation had better use a calculator.
As in the last government formation, a complex system gives points for each senior position. A rough breakdown of this allotment, pending a final agreement of the blocs, is as follows; prime minister (15),www.ekurd.netspeaker (12), president (10), deputy prime minister or speaker (8), vice-president (8), sovereign minister (8), production minister (6), service minister (5), minister of state (3).
This system also gives each bloc participating in government a number of points based on the number of seats they have in parliament. The seats-to-points ratio is decided by the negotiating teams of the blocs. In the last election, it was one point for every two seats. This time, some negotiators are talking about 2.6 seats for each point.
For each post taken, the allocated points are then deducted from the relevant bloc’s total. Given that all the players are participating in government this time, the demand for ministerial posts is at an all-time high. As usual, each bloc is counting on a lot more than they deserve in accordance with this system. Most of them would be thinking in quota terms and not in points. The question her is which system would prevail, points or quota.
The Kurds, for example, would have used most of their electoral points by the time a deputy prime minister is appointed. If the points system is applied, the government would have no Kurdish ministers!
In another scenario, if Allawi or another leading Shia member of the Iraqiya bloc receives a high-profile post that gobbles up a big share of points, Sunnis who still see Allawi as a Shia and not member of Iraqiya, would regard this as disturbing the “national balance” as there would be more Shia than Sunnis in the new cabinet.
In the end, such dilemmas prove that Iraq’s political math still has its own rules. The sad truth is that Iraq remains an ethno-sectarian state, one which acts and governs accordingly. There is clearly still more importance given to representation quotas than the election results. The results in governance speak for themselves. This must change.
All Iraqis have all seen how the ethno-sectarian quota system has contributed to the increase of corruption and decrease of security. For this to be redressed, two key measures need to be taken by the next government. First, true national reconciliation. Second, all outstanding issues between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government must be worked out.
These two important initiatives would be a step towards ending quota and affording democratic rights and equal opportunities for all Iraqis, regardless of ethnicity or sect.
Although these principles are carefully enshrined in the constitution and repeated almost daily by Iraqi leaders, they are hard to come by in the streets.
Until this happens, Iraq will remain an ethno-sectarian state in which no one truly trusts each other and all the groups looking for protection, compensation or the upper hand.
In such a divided system, designed in theory as an equalizer, big groups get less than they deserve and small groups get more than they deserve.

End of power-sharing or end of Iraqiya

Since the very beginning of the 2010 political process, the Iraqiya bloc has fed its supports a steady diet of disappointments. From day one, the mostly Sunni and secular coalition has lost credibility with its allies, foes, analysts and the regional and international players who once saw the grouping as a game-changer in the new Iraq.
The decision to walkout on the November 12 meeting of parliament has only underscored a deepening dysfunction, leaving many in Iraq’s political arena to question Iraqiya’s viability as a political partner. To be blunt, Iraqiya has gradually gained the reputation as a moody and unpredictable group that no one can do business with.
The excuses that they came up with in the second meeting of parliament showed cracks in the coalition and revealed a disorganised and fractured list. One leader, Dr Rafi’ Al-Issawi, dismissed the walkout as a misunderstanding, while another, the head of the list Dr Ayad Allawi, declared the power-sharing deal that broke eight months of political gridlock dead in the water.
Perhaps more importantly, and not without some irony, Iraqiya proved its own ineffectiveness. They were unable to block the process as they claimed, and it’s now clear that a government can move forward with or without them.
After securing the speakership, and using the excuse of parliament ratifying the political agreement and removing de-Baathification on some of their figures, Iraqiya tried to stop the process of electing the president and naming the Prime Minister. This was seen by many as a clear manoeuvre to get more than what they had originally agreed to.
Not only did they fail to stop the process and break the quorum, they became irrelevant to the election of the president. Therefore, when the first problem faces them,www.ekurd.netand there will be many, they would have to tell the president that “Although we did not vote for you, we want you to help us solve a problem.” In such a scenario, President-elect Jalal Talabani’s support would come out of graciousness, not duty. After all, they did not vote for him.
Even more important, Iraqiya lost the trust of a key ally in Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani. It was Barzani’s initiative, some observers believe, to specifically include Iraqiya in the political process and provide them with guarantees.
But their behaviour has made many people, including those who honestly wanted to support them, think twice. Iraqiya has proved that as a bloc they are not very united and clearly lack strong leadership.
From the start of their declaration of victory minutes after close of polls on election day, Iraqiya has demonstrated that it would be quite difficult to rely on them as a united bloc and as a bloc that can institute real change to Iraq.
Every few weeks, a new speaker for the list emerges and says something different from the one before. Each leader of the bloc says something different from the other. They have not articulated a united argument about their demands or vision for the future. It is common for divergent members to contradict one another. One says they are in, another says they are out; so it goes in Iraqiya.
They have many so-called leaders, and each leader seems to want something different. When a new development takes place, Iraqiya moves in a thousand different directions. This lack of cohesion has cost them many different opportunities to get a better deal than the one they have today.
It’s been a catalogue of missed opportunities: from refusing a power-sharing deal with Maliki early on to refusing to support Adel Abdulmahdi’s candidacy for PM and, lately, losing Barzanis trust, when he tailored his initiative purely to bring them on board.
While some Iraqiya members said they supported Barzani’s initiative to bring an Iraqi solution to the issue, others got extremely excited about the Saudi initiative that was designed to bring an outside settlement to the government formation.
Such indecision still plagues Iraqiya: at a time when some attended the second session of parliament, the head of the list was heading out of Iraq to London and declaring the power-sharing deal dead while predicting a deterioration of the security situation.
Iraqiya’s cracks are showing and their political future is unclear. Given their all-or-none approach; their division and lack of leadership raise serious questions about their viability to continue as a bloc despite the large number of seats they have.

A Stillborn Initiative

The Saudi king’s invitation to the Iraqi parties to hold talks in Riyadh after Hajj raises numerous questions and alarm bells for the Iraqi people about their future. It also serves as a reminder of the dangers and challenges that lie ahead for the new Iraq.
On Saturday, 30 October 2010, as the various Iraqi parties were preparing to meet in Arbil and Baghdad to settle the political crisis and form a government, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia invited President Jalal Talabani and other Iraqi leaders for talks in Riyadh after Eid Al-Adha.
The irony here is that a country which has never seen an election, does not allow for a Shia presence, and does not have, or recognize, any ethnic minorities is trying to fix the problems of a new democracy with a Shia majority and a sizeable Kurdish, Turkoman and Chaldo-Assyrian population.
The manner in which the invitation was drafted was a clear indication that the Saudis do not have a clue about the new Iraq, nor do they intend to solve the country’s problems.
The invitation mentions President Jalal Talabani by name and “the rest of the parties that took part in the election” -- as if the problem here is President Talabani and the other parties, or is over the presidential post, or is between Kurds and Arabs.
The reality is that the dispute is between the Arabs. One day it is an internal conflict between the Shia; another day it is between the Sunnis; and at other times, it is between Shia and Sunnis.
Given their impartial position, the Kurds were paving the way for a settlement of the dispute.
Many here in Iraq recognize that the Saudi invitation was timed to spoil these attempts by driving a deeper wedge between the Arabs and the Kurds of Iraq while at the same time prolonging and deepening the Sunni-Shia conflict.
By its very nature, Saudi Arabia is not fit to either mediate in Iraq or even understand the nuances of this complex and diverse country.
Their predominant position is an anti-Shia one. During his entire time as prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, who is Shia, did not receive a single invitation to visit Saudi Arabia. Given examples such as this, how can Saudi Arabia overnight become a mediator or an arbitrator between the Shia and the Sunnis?
The Iraqi reactions to the initiative were a clear demonstration of the limited credibility Saudi enjoys. The Shia and the Kurds refused the mediation, while the Sunnis welcomed it.
Every now and then, the people of Iraq hear of Saudi preachers insulting Shia symbols, including the revered Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, as well as disparaging comments toward the Shia faith in Saudi Arabia’s mosques and satellite TV channels. Most Iraqis believe that ending these practices would be a goodwill gesture before helping to form the government.
As opposed to dressing their initiatives with an all-Iraqi solution to form the government, the Saudis would have been much better off if they were more open and truthful by solely expressing concerns about the status of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. They could have also been more open in expressing their concerns about the extent of Iran’s influence or interference in Iraq.
The initiative also could have been better prepared. As things stand, it seems that Saudi minimized Iraqiya’s chances of positioning themselves well in the next government. They instead managed to draw the Kurds and the Shia closer to each other, while further enhancing Iran’s role in Iraq.
If tomorrow Mahmoud Ahmadinajad makes a similar invitation as the one extended by King Abullah (who, it should be noted, has not even appointed an ambassador to Iraq) surely many more people -- including Sunnis -- would attend the Tehran meeting rather than one in Riyadh.
But Ahmadinajad would not interfere so blatantly, because he seems to understand the new Iraq better than the Saudis. The past seven months have proven that any interference in negotiations over the government formation will only further complicate Iraq’s deeply polarized political environment.
When the people of Iraq went to the polls to vote for their MPs, they did so with the understanding that the Iraqis are the only ones who should form the government, and that the only place where it can be formed is Iraq. If Iraq veers from this principle, the political blocs will be responsible – and the citizens will be the ones to pay the price.

Kingmakers again!

The Kurds have once again found themselves the kingmakers of Iraq, but this time, the stakes are much higher. Iraq’s political paralysis has earned it the world record for the longest period of time in which a country has gone without forming a government after holding an election. Given that all of the other parties have taken sides, it is clear that it is up to the Kurds to decide who will lead the country.
The good news is that this time, the political picture and the leadership options are clearer. After months of indecision, incumbent Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki finally won his battle to secure the National Alliance’s nomination for the premiership. Two months ago, I wrote about players and spectators and encouraged the Kurds and other smaller blocs to make up their mind about the next prime minister. The Sadrists and the others seem to have made their decision by nominating Maliki; luckily for the Kurds, it did not change the equation much.
To be sure, Iraqi politics remains dysfunctional and paralyzed. The country is unable to move in any definitive direction because of its politics. The Kurds should not be influenced by the political quagmire, however. Their choices are simple today: Allawi or Maliki.
The ongoing conflict over the prime minister’s post was a clear symptom of the paralyzed politics of Baghdad. It became clear that the conflict is one between lists, and not about policies. Sadly, the conflict is centered on the interests of the blocs rather than to the public interest.
Breaking the world record and not feeling the sense of urgency to form the government or make concessions is a clear example.
The Kurds are different from other blocs because they are not embroiled in Baghdad’s difficult and divisive politics.
External pressures could be placed on the Kurds to not support a seemingly sectarian government led by powerful Shia parties. But the reality is the other options are not much better.
In the early stages of negotiations, a national unity government could have been an answer. But today it is not. The bad relationship created over the past six months has in my opinion destroyed any potential for trust between the two main lists to create a national unity government. Maliki remained a strong candidate so did Allawi.
As one of the more neutral groups in Baghdad’s vicious political fight, the Kurds have an opportunity today to make a real difference in the political process and for themselves.
Although they are a list and an alliance, their politics are more mature and clearer in terms of hierarchy, goals, interests and objectives. The main reason for this is that they are from one region. Their aims and demands were not created yesterday; they were developed after decades of struggle.
Many observers believe that the ball is in the Kurds’ court, but this should not be seen as a burden. In fact, it could be an opportunity.
The Kurds cannot afford to play the political game without having a clear idea as to their demands. The 19-point list should be the basis for the Kurds to negotiate a deal with either Allawi or Maliki.
Other characteristics, like the leadership, vision, strength of the candidates, should also be considered.
In dealing with the blocs, the Kurds should consider the composition, unity and sustainability of each bloc and their historic relationship with -- or animosity toward -- the Kurds and their demands.
During the months-long political game, the Kurds have thus far been spectators. As we approach the final stretch, it is now their time to play, and to score the winning goal.

A digital democracy is emerging

A pioneering conference in Erbil last week provided a much-needed look at Iraq’s technological future.
It offered unprecedented discussion of how Iraq can use technology, information and e-governance to re-establish its strong economic, intellectual and political standing in the region.
The two-day conference, organized by international media development agencies the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) and IREX, explored the innumerable ways Iraq can develop its emerging democracy by utilizing technology to harness the information revolution.
Information and communication are keys to creating a healthy society; one in which the public is engaged, informed and empowered, while the government is responsive, transparent and accountable.
At the heart of this “revolution” is a free and unfettered flow of information to the public. This info-stream cannot happen by leaving technological advancement to take its own course; the process must be managed.
The use of communication technologies is increasing by the second. Iraq is well placed to benefit from this accelerated pace. By handling this transition wisely, chaos and confusion can be avoided.
It is the duty of the government, the media and the public to see this transition through and develop Iraq’s “digital democracy.”
This new technological landscape is changing old ways of receiving and transmitting information. We, too, should change. The public, the media and government can all play important roles in shaping the future.
Information empowers the public and enables individuals to learn their rights as well as how exercise and protect them. Information is always a key tool in combating corruption.
With today’s technologies, individuals have increasingly become information providers. Any citizen can take a picture, record a video or write something, and then post it immediately on the Internet for the entire world to see.
The media in Iraq can promote public awareness about the need for information and its benefits. It can also disseminate information on public services and rights awareness.
Public media provide a forum to voice dissatisfaction, as well as demand accountability and action. It is, after all, a forum for public debate. The most important role of media, however, is to create a public that is informed enough to be critical and analytical of any information received.
Our media market is saturated with low quality, and often downright bad, products. Even so, no authority can or should close them down.
The only party that can do this is the public. If credible and professional media creates a media-literate public that can interpret, analyze and use the information, there would be no market for bad media in Iraq.
The best avenue for the government to take is to lift all obstacles on communication and access to information. For example, develop legislation for the people’s right to information, strengthen the mechanisms for access to information through e-governance, and work on increasing Internet access by allowing the private sector to enter the service provision market.
In the new technological landscape, fair play is the only way to win in the long run.

Human Rights - Iraq's first post withdrawal test

As fallout of America’s withdrawal from Iraq begins to take shape, it looks as if it will be some time before the "new Iraq" can truly stand on its own.
One scathing example of Iraq's political immaturity was brought to light last week by an Amnesty International report on the state of the country's prison system.
The disappointing and confusing reactions to the report from Iraq's government, security apparatus and civil society have made it clear that human rights in Iraq is still an abstract concept. This needs to change.
The Amnesty report "New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq" claimed that an estimated 30,000 detainees are being held without trial in Iraqi prisons. It also found that "Some detainees have been held in secret detention facilities and tortured."
Many prisoners face violence, psychological abuse as well as other forms of gross mistreatment, according to the study which was compiled from interviews with detainees, prison directors, refugees and activists.
The scope of prisoner abuse listed in the report underscores the need for a better understanding of human rights by correctional institutions and personnel, as well Iraqi politicians and the public. But that's not all.
The findings serve as a direct contradiction to the repeated statements of government officials who have stressed a commitment to uphold the human rights of Iraqi citizens. In fact, Iraqi officials were quick to dismiss either the sources or numbers mentioned in the report.
Although the judiciary, ministry of justice, security officials, politicians and rights groups all reacted with different shades of denial, one point became clear: no official mechanism exists in Iraq to monitor and report human rights violations.
As it stands, there is no state-run watchdog that assures the accurate flow of information on rights abuses to the public, the government and international community.
An organization such as this would institutionalise the concept of human rights into the security culture, and could be a move towards adopting international humanitarian standards.
A key issue in the debate over the report was the number of detainees. This should never have happened. The Iraqi government should have a record of everyone in custody and make this list available to the likes of Amnesty and Human Rights Watch. After all, transparency is a key guarantor of good practice, good governance and accountability.
Ambiguity, stark denials and lack of access can have damaging effects, especially with reputable international organizations. Iraqis should not forget that it was these same organisations that helped expose the former regime and his crimes against the people of Iraq.
The United States can play an effective role in preventing Iraq from reverting to its awful past. Although many in Iraq argue that the human rights situation was worse when the US forces were in Iraq, at least they were seen as monitors and enforcers of due process and procedure.
US military spokesman in Baghdad, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Owen, said after the release of the Amnesty report that the Iraqi detention facilities were "inspected frequently and abide by the rule of law and international standards for detainee care and management."
US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley’s remarks on the report were welcomed by many Iraqis who fear that the human rights situation could deteriorate further. Crowley said that respect for human rights is an important issue in relations between Washington and Baghdad. "Human rights are a critical component" of US work "to build up institutions of the Iraqi government," he added.
One of the things that we in the new Iraq take pride in is that we are striving to uphold the values of the free world. America can help us reach this goal. Washington can help the Iraqi government - and at times put pressure on it - to uphold the values that both American and Iraqi blood was shed for.
But this cannot be done by simply dismissing and denying unpleasant reports. This is achieved through engaging seriously with rights organizations, responding positively to their recommendations, and demonstrating solid steps to prevent further abuse.
The US should encourage the Iraqi government to study the Amnesty prison report carefully. The allegations of this study, and previous reports, must to be taken very seriously to make sure that the next report is not as damning as this one.

US-Kurdish relations, short term venture or a long term partnership

The visit of US vice-president Joe Biden to Arbil was an important recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan and president Barzani and the role the region plays in Iraq’s political process.
It was also seen as a reassurance that US relations with Kurdistan region are intact. But what type of relations exist today?
Depending on the size and gravity of the problem, the level of contact between the two have ranged between the Americans inviting Kurdish leaders to the White House to a phone call or meeting in Baghdad when the American president is in town.
Other means of contact are usually left up to the vice-president or the secretaries of state or defense, who call Kurdish leaders and occasionally visit Kurdistan.
Thus far, Kurdish-US relations have fluctuated based on the issue at hand – with the problem usually involving Baghdad, Kirkuk or Turkey.
The typical scenario is that the Kurds are adamant about a certain issue, and the US steps in with either a visit, invitation or a phone call. The Kurdish stance softens soon afterwards.
A key issue that the Kurds are debating now is whether they are getting their money’s worth out of this relationship.
Some Kurds say that the US needs Iraqi Kurdistan more than Iraqi Kurdistan needs the US today, as Iraqi Kurdistan is the only success story of the US liberation of Iraq.
This may not be a very popular statement amongst the Kurds in general. Many still want to believe that the US is Iraqi Kurdistan’s key partner and ally.
But this could change. Relations are usually based on give and take. The Kurds maintain that despite positively responding to all of America’s requests, the US is not as responsive when the Kurds ask for help on any their issues.
The issues of article 140, revenue-sharing, relations with Turkey and the constant shelling of borders are all issues that the Kurds believe that the US could play a more effective role in solving.
Thus far, on the surface at least, America’s high-profile political engagement with Kurdistan came during crises, when they wanted the Kurds to soften their position.
While it is clear that the Kurdish relationship with the US is a valuable, strategic option that the Kurds cannot abandon, they can certainly manage it better. Relations with the United States are deeply rooted and long-term – they are not just with the administration that happens to be in power.
America’s pride in Iraqi Kurdistan’s achievements is mostly limited to security and stability. They are still hesitant to speak out when it comes to democracy, good governance, transparency, anti corruption, freedom of speech and human rights.
While steps have been taken on a democratic path, Iraqi Kurdistan still has some way to go.
It is not difficult to become an ally of the United States, but it may be more of a challenge to become a true ally and partner.
Measures to combat corruption, promote transparency and good governance, and uphold human rights and freedom of speech are all steps that Iraqi Kurdistan’s leadership can take.
This would create a much more solid foundation for Kurdish-US relations. It would also open the scope for more partners. Let’s not forget that some Kurds argue that compared to its neighbors, Iraqi Kurdistan is much better off in terms of democratic progress.
But this comparison doesn’t stand because no country in the region constitutes a good example of democracy, human rights and good governance. The Kurdistan region should look at the European democracies as a model.
Kurdish-US relations are at a crossroads. They can either resemble US relations with its pseudo allies in the region like Egypt or Saudi Arabia, or they can be modeled after America’s relations with democracies in Europe.
It is now up to the Kurds and the US to decide which way it will go.

Which one comes first, democracy or federalism?

As things stand today, all indications suggest that the revived Iraqi National Alliance, INA, will form the government under the leadership of current prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and will be joined by the Kurds.
Iraqiya has declared that if this scenario occurs, they will denounce the process as illegal. Some Iraqiya leaders even suggested that they would boycott the political process.
A boycott would send the political process in Baghdad back to square one, throwing Iraq back into the political turmoil it faced 2005.
At that time, the Shias and Kurds were leading Iraq while the Sunnis remained on the sidelines. This led to a three-year-long wave of violence, terrorism and extremism that swept Baghdad and stretched into other provinces. It was a truly sectarian civil war, the traces of which continue to haunt and threaten us today.
To be sure, the same turmoil would emerge if Iraqiya formed the government on its own with Ayad Allawi as the prime minister, alienating the Shia-dominated lists. And let’s not forget the Kurds -- they would join his government as well.
A closer look at the two options makes it clear that there is a serious mistrust not between Allawi and Maliki -- or even between the Iraqiya and the INA ¬– but rather between the Shia and Sunni Arabs of Iraq.
In addition to the discrimination, injustice and atrocities committed against Iraq’s Shia before the fall of Saddam, the lack of clarity and progress in national reconciliation by today’s rulers have also contributed to deepening the mistrust between the two communities.
No concrete steps have been taken to achieve a true national reconciliation. On the contrary, in the weeks before the last election, the de-Ba’thification committee headed by a leading Iraqi National Congress member, Ali Allami – who is accused of strong ties with Iran -- disqualified a number of candidates for their past involvement with the Ba’th Party. Most were from Iraqiya.
If there was a true will to move forward and a confidence in a democratic system based on equality, these candidates – who after all were entering the democratic process through elections -- should have been commended and brought into the fold of the new Iraq rather than being driven back to the Baath Party.
Although the Shia and Sunni communities lived peacefully as neighbours in many regions of Iraq, each appears to mistrust the political leadership and military force of the other. Hence, both sides fear or reject being ruled by the other.
But the dilemma for today’s Iraq is that a government based in Baghdad would have to rule the entire country -- and it will need to be either INA or Iraqiya.
In any mature democracy, it is usually the case that one bloc is in the government and the other is in the opposition. Iraq’s democracy does not seem to be ready for such a setup yet.
Each bloc fears being in the opposition, as being in power seems to be the only guarantor for protection.
One interesting point to note here is that the Kurds are not afraid of either bloc being in power. The reason is that they rule their region alone and are trying to work out a federal relationship with Baghdad.
If the Sunnis and the Shia of Iraq had their own federal regions, our democracy would have been solid and the bickering over forming the government would not have lasted this long.
The last six months demonstrated that for democracy to be entrenched in Iraq it needs to have a truly federal structure whereby each of Iraq’s communities live in a region or regions that enjoy a federal relationship with Baghdad.
Once this is in place, policies and issues would replace personalities. Each community would worry more about their federal status in Iraq as opposed to who is ruling in Baghdad.
The leadership in Baghdad would worry more about regulating the relationship with (and between) the regions, including managing the delegation of power regionally, as opposed to focusing on consolidating all of the power in one city, in one office and with one man.
The days of one man holding all of the power have long gone. This is confirmed by the constitution, and is something the politicians must come to realize. The irony here is that the same people who are calling for a strong, centralised state are going to be harmed most by this centralisation.

Iraq After US Withdrawal – End of Era or New Beginning?

As the debate continues over the effects of the United States troop withdrawal from Iraq, there are forces manoeuvring to fill the gap left by the Americans. But they are outsiders, not Iraqis.
The 4th Stryker Brigade made history last week when they withdrew to Kuwait, the last US combat soldiers to leave Iraq.
So what’s next? Iraqis don’t seem to be thinking about the repercussions too much, but regional players are already strategising about how they can gain the upper hand.
Each of Iraq’s neighbours is carefully plotting its own strategy. Every scenario would be detrimental, destabilising and damaging for both Iraq and America.
Iran is trying to frame its relationship with Iraq as one of brotherly concern. As the stalemate in forming a new Iraqi government has continued since the March parliamentary election, Tehran has managed to stall the political process while ensuring that the next government can be only be created with its blessing – and only after the US troop withdrawal.
As Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi’s bid for the premiership gained momentum, Iran quickly forged a new alliance between Iraq’s two main Shia blocs, the Iraqi National Alliance, INA, and State of Law. The goal was to prevent Allawi, who is favoured by Sunnis and enjoys close ties with US and Arab leaders, from become prime minister.
The short-lived alliance between the two rival Shia groups collapsed when Tehran failed to shift INA’s staunch opposition to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s re-election bid. But Iranian influence remains intact, with Tehran reportedly continuing to pressure Shia leaders within INA to accept Maliki, as they hold talks with all the major players.
Iran has made extraordinary efforts to ensure that it has the upper hand in Iraq, and if it brokers the deal that creates the next government, its influence will be assured.
Turkey, meanwhile, has already made it clear that it might intervene to fill the gap created by the departure of the Americans, albeit in an area where the US never had a presence, the Qandil mountains, stronghold of the Kurdish rebel group, the PKK.
The wider Arab world seems to have its own plans for gaining a foothold in Iraq and changing the political landscape. Some Arab states are working quietly, through Turkey, to influence the situation in favour of the Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority.
A recent piece in the London-based, Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, reported that Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries were planning a conference modelled on the 1989 Taef Agreement which ended Lebanon's civil war.
The article said the conference would seek “to resolve issues in Iraq away from Iranian and American influence”, and would take place in Damascus.
The paper quoted Iraqi sources as saying that a government could not be formed without the involvement of Arab states, and set out four different scenarios, all of which excluded Maliki and favoured Allawi to head the government.
Syria seems to be turning a blind eye to al-Qaeda activities, including allowing insurgents to cross into Iraq.
Earlier this year, a joint Iraqi-US special operations team in Mosul killed Abu Khalaf, a top al-Qaeda figure based in Syria who had coordinated suicide bombings in Anbar and Baghdad. In late 2008, a US raid on the Syrian border city of al-Bukamal killed several senior foreign fighters operating against Iraqi targets.
Damascus is also allowing the Baath party to organise and operate freely as it attempts to destabilise Iraq. Fugitive members of the Baath who have been charged with or convicted of various crimes are moving around freely in a number of Arab countries, in some cases with the protection of the host government.
It is clear that al-Qaeda will do whatever it can to capitalise on Iraq’s current vulnerability. The security forces are demoralised, there is no government in place, and the top security officials – the interior and defence ministers – have been undermined by losing their parliamentary bids in the March election.
All the above scenarios are plausible if neither the Iraqis nor the Americans make positive plans for the post-withdrawal phase.
Following the troop withdrawal, the US still needs to ensure that Iraq heads towards becoming a stable, democratic, peaceful and viable partner of the US and the free world. This has not happened yet, and has taken longer than originally anticipated.
For this to happen, the US needs to play an active political role in the country, and to do so in ways that empower the voices of independent Iraqis and groups. The Americans need to promote good governance and support efforts to steer Iraq in the right direction.
Iraqis need to realise that thus far, the doors have been left open to interference by nearly everyone in the region. Now that the American troops have gone, Iraq’s leaders need to understand that the more interference they allow, the less relevant they themselves will become. And in doing so, they will let Iraq become a battleground for regional and international players.