For those who have not been following the back story of Egypt and Tunisia, here it is in a nutshell: Their governments were led by small groups of people who were extremely rich, corrupt, non-transparent, and violent and did not represent the people.
The people in turn were poor, deprived of basic rights, lacked basic services and, most importantly, were ignorant of what was going on around them and in the world.
This setup was very comfortable for the authorities until a new element entered the equation: the Internet, which connected citizens to the outside world.
Because of the Internet, the values of governance, human rights and freedom are global and non-negotiable. There are no more half-corrupt governments or half-corrupt officials. They are either corrupt or not, transparent or not.
As a result, the information vacuum, often created by the government, becomes very visible. If the authorities do not fill it with the correct information, others will – whether it is the likes of organizations, with firm agendas, such as Al-Jazeera, or ordinary citizens.
The new reality of connectivity is creating a new landscape of information, and as a result a new global citizenry.
It is creating a public that is informed and knows what it needs. A public that is not afraid of fighting for its right to live in dignity, prosperity and freedom. A public that is intolerant of poor governance.
This reality unites all of us in one country. This country is called Facebookstan, Twitterstan – or, even better -- Wikileakistan.
This new country is not united by a dictator or by borders; it is united by the values of governance and citizen values around the world.
The global citizens of this country now all have the same high expectations of their governments. At the same time, they are all reporting on the developments in their lives and are comparing notes.
This new reality places a lot more pressure on governments to meet the new standard of good governance. A standard that is set by everyone through Facebook, Twitter and Wikileaks. A standard that does not tolerate any shortcomings, simply because nothing can be hidden anymore.
The people created this new reality, and had a transitionary period to embrace it. This new reality minimized the differences between the public’s aspirations in various parts of the world.
In the future, or soon, it will also eradicate the differences between governments and their standards of governance.
The challenge is now for the governments to adapt. This requires an understanding of the new reality and good governance, and will require them to act fairly and justly. Unlike the past, governments can no longer hide behind history, revolutionary legacy or external threats.
Thanks to the Internet and social networks, the public is well aware of governance, and in most case they can judge which entities or developments are dangerous, and which are not.
Similarly, a corrupt official is a corrupt official, whether he was a war hero in the past or not, a revolutionary or not, the people expect from him to do what he was appointed to do.
The good news for the people is that there is no going back. The more connected our mobile phones and computers are, the better our lives will be.
The bad news for corrupt governments is that life has changed forever. Those who hold or seek government posts solely for their personal gain will soon realize that it is not worth it anymore. They will be held to account, and should start looking for other jobs.
Newly empowered global citizens are the future, and leaders need to take notice. The universal values of good governance, transparency, human rights and freedoms will soon be the code of conduct for any government that wants to stay in power.
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
Friday, February 4, 2011
Kurdistan's Government & Opposition: an endless cycle
From the start of our new government, new parliament, new presidency and new opposition; the people of Kurdistan have mostly been preoccupied with crisis after crisis between the two.
Most of the time, the crisis gets big when the opposition attacks or seems to attack a “fundamental value” of the people and history of Kurdistan and hence prompting a strong reaction from the government and the ruling parties.
Usually, the reaction comes after a longer campaign from the opposition against the government over things that they can’t defend such as bad public services, corruption, nepotism and political reform.
With every time that a crisis appears, the action and reaction of both sides is disproportionately bigger, more personal and emotional than it should be. As a result, decisions taken are often far from being realistic or based on sound political judgment or practical reasoning.
On of the key reasons for this unhealthy relationship between government and opposition is the disconnect between the ruling parties and the opposition ones as a result of the geographical separation of the constituencies of the ruling and opposition parties.
The geographical distance between government and opposition leaders is an important factor in not creating a better atmosphere between them.
Very rarely in a democracy or an emerging democracy the leaders of the opposition and the ruling parties or the government do not meet when it comes to discussing national security issues, like dissolving the parliament or the government.
The other factor in this is that the geographical distribution of power base of the opposition and the ruling parties is not representative of the political reality of Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
The KDP, the senior partner in the ruling alliance, holds the majority in two governorates, and the opposition group Goran enjoys the majority in the third one.
The PUK, who came second in Sulaymaniya and in Arbil in the elections, is holding the government.
This peculiar setup has driven a wedge between the political parties and their supporters.
It is creating the setup of a strong government in two governorates and a vocal opposition in the third.
Walking through the streets of Sulaymaniyah, one would not think that the KDP is controlling Iraqi Kurdistan. By the same token, very little in Arbil or Dohuk suggest the presence of any Goran opposition.
A situation like this usually creates a much stronger rhetoric when it comes to a conflict and distances the various parties further from each other. This is clearly reflected in every crisis that pops up.
The other important reason is that good government breeds good opposition and vice-versa.
There are a number of important portfolios that the government (the presidency and the council of ministers) has so far failed to tackle.
Fighting corruption and nepotism, political reform and providing public services are all issues that are still waiting to be seriously tackled. So far, they are still talked about and nothing practical is being done about them.
It is only natural from an opposition group to attack the government and its leaders on these issues. Only when real measures are taken to address these portfolios, the government would be able to respond to Goran’s attacks in a more measured way.
Gorran in turn would be able, or forced, to have a more specific and constructive criticism and argument.
This would also pave the way for a more reasonable geographic distribution of government and opposition and real, calm and constructive dialogue and debate between the two.
Most of the time, the crisis gets big when the opposition attacks or seems to attack a “fundamental value” of the people and history of Kurdistan and hence prompting a strong reaction from the government and the ruling parties.
Usually, the reaction comes after a longer campaign from the opposition against the government over things that they can’t defend such as bad public services, corruption, nepotism and political reform.
With every time that a crisis appears, the action and reaction of both sides is disproportionately bigger, more personal and emotional than it should be. As a result, decisions taken are often far from being realistic or based on sound political judgment or practical reasoning.
On of the key reasons for this unhealthy relationship between government and opposition is the disconnect between the ruling parties and the opposition ones as a result of the geographical separation of the constituencies of the ruling and opposition parties.
The geographical distance between government and opposition leaders is an important factor in not creating a better atmosphere between them.
Very rarely in a democracy or an emerging democracy the leaders of the opposition and the ruling parties or the government do not meet when it comes to discussing national security issues, like dissolving the parliament or the government.
The other factor in this is that the geographical distribution of power base of the opposition and the ruling parties is not representative of the political reality of Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
The KDP, the senior partner in the ruling alliance, holds the majority in two governorates, and the opposition group Goran enjoys the majority in the third one.
The PUK, who came second in Sulaymaniya and in Arbil in the elections, is holding the government.
This peculiar setup has driven a wedge between the political parties and their supporters.
It is creating the setup of a strong government in two governorates and a vocal opposition in the third.
Walking through the streets of Sulaymaniyah, one would not think that the KDP is controlling Iraqi Kurdistan. By the same token, very little in Arbil or Dohuk suggest the presence of any Goran opposition.
A situation like this usually creates a much stronger rhetoric when it comes to a conflict and distances the various parties further from each other. This is clearly reflected in every crisis that pops up.
The other important reason is that good government breeds good opposition and vice-versa.
There are a number of important portfolios that the government (the presidency and the council of ministers) has so far failed to tackle.
Fighting corruption and nepotism, political reform and providing public services are all issues that are still waiting to be seriously tackled. So far, they are still talked about and nothing practical is being done about them.
It is only natural from an opposition group to attack the government and its leaders on these issues. Only when real measures are taken to address these portfolios, the government would be able to respond to Goran’s attacks in a more measured way.
Gorran in turn would be able, or forced, to have a more specific and constructive criticism and argument.
This would also pave the way for a more reasonable geographic distribution of government and opposition and real, calm and constructive dialogue and debate between the two.
Monday, January 31, 2011
A Tale Of Two Cities
Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG] Prime Minister Barham Salih’s recent return from Baghdad and the KRG-Baghdad agreement over oil and the budget is yet another episode in the never-ending cycle of tense disagreements between Erbil and Baghdad.
Unfortunately, there is no end in sight for the ongoing disputes between the two cities. Every few months, we see an increase in tensions between Erbil and Baghdad, and an ensuing media war between ministers and other officials who eagerly exchange accusations.
These are usually followed by a meeting of the PMs and the standard statement along the lines of: “It was positive and all ongoing issues were resolved”. But in reality it is just a temporary agreement to settle an issue – one that lasts either a year (when the dispute involves the budget) or for the term of one of the governments – Baghdad or Erbil.
There are various reasons for this fluctuating relationship between the two cities, but these solutions are far from sustainable. What is required is a change in the mentality of both sides to understand the nature of their relationship, to accept the new reality of Iraq and work on true confidence-building measures between the two cities. Historically, Iraq has been defined by a strong Baghdad with a dictator, while Erbil has served as the center of an armed opposition movement.
This has changed; today, Baghdad does not have as much control, and has an elected government in which the Kurds are represented.
Erbil is the capital of a region that is trying to rebuild what Baghdad destroyed over an 80-year period. Both Baghdad and Erbil still don’t digest this reality.
Erbil still sends a “negotiating team” to a government that they are part of; and Baghdad still behaves as if it is giving Erbil a share that it would not otherwise “deserve”.
The two sides are still trying to figure out what federalism means in the new Iraq. The constitution provided guidelines, but day-to-day operations are proving that each has a different understanding.
Miscommunications and misunderstandings on fundamental issues are usually cleared up by two groups: the technocrats and the politicians.
So far, most of the communication between Baghdad and Erbil has been led by politicians, and the delegation that appears on TV newscasts is usually the entire team on both sides.
A government official in Erbil, who is not a politician, said that on “many occasions, our politicians try to solve deep and complex issues with high-level handshakes.” He said that the absence of technocrats on these talks causes serious misunderstandings: “Each side thinks that they have agreed to something different”.
The statements after every breakthrough meeting are nearly identical – they even include the same language — because the talks are always between a small circle of people.
This is creating a strong perception of a lack of transparency amongst the public.
The public in Iraq in general is not clear on exactly what the issues are; what (or who) is causing the tension; how were they solved; or what happened that caused the breakthrough.
As a result, the public sentiment is one of resentment or even rejection of “the other”.
The distance between ordinary Kurds and Arabs should have been a lot closer than what it is today.
The reality is that dialogue between these two cities is quite dysfunctional, to say the least. Relations between the Kurds and Arabs today are reduced to politicians, Arab tourists during holiday seasons and a small amount of business. None of these help the public understand the other side’s reality.
To create permanent solutions, our politicians need to step back a bit and allow for other non-political bridges to be built between the two cities. It’s time to get the technocrats of both sides to iron out the issues, and then bring together political leaders to place their signatures on clear, open and permanent agreements.
Unfortunately, there is no end in sight for the ongoing disputes between the two cities. Every few months, we see an increase in tensions between Erbil and Baghdad, and an ensuing media war between ministers and other officials who eagerly exchange accusations.
These are usually followed by a meeting of the PMs and the standard statement along the lines of: “It was positive and all ongoing issues were resolved”. But in reality it is just a temporary agreement to settle an issue – one that lasts either a year (when the dispute involves the budget) or for the term of one of the governments – Baghdad or Erbil.
There are various reasons for this fluctuating relationship between the two cities, but these solutions are far from sustainable. What is required is a change in the mentality of both sides to understand the nature of their relationship, to accept the new reality of Iraq and work on true confidence-building measures between the two cities. Historically, Iraq has been defined by a strong Baghdad with a dictator, while Erbil has served as the center of an armed opposition movement.
This has changed; today, Baghdad does not have as much control, and has an elected government in which the Kurds are represented.
Erbil is the capital of a region that is trying to rebuild what Baghdad destroyed over an 80-year period. Both Baghdad and Erbil still don’t digest this reality.
Erbil still sends a “negotiating team” to a government that they are part of; and Baghdad still behaves as if it is giving Erbil a share that it would not otherwise “deserve”.
The two sides are still trying to figure out what federalism means in the new Iraq. The constitution provided guidelines, but day-to-day operations are proving that each has a different understanding.
Miscommunications and misunderstandings on fundamental issues are usually cleared up by two groups: the technocrats and the politicians.
So far, most of the communication between Baghdad and Erbil has been led by politicians, and the delegation that appears on TV newscasts is usually the entire team on both sides.
A government official in Erbil, who is not a politician, said that on “many occasions, our politicians try to solve deep and complex issues with high-level handshakes.” He said that the absence of technocrats on these talks causes serious misunderstandings: “Each side thinks that they have agreed to something different”.
The statements after every breakthrough meeting are nearly identical – they even include the same language — because the talks are always between a small circle of people.
This is creating a strong perception of a lack of transparency amongst the public.
The public in Iraq in general is not clear on exactly what the issues are; what (or who) is causing the tension; how were they solved; or what happened that caused the breakthrough.
As a result, the public sentiment is one of resentment or even rejection of “the other”.
The distance between ordinary Kurds and Arabs should have been a lot closer than what it is today.
The reality is that dialogue between these two cities is quite dysfunctional, to say the least. Relations between the Kurds and Arabs today are reduced to politicians, Arab tourists during holiday seasons and a small amount of business. None of these help the public understand the other side’s reality.
To create permanent solutions, our politicians need to step back a bit and allow for other non-political bridges to be built between the two cities. It’s time to get the technocrats of both sides to iron out the issues, and then bring together political leaders to place their signatures on clear, open and permanent agreements.
Monday, January 24, 2011
Kirkuk: the case for plan B
The way things stand now, one can predict that in the next 50 years Kirkuk will still be one of the sticking points between Baghdad and Erbil.
Today, the rhetoric is that Kirkuk is the heart of Kurdistan — the Quds of Kurdistan. In reality, it is the sick child of Iraq. The whole family is trying to prescribe its own medicine to cure this child, yet no one seems to be succeeding.
Looking at the various positions on Kirkuk, the Kurdish stance seems the most consistent and fixed. The views of the other communities have ranged from denying Kirkuk’s Kurdistani identity to a systematic policy of Arabization and ethnic cleansing.
The Kurdish leadership constantly reminds the world, the Kurdish people and its own officials that Kirkuk has always been the make-or-break issue for Kurdish negotiations, relations and wars with Baghdad.Kirkuk’s status has always been the ultimatum. It has, on many occasions in Kurdish history, destroyed movements or caused major setbacks.
The key reason for this is that the Kurdish popular stance on Kirkuk — including its identity, its people and future — has always been strong and non-negotiable. This was necessary during the days of the revolution, when Kurds were harnessed by Saddam’s regime and international isolation. Today, all three are gone.
Looking at the position today, the leadership, political parties and the public are accepting nothing short of the implementation of article 140. Before that, it was nothing short of article 58 of the transitional administrative law.
Regardless of the historical facts and Kirkuk’s more recent history, there are new facts on the ground today that were placed by the former regime and preserved by the new Iraq. These new realities cannot be removed quickly, to say the least.
Strength is helpful when negotiating issues. But if you look around and see that yours is the least popular and practical position — regardless of whether you are right or not, whether you are strong or not, and whether you have the constitution on your side — you should rethink your stance.
Looking at the non-Kurdish position on Kirkuk, one can see that almost all of the players stand on one side while the Kurds are on the other.
The neighbors and other regional players seem to be actively working to prevent any KRG control over Kirkuk.
Neither the UN nor the US nor any other member of the international community practically support the implementation of 140 or support making Kirkuk as part of the Kurdistan Region. Many of their recommendation publicly and privately confirm this. If fact, some even put the blame on the Kurds for not being able to have Kirkuk.
“The Kurds had the opportunity to reverse this quickly in 2003, but they were too busy with their internal KDP-PUK competition and with looting,” according to one of the US army commanders in Kirkuk at the time.
All of this is happening while the Kurdish leadership is at logger horns with Baghdad over this issue and others. The reality is that implementing 140 is not going to be easy — if not impossible.
With every day that passes, resolving Kirkuk according to the Kurds’ demands gets more difficult. The reason is simple: with every day that passes, more is at stake in the Kurdistan region.
As a revolutionary movement, as an isolated group or in defiance of Saddam’s regime, it was possible to say, “Kirkuk or nothing”. The people would have supported such statement. Today, it is almost impossible to give this ultimatum — it simply isn’t practical. But this is not reflected in our rhetoric. Our mantra is still: all-or-nothing.
But our leaders today are responsible for changing that mentality.
When plan A is not working, then it would be appropriate to look for plan B; to identify it, adopt it and promote it among the people.
Otherwise, when the public is faced with the tough reality that it is impossible to win Kirkuk as had been promised, it will be the leaders who will be pummeled with accusations and blame for failing to deliver on their promises.
A controversial and problematic point in emerging democracies is the “historic legitimacy” of leaders. But it can be particularly helpful in situations such as Kirkuk.
In Palestine for example, Mahmoud Abbas today cannot get away with Yasser Arafat-type statements and actions. Similarly, today’s leaders in Kurdistan cannot get away with what Mullah Mustafa Barzani could say or do. And future leaders will not be able to get away with what Mam Jalal and Kak Masoud can do or say today about Kirkuk.
The sooner the Kirkuk issue has a plan B, the easier it will be to resolve its status once and for all – a feat that will prevent Kirkuk from becoming a source of instability for Kurdistan, Iraq and the Middle East.
Today, the rhetoric is that Kirkuk is the heart of Kurdistan — the Quds of Kurdistan. In reality, it is the sick child of Iraq. The whole family is trying to prescribe its own medicine to cure this child, yet no one seems to be succeeding.
Looking at the various positions on Kirkuk, the Kurdish stance seems the most consistent and fixed. The views of the other communities have ranged from denying Kirkuk’s Kurdistani identity to a systematic policy of Arabization and ethnic cleansing.
The Kurdish leadership constantly reminds the world, the Kurdish people and its own officials that Kirkuk has always been the make-or-break issue for Kurdish negotiations, relations and wars with Baghdad.Kirkuk’s status has always been the ultimatum. It has, on many occasions in Kurdish history, destroyed movements or caused major setbacks.
The key reason for this is that the Kurdish popular stance on Kirkuk — including its identity, its people and future — has always been strong and non-negotiable. This was necessary during the days of the revolution, when Kurds were harnessed by Saddam’s regime and international isolation. Today, all three are gone.
Looking at the position today, the leadership, political parties and the public are accepting nothing short of the implementation of article 140. Before that, it was nothing short of article 58 of the transitional administrative law.
Regardless of the historical facts and Kirkuk’s more recent history, there are new facts on the ground today that were placed by the former regime and preserved by the new Iraq. These new realities cannot be removed quickly, to say the least.
Strength is helpful when negotiating issues. But if you look around and see that yours is the least popular and practical position — regardless of whether you are right or not, whether you are strong or not, and whether you have the constitution on your side — you should rethink your stance.
Looking at the non-Kurdish position on Kirkuk, one can see that almost all of the players stand on one side while the Kurds are on the other.
The neighbors and other regional players seem to be actively working to prevent any KRG control over Kirkuk.
Neither the UN nor the US nor any other member of the international community practically support the implementation of 140 or support making Kirkuk as part of the Kurdistan Region. Many of their recommendation publicly and privately confirm this. If fact, some even put the blame on the Kurds for not being able to have Kirkuk.
“The Kurds had the opportunity to reverse this quickly in 2003, but they were too busy with their internal KDP-PUK competition and with looting,” according to one of the US army commanders in Kirkuk at the time.
All of this is happening while the Kurdish leadership is at logger horns with Baghdad over this issue and others. The reality is that implementing 140 is not going to be easy — if not impossible.
With every day that passes, resolving Kirkuk according to the Kurds’ demands gets more difficult. The reason is simple: with every day that passes, more is at stake in the Kurdistan region.
As a revolutionary movement, as an isolated group or in defiance of Saddam’s regime, it was possible to say, “Kirkuk or nothing”. The people would have supported such statement. Today, it is almost impossible to give this ultimatum — it simply isn’t practical. But this is not reflected in our rhetoric. Our mantra is still: all-or-nothing.
But our leaders today are responsible for changing that mentality.
When plan A is not working, then it would be appropriate to look for plan B; to identify it, adopt it and promote it among the people.
Otherwise, when the public is faced with the tough reality that it is impossible to win Kirkuk as had been promised, it will be the leaders who will be pummeled with accusations and blame for failing to deliver on their promises.
A controversial and problematic point in emerging democracies is the “historic legitimacy” of leaders. But it can be particularly helpful in situations such as Kirkuk.
In Palestine for example, Mahmoud Abbas today cannot get away with Yasser Arafat-type statements and actions. Similarly, today’s leaders in Kurdistan cannot get away with what Mullah Mustafa Barzani could say or do. And future leaders will not be able to get away with what Mam Jalal and Kak Masoud can do or say today about Kirkuk.
The sooner the Kirkuk issue has a plan B, the easier it will be to resolve its status once and for all – a feat that will prevent Kirkuk from becoming a source of instability for Kurdistan, Iraq and the Middle East.
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Iraq's Najaf: An Iranian shrine or a Middle Eastern Vatican
Walking through the streets of Najaf, the city appears to be just another place in Iraq that requires extensive development and services. But the truth is that this holy city is capable of tipping the political balance in Iraq.
Not many people in the Sunni world appreciate the importance of Najaf. Since 2003 it has been an influential centre of politics in the new Iraq. In many ways, it has served as the country’s premier political resort, with leaders from nearly every Iraqi community visiting the Ayatollahs to win their blessing.
Post-2003, Iraqi political leaders turned it into a powerful locale for politicking: Whenever there was a problem, officials, especially Shia, ran to Najaf to convince the Grand Ayatollahs to be on their side or at least create the impression that the Marjiiyyah – a body that was usually careful not to publicly back one party or leader — was one their side.
As a result, in the eyes of some observers inside Iraq and most outside of the country, Najaf’s religious leadership was made to be part of Iraq’s tumultuous conflicts on many occasions. An important factor that contributed to this was the silence of the Marjiiyyah on non-Iraqi issues, including Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election and the situation in Lebanon.
The presence of the Grand Ayatollahs, the leaders of the Shia faith, makes Najaf not just a holy center for Iraq but for the entirety of the Shia world. Many still remember the role the city played in toppling the regime of the Shah of Iran by hosting the leader of the Islamic revolution. Despite this, there is no question that had it been embraced by the Arab states, Najaf could have had a much more influential role in Middle East politics.
Many call Najaf the “Vatican of the Shia” — and it could become the Vatican of the Middle East rather than a local center for Iraqi politics. The holy city could have this influence if the Arab world approached it differently.
While many Arab countries complain about Iran’s influence in Iraq, they have not been effective in countering it. Rather than considering the Shia of Iraq as part of Iran; turning a blind eye on Al-Qaeda’s attacks on Iraq’s Shia people and shrines; and also allowing outrageous public insults and attacks on the Shia faith and its symbols; the Arab world could have approached Najaf as the centre of gravity for the Shia faith — which is essentially an Arabist faith.
As a consequence of the Sunni Arab neglect of Najaf and the Shia of Iraq, Iran became the de-facto leader of the Shia faith. This naturally turned Najaf into a religious capital,www.ekurd.netor even a shrine, and made Qum the political capital of the Shia world. Many observers and some insiders have confirmed that the last round of negotiations to form the government was held secretly with Muqtada al-Sadr in Qum.
Today, an opportunity presents itself to turn the corner by giving Najaf a different role than the one it had in the past.
But for this to happen, Iraq’s political leaders should stop going to Najaf for arbitration or support, and the Marjiiyyah should take a tougher stance against those who want to drag it into their petty politics. Rather than consider political requests, they can simply close the door.
With the Arab summit approaching and the changed attitude some Arab countries have showed towards Iraq, they too have an opportunity bring the Shia of Iraq into the Arab fold. But this will not happen through statements or a fly-by visit of someone like Arab League secretary-general Amr Mousa — who visited Grand Ayatollah Sistani last week — alone. The Sunni Arab world could declare it’s genuine support for the new Iraq and offer their genuine help to make things work.
For example, the weak infrastructure, the dilapidated buildings and poor services put Najaf in dire need of assistance. Providing this aid could be one way to create a city with remarkable potential, a proud and developed holy place representing the best of both Iraq and Shia Islam. Whoever has the foresight to takes the first step could do much more than build a better metropolis, however – they would be seizing the opportunity to win the hearts, power and minds of one of the world’s most revered holy cities.
Not many people in the Sunni world appreciate the importance of Najaf. Since 2003 it has been an influential centre of politics in the new Iraq. In many ways, it has served as the country’s premier political resort, with leaders from nearly every Iraqi community visiting the Ayatollahs to win their blessing.
Post-2003, Iraqi political leaders turned it into a powerful locale for politicking: Whenever there was a problem, officials, especially Shia, ran to Najaf to convince the Grand Ayatollahs to be on their side or at least create the impression that the Marjiiyyah – a body that was usually careful not to publicly back one party or leader — was one their side.
As a result, in the eyes of some observers inside Iraq and most outside of the country, Najaf’s religious leadership was made to be part of Iraq’s tumultuous conflicts on many occasions. An important factor that contributed to this was the silence of the Marjiiyyah on non-Iraqi issues, including Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election and the situation in Lebanon.
The presence of the Grand Ayatollahs, the leaders of the Shia faith, makes Najaf not just a holy center for Iraq but for the entirety of the Shia world. Many still remember the role the city played in toppling the regime of the Shah of Iran by hosting the leader of the Islamic revolution. Despite this, there is no question that had it been embraced by the Arab states, Najaf could have had a much more influential role in Middle East politics.
Many call Najaf the “Vatican of the Shia” — and it could become the Vatican of the Middle East rather than a local center for Iraqi politics. The holy city could have this influence if the Arab world approached it differently.
While many Arab countries complain about Iran’s influence in Iraq, they have not been effective in countering it. Rather than considering the Shia of Iraq as part of Iran; turning a blind eye on Al-Qaeda’s attacks on Iraq’s Shia people and shrines; and also allowing outrageous public insults and attacks on the Shia faith and its symbols; the Arab world could have approached Najaf as the centre of gravity for the Shia faith — which is essentially an Arabist faith.
As a consequence of the Sunni Arab neglect of Najaf and the Shia of Iraq, Iran became the de-facto leader of the Shia faith. This naturally turned Najaf into a religious capital,www.ekurd.netor even a shrine, and made Qum the political capital of the Shia world. Many observers and some insiders have confirmed that the last round of negotiations to form the government was held secretly with Muqtada al-Sadr in Qum.
Today, an opportunity presents itself to turn the corner by giving Najaf a different role than the one it had in the past.
But for this to happen, Iraq’s political leaders should stop going to Najaf for arbitration or support, and the Marjiiyyah should take a tougher stance against those who want to drag it into their petty politics. Rather than consider political requests, they can simply close the door.
With the Arab summit approaching and the changed attitude some Arab countries have showed towards Iraq, they too have an opportunity bring the Shia of Iraq into the Arab fold. But this will not happen through statements or a fly-by visit of someone like Arab League secretary-general Amr Mousa — who visited Grand Ayatollah Sistani last week — alone. The Sunni Arab world could declare it’s genuine support for the new Iraq and offer their genuine help to make things work.
For example, the weak infrastructure, the dilapidated buildings and poor services put Najaf in dire need of assistance. Providing this aid could be one way to create a city with remarkable potential, a proud and developed holy place representing the best of both Iraq and Shia Islam. Whoever has the foresight to takes the first step could do much more than build a better metropolis, however – they would be seizing the opportunity to win the hearts, power and minds of one of the world’s most revered holy cities.
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